
# SCUOLA DI SCIENZE UMANISTICHE LETTORATO DI INGLESE

# SELECTED TEXTS FOR ADVANCED STUDENTS: 2<sup>nd</sup> YEAR ASIAN & AFRICAN STUDIES and 2<sup>nd</sup> LEVEL PHILOSOPHY

2016/17



# **Course material:**

# **Required:**

"Selected Texts for Advanced Students: Asian & African Studies and Philosophy 2016-17" (available at Torino Copy, via Roero di Cortanze) Dummett, Hughes & Stephenson, *Life*: Advanced student book ISBN: 9781133315735 (available at Libreria Stampatori, via S. Ottavio)

Recommended: Dummett, Hughes & Stephenson, Life: Advanced

workbook ISBN: 9781133315766

# **Course topics:**

Philosophers of the English-speaking World (16<sup>th</sup>-20<sup>th</sup> century) Colonialism, Immigration, Slavery and Globalization

# Language topics:

Tense review (past, present, future)

**Modal verbs** 

Passive, hearsay reporting

Reported speech, reporting verbs

**Conditionals** 

Phrasal verbs

**Infinitives vs. -ing forms** 

**Inversion** 

**Relative pronouns** 

**Comparatives** 

**Prepositions** 

**Articles** 

Nouns and quantifiers

Link words (adverbs, conjunctions)

#### The lettorato exam:

This C1-level lettorato exam has two different codes: *Lettorato Seconda Annualità* for Asian and African Studies students who have already completed *Lingua Inglese Prima annualità*, and *Lingua Straniera Inglese*: 2° *Livello LET0470* for Philosophy students who have already completed *Lingua Straniera Inglese LET0420*. The exam is the same for both degree courses, but the final result is different; whereas the final result for *LET0470* is either *superata* or *non superata*, students of Asian and African Studies will be given a mark out of 30, which will be averaged with that of Prof. Martelli's or Prof. Adami's exam. *LET0470* will be registered automatically on the student's electronic *libretto*. Instead, Asian and African Studies students will have to consult Prof. Martelli or Prof. Adami regarding the procedure for registering their final mark on their *libretto*.

The exam lasts approximately three hours and is divided into two sections (30 points each).

The first part of the exam (**Summary**) involves listening to a professor or scholar speak on a specific topic. It can be in the form of a lecture, an interview or a reading, and it lasts approximately 6-7 minutes. You will hear the spoken text twice, during which you should take notes. Next, you will have 1 hour and 15 minutes to write a summary (approximately 180-250 words) of what you have heard. During this part of the exam, you will be able to use a **monolingual** dictionary. One half of the mark will be based on content (the main points of the spoken text) and the other on language (accuracy, cohesion, range of language, appropriate paragraphing).

The second part of the exam (**Reading Comprehension**) consists of an open cloze on a specific topic. An open cloze is a text containing blank spaces, and you must fill in each blank space with **one** appropriate word. There are also exercises testing comprehension (true/false and short answer), logical order and vocabulary. You will have 1 hour to complete this part of the exam, and dictionaries are **not** allowed.

The **TEST PRACTICE** exercises contained in this handout pack are either taken from previous exams or are very similar to the types of exercises you will find at the exam. For this reason, it is essential that you complete all of the exercises in the handout pack before sitting the exam.

The content of both parts of the exam will be based on the topics listed on page 2; for this reason, it is very important that you try to familiarize yourself as much as you can on all of these subjects.

A good way to prepare for the listening comprehension part of the exam is to listen to university lectures on the course topics mentioned on p. 2. The Internet is a very good resource (eg. youtube, TED, Open University) and contains many suitable lectures.

# **Note-taking**

# Effective note-taking require that you:

- •recognise the main ideas
- •identify what information is relevant to your task

do NOT try to write down every word. The average lecturer speaks approximately 125-140 words/minute, and the average note-taker writes at about 25 words/min

- have a system of note-taking that works for you
- reduce the information to note and diagram format
- where possible, put the information in your own words
- organize notes into some sort of logical form
- record the source of the information
- don't be concerned with spelling and grammar at this stage

## Forms of note-taking

- Outlining I. Topic sentence or main idea A. Major points providing information about topic 1. Subpoint that describes the major point a. Supporting detail for the subpoint
- Patterning: flowcharts, diagrams
- Listing

# Using symbols and abbreviations:

•Develop a system of symbols and abbreviations; some personal, some standard

#### SYMBOLS:

= equals/is equal to/is the same as

≠ is not equal to/is not the same as

≡ is equivalent to

 $\approx$  approximately

Δ change

∴ therefore, thus, so

+, & and, more, plus

+ positive

- negative

> more than, greater than

< less than

- less, minus

→ gives, causes, leads to, results in, is given by, is produced by, results from

#### **COMMON ABBREVIATIONS:**

c.f. (confer) = compare

i.e. (id est) = that is

e.g (exempli gratia) = for example

NB (nota bene) = note well

no. (numero) = number

etc. (et cetera)= and so on

x = times

w/ = with

w/o = without

w/in = within

wrt = with respect to

re: = regarding

c. = circa

b. = born

d. = died

## **PERSONAL ABBREVIATIONS:**

diff =different

gov(t) = government

nec = necessary

...tn = tion (imaginatn  $\rightarrow$  imagination)

... $mt = ment (paymt \rightarrow payment)$ 

approp = appropriate (drop last letters)

lge = large (drop internal vowels)

esp = especially

usu = usually

# Writing a summary

The summary section of the exam is meant to test both your listening and writing skills. For this reason, it is important to be as detailed as possible in your summary, but without exceeding the 180-250 word limit. You will therefore need to sift between vital information/examples and points that are completely irrelevant to the main topic of the discourse (eg. bureaucratic matters mentioned at the beginning of a lecture or various forms of side-tracking).

Your summary always requires the following:

## 1. Appropriate layout:

There are two ways to format your summary. You can choose to use either **indented paragraphs** or **block paragraphs**. The first sentence of an indented paragraph does not start at the left margin; instead, it begins approximately 5 spaces in. Block paragraphs are, as the name suggests, 'blocks' of text with no indentation, and each paragraph is separated by a blank line. You will lose points if you do not use one of these methods or if you only write one long paragraph.

# 2. Structure/Content:

Your summary should **always** begin with an introductory sentence that mentions the source and the general topic of the lecture. Unlike other types of composition writing, a summary does not require a title or a conclusion. Moreover, as you are reporting what you have heard, it is important to use a wide variety of **reporting verbs** throughout your summary. It is unacceptable to provide personal opinions or to include information not mentioned by the speaker. Your writing will also sound better if you use **link words** to connect your ideas and sentences. Lastly, you will lose points if you do not use your own words.

Below is a detailed summary of an introductory lesson. Please watch the video and then read the summary.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?

v=hdCBGWcd4gw&feature=edu&list=PL2FEB728FF960FBD9

In this lecture, Prof. Millican introduces students to his General Philosophy course. The course is focused on eight specific topics – scepticism, knowledge, perception, primary and secondary qualities, induction, free will, mind and body and personal identity – which are linked to epistemology (the theory of knowledge) and metaphysics (the nature of things).

Millican stresses the importance of getting an historical perspective on philosophy, stating that most of the topics will be accompanied by a reading from the 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup> century, the early modern period. He promotes such an approach by saying that during this period in history, in which a scientific view of the world was replacing a religious one, some problems became evident and many of them are still important today. Moreover, many of the terms used in current debates have historical origins, e.g. Cartesian dualism. Therefore, since current discussions still employ the language of the past, it is important to be familiar with these terms and arguments. Nor will it be a waste

of time for students, for they will be studying the greatest thinkers of the past and seeing how topics are interconnected. Furthermore, modern debates often reflect the discussions of this period, and by having a good understanding of such debates of the past one can also bring forward points that may be overlooked in contemporary debates.

Millican concludes by stating that he will dedicate the first two lectures to providing a general historical perspective concerning the above-mentioned topics, after which he intends to move on to discuss each topic in detail.

## **Layout and Organization:**

- 1. Which type of paragraph formatting is used in the summary?
- 2. How is the summary organized? In what ways is it similar to/different from a composition?
- 3. Is all of the information presented in the same order as it is in the lecture?
- 4. Could the first sentence of this summary be eliminated?

# Paraphrase, link words and reporting verbs:

- 1. As you listen to the lecture, underline some examples of paraphrase in the summary.
- 2. Circle the link words and underline the reporting verbs in the summary. (see p. 7 for help)

# **Link Words and Reporting Verbs**

Adding information in contrast,

and in spite of / in spite of the fact that

in addition, instead, in addition to instead of as well as likewise,

also nevertheless,/ nonetheless,

too/ as well on the contrary, furthermore,/ moreover,/ what is more, rather, rather than

apart from similarly, above all, unlike

Summarising while/ whereas

in short, Giving examples and clarification according to

in brief, according to in summary, for example, / for instance, / e.g.

to summarise,
namely,
to conclude,
such as / like
in conclusion,
that is (to say) / i.e.

Sequencing ideas
first of all,
firstly, secondly, finally

that is (to say) / i.e.

Expressing degree
to a certain extent
in some ways

the first point is **Common reporting verbs** 

next, /then, add
afterward(s), / after that, agree
lastly, announce
the following argue
the former, ... the latter comment

**Giving a reason** conclude by + -ing due to / due to the fact that conclude with

owing to / owing to the fact that deny because discuss sth (no preposition!)

because of doubt since/ as explain Giving a result go on + inf.

therefore,/ thus, insist so introduce consequently, justify

this means that mention as a result, observe hence propose

Contrasting/comparing ideas recommend

but remark
(and) yet start (out) / begin by + -ing

however, start/begin with

although / even though/ though state
despite / despite the fact that suggest

# **Guided Note-taking: Colonialism**

Prof Singh speaks to students about Colonialism in India and complete the notes.
Part 1: European colonialism pre 20 <sup>th</sup> c.
- 17th, 18th, 19th c. E. consolidated sea 1 into Asia, in part. India
India: imp place for ships to 2
- By mid 19th c, Brit East India Company fought major political campaigns.
Lgst= 1857 "" (India) aka "Sepoy Mutiny" (UK, US)
soldiers paid by BEIC rebelled
- Brit gov't took control of India from the BEIC : British Raj.
Ran country from Eng. for 90 years.
Reasons for Brit control over India (3 mill. pop):
1. econ & industrial superiority from industrial rev.
2. (most imp)
- B set smaller states against one another, made treaties with larger states.
3. used mid class Indians to become ambassadors for Brit rule in India.
- These Inds. wanted: Supported Brit rule.
Role of Ind w/in Brit Empire
- aka "Jewel in the Crown": provides
1. (most imp):
2. human labor force.
a. mid 19 <sup>th</sup> c (slavery abolished): Indian indentured wkers in the Caribb,
Africa, and SE Asia
b. military recruitment:
Brit campaign in Mesopotamia / Iraq done by Ind soldiers.
3. economic resources
markets for Brit industrial goods
Britain = premier econ power
Part 2: Effect of WW1/2 on Brit Emp.
- Empire after WW1
- Inds saw no hope for independence; criticism from Ind politicians: Ind 'bled dry' to
finance WW1
in Ind during WW2: food sent to Eng.
- neg econ impact on Ind.
- Indian soldiers now had some mil exper/confidence
- wanted same benefits as Brit soldiers: NO
=> unrest spurs independence movemt
by Royal Ind Navy/Air Force at end of WW2
=> Brit understands can't keep India militarily.
- After WW2 Britain abandoned empire quickly
How did that come about?
1. Brit can't hold on to chunks of its empire: what to keep/let go: no-one wanted
to let Ind go (so imp economically)
2. huge campaign for independence inside of India
3. changing global politics


Guided Note-taking: John Locke
Listen to the following interview with Prof Miller on John Locke and complete the notes.

General topic: and 1. Introductory facts re: Locke (at least 2 specific details) a.	
b.	
c. hotly debated question: was Locke?	
2. Locke's financial situation (at least 2 specific details)	
a.	
b.	
3. Opposing views: (at least 2 specific details for each) a. Bernasconi /Mann/Davis Evidence:	
b. Miller Evidence:	
4. Extra details (at least 2)	
a.	
b.	

# **Guided Note-taking: Atlantic Slave Trade**

1. Dev	elopment of slave trade - nations involved:	
	- time period:	
	- type of labour:	
	- other details:	
2. Braz	zil: - time period:	
	- enslaved populations:	
	- types of labour:	
	- other details:	
		AND

# **READINGS ON ENGLISH-SPEAKING PHILOSOPHERS**



#### GETTING STARTED: GUIDED CLOZE AND READING COMPREHENSION

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**URE** 



Bertrand Arthur William Russell (b.1872 – d.1970) was a British philosopher, logician, essayist and social critic best known for his work in mathematical logic and analytic philosophy. Over the course of his long career, Russell made significant contributions, not just to logic and philosophy, but to a broad range of subjects including education, history, political theory and religious studies. After a life marked by controversy—including dismissals from both Trinity College, Cambridge, and City College, New York—Russell was awarded the Order of Merit in 1949 and the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Noted for his many spirited anti-war and anti-nuclear protests, Russell remained a prominent public figure until his death at the age of 97. [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]

#### THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY (Bertrand Russell)

A. Read the following text and fill in each blank with one appropriate word.

At the exam, you will not be given any choices. Remember to write only one word in each space. See underlined clues in the text to help you make your selection.

- HAVING now come to the end of our brief and very incomplete review of the problems of philosophy, it will be well to consider, in conclusion, what is the value of philosophy and why it (1)\_\_\_\_\_\_ (can, need, ought, should) to be studied. It is all the more necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.
- This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of goods which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science, through the medium of inventions, is useful to innumerable people who are wholly ignorant of it; thus, the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. Thus, utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those (2) (they, who, which, whom) study it. It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of philosophy must be primarily sought.
- But further, if we are not to fail in our endeavour to determine the value of philosophy, we must first free our mind from the prejudices of what are wrongly called 'practical' men. The 'practical' man, (3) (as, how, like, what) this word is often used, is one who recognizes only material needs, who realizes that men must have food for the body, but is oblivious of the necessity of providing food for the soul. If all men (4) (are, had, was, were) well off, if poverty and disease had been reduced to their lowest possible point, there would still remain much to be done to produce a valuable society; and even in the existing world the goods of the mind are at least as important as the goods of the body. It is exclusively among the goods of the mind that the value of philosophy is to be found; and only those who are not indifferent to these goods can be persuaded that the study of philosophy is not a (5) (loss, lot,

use, waste) of time.

- Philosophy, like all other studies, aims primarily at knowledge. The knowledge it aims at is the kind of knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, and the kind which results from a critical examination of the grounds of our convictions, prejudices, and beliefs. But it cannot be maintained that philosophy has had any very great measure of success in its attempts to provide definite answers to its questions. If you ask a mathematician, a mineralogist, a historian, or (6)\_ \_ (all, any, many, no) other man of learning, what definite body of truths has been ascertained by his science, his answer will last as long as you are willing to listen. But if you put the same question to a philosopher, he will, if he is candid, have to confess that his study has not achieved positive results such as have been achieved by other sciences. It is true that this is partly accounted for by the fact that, as (7) (long, much, soon, well) as definite knowledge concerning any subject becomes possible, this subject ceases to be called philosophy, and becomes a separate science. The whole study of the heavens, which now belongs to astronomy, was once included in philosophy; Newton's great work was called 'the mathematical principles of natural philosophy'. Similarly, the study of the human mind, which was a part of philosophy, has now been separated from philosophy and has become the science of psychology. Thus, to a great extent, the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real: those questions which are already capable of definite answers are placed in the sciences, (8) (despite, however, nonetheless, while) those only to which, at present, no definite answer can be given, remain to form the residue which is called philosophy.
- This is, however, only a part of the truth concerning the uncertainty of philosophy. There are many questions -- and among them those that are of the profoundest interest to our spiritual life -- which, so far as we can see, must remain insoluble to the human intellect unless its powers become of quite a different order from what they are now. Has the universe any unity of plan or purpose, or is it a fortuitous concourse of atoms? Is consciousness a permanent part of the universe, giving hope of indefinite growth in wisdom, or is it a transitory accident on a small <u>planet on (9) \_\_\_\_\_\_ (that, where, which, whom)</u> life must ultimately become impossible? Are good and evil of importance to the universe or only to man? Such questions are asked by philosophy, and variously answered by various philosophers. But it would seem that, whether answers be otherwise discoverable or not, the answers suggested by philosophy are none of them demonstrably true. Yet, however slight may be the hope of discovering an answer, it is part of the business of philosophy to continue the consideration of such questions, to (10) \_\_\_\_\_\_ (be, do, let, make) <u>us aware</u> of their importance, to examine all the approaches to them, and to keep alive that speculative interest in the universe which is apt to be killed by confining ourselves to definitely ascertainable knowledge.

[...]

- Apart from its utility in showing unsuspected possibilities, philosophy has a value -- perhaps its chief value -- through the greatness of the objects which it contemplates, and the freedom from narrow and personal aims resulting from this contemplation. The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests: family and friends may be included, but the outer world is not regarded except as it may help or hinder what comes within the circle of instinctive wishes. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in comparison with which the philosophic life is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins. Unless we can so enlarge our interests as to include the whole outer world, we remain like a garrison in a beleaguered fortress, knowing that the enemy prevents escape and that ultimate surrender is inevitable. In such a life there is no peace, but a constant strife between the insistence of desire and the

powerlessness of will. <u>In one way or</u> (14) (anoth	er, other, others, otherwise), if our life is to be
great and free, we must escape this prison and this strife.	
Bertrand Russell, "The Value of Philosophy	y" in Problems of Philosophy
B. Decide whether the following statements are true or fal-	se. Explain why using <u>your own words</u> .
Make sure you write 'True' or 'False'. You must justify bot	th true and false statements. Do not copy more
than 3 consecutive words from the text.	
1 The 'practical' individual fails to see the benefits of	f the 'goods of the mind'.
2 Russell considers philosophy to be inferior to hist	ory and physical science because it seems to be
incapable of producing definite knowledge.	

3 This excerpt, taken from an exhaustive analysis of philosophical problems, most likely appears at the end of the work.
4 Regarding the disciplines of physical science and philosophy, many fail to see the utility of studying the former.
C. Briefly answer the following questions in the space provided.  Answer each question using your own words in 1-2 sentences.  1. What does Russell mean when he says that "the uncertainty of philosophy is more apparent than real" in para. 4?
2. In para. 1, Russell uses the adjective 'hair-splitting'. Is it used in a positive or negative way? What is its meaning?
3. To make his point in para. 6 and 7, Russell uses both metaphor and simile. Identify one example and explain the meaning.
<ul><li><b>D. Speaking</b></li><li>1. In your opinion, what is the value of studying your degree course?</li></ul>

#### 1. Match the philosophers to their dates and works.

Bacon, Francis	1285-1349	A Treatise of Human Nature
Bentham, Jeremy	1561-1626	Democracy and Education
Dewey, John	1588-1679	Utilitarianism
Hobbes, Thomas	1632-1704	Essay Concerning Human Understanding
Hume, David	1711-1776	The New Atlantis
Locke, John	1748-1832	Introduction to the Theories of Morals and Legislation
Mill, John Stuart	1806-1873	Leviathan
William of Ockham	1859-1952	Summa logicae
2 Match the following to the phil	ocophove in 1	

2. Match the following to the philosophers in 1.

Empiricism x 2PragmatismInductionAbsolutismScholasticismUtilitarianism x 2

#### 3. Match the quote to the philosophers in 1

"By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness."

His method is to proceed "regularly and gradually from one axiom to another, so that the most general are not reached till the last."

"I assume that amid all uncertainties there is one permanent frame of reference: namely, the organic connection between education and personal experience; or, that the new philosophy of education is committed to some kind of empirical and experimental philosophy."

"That a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth as for peace and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself."

"I had always entertained a notion, that my want of success in publishing the Treatise of Human Nature, had proceeded more from the manner than the matter, and that I had been guilty of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too early. I, therefore, cast the first part of that work anew in the Enquiry concerning Human Under-standing, which was published while I was at Turin."

"If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For bating, perhaps, some faint ideas of hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some pains which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them; especially of ideas answering the terms which make up those universal propositions that are esteemed innate principles."

"I deny that any one knows or can know, the nature of the two sexes, as long as they have only been seen in their present relation to one another. Until conditions of equality exist, no one can possibly assess the natural differences between women and men, distorted as they have been. What is natural to the two sexes can only be found out by allowing both to develop and use their faculties freely."

"It is useless to do with more what can be done with less."

#### 4. Match the images to the philosophers in 1.

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## EXTRA PRACTICE: Francis Bacon and the Scientific Method

Order the paragraphs in what you consider to be the most logical order (1-8). Some of the answers

- have been given. Try to identify links between each paragraph and underline them. A key figure for understanding the development of scientific method is Francis Bacon (1561-1626). He sought to promote a dynamic system of thought based on inductive and empirical systems, the purpose of which was to create and promote new inventions to the betterment of humanity. His radical vision was to see human destiny as progressive and improving, rather than static or cyclical. The alternative is to recognise that, whilst based on a body of empirical research, almost all a. 8 important scientific discoveries or advances have involved intuition and imagination. Scientists make intuitive guesses. Many, perhaps most, will prove to be wrong, but progress has come from the guesses that were right. Gathering evidence is not enough in itself; there needs to be a creative input from the scientist. He saw his new system as significantly different from the pointless deductions of the scholastics and an improvement on the Aristotelian model of induction. This latter system begins with individual observations and other experiences and then generalises upwards to high level theories and principles. Having arrived that 'the most general propositions', it is then possible to work back downwards by a process of deduction to various intermediary propositions. For example, by observing a few dogs it should be possible to conclude, by induction, that all dogs bark. This is the general proposition. Then, by a process of deduction, one could conclude that as a red setter is a dog, it too will bark. The problem with this, as Bacon rightly points out, is that if the general proposition is wrong, which it could easily be as it is based only a few observations, then the propositions deduced from it may well be false as well. c. 2 Before we look at Bacon's views on induction, it is worth noting what he saw as the main faults of the scholasticism of his time. He called these the 'distempers' (diseases) of learning and first identifies them in his 1605 work The Proficience and Advancement of Learning. The first distemper he called 'fantastical learning'. This is pseudo-science, as it has no empirical basis and consists mostly of wishful thinking. He would include magic, astrology and alchemy. The point is not that these ideas are wrong but that there is no reliable empirical evidence for them. The second distemper he called 'contentious learning', which he saw as debate for its own sake. Here there is no desire for new knowledge but only for the opportunity to score points off an opponent. This is what he would refer to as 'Aristotelianism', involving endless hairsplitting and pedantry. The third distemper was 'delicate learning', which is perhaps the hardest of the distempers for us to understand today. He means a preoccupation with prose style itself rather than with the meaning or content. d.\_\_\_\_\_ These distempers are essentially problems for scholars. Bacon also believed that all humans were prone to problems or difficulties of thinking that prevented them from seeing the world as it actually is. These are the famous 'idols', from the Greek term eidolon, which means 'image' or 'phantom'. In his book the New Organon (or, True Directions Concerning the Interpretation of Nature), he identifies four idols: the idols of the tribe (simple innate human failings), the idols of the cave (cultural failings), the idols of the marketplace (faulty language), and the idols of the theatre (religious, political or philosophical schemes of thought). Bacon's alternative is more labour-intensive but, he thought, more reliable. He advocated that we move 'regularly and gradually from one axiom to another, so that the most general are not reached till the last'. This means that we do not jump to conclusions on the basis of only a few observations or experiences. Instead we move gradually, step by step, examining each generalisation on what he called 'the ladder of intellect' in great detail, both by simple observation but also by experimentation. In the dog example, Bacon would require us to examine every breed of dog in all circumstances presumably experimenting on them by irritating them in some way, to see if they bark. Furthermore, because of the inadequacies of our senses (the idols of the tribe) we should use scientific instruments wherever we can. Each generalisation (or 'axiom') can then be relied upon and used as a stepping stone to the next level upwards. Even a falsification (a piece of evidence that goes against the expected generalisation) is useful because it stops the scientist from going down the wrong path and wasting time. However, there are significant questions to be asked of Bacon's method. When does one stop collecting facts and observations and say that one has achieved a satisfactory generalisation? When is one allowed to move from particular observations to an abstract proposition? How many observations need to be made, how many experiments need to be conducted? There seems to be no answer to these questions in Bacon's system. On can imagine scientists using the Baconian method spending their entire career in the collection of facts. William Harvey, who discovered the circulation of blood, suggested that Bacon's view of science was 'like a Lord Chancellor'. He meant that Bacon saw science as would a politician responsible for
- g.\_\_\_\_\_ Bacon considered the distempers and idols to be hindrances in the pursuit of real knowledge. We

the country's finances – always adding up the evidence and making calculations.

should either avoid them, or, if they cannot be avoided, we should at least be aware of them and take them into account in our thinking. However, even if we know to avoid the problems, this does not tell us what method we should actually adopt in the pursuit of knowledge. Bacon's answer is outlined in the *Magna Instauratio* and in the *New Organon*. It is his method of 'true and perfect induction'.

[Jackson et al., Understanding Philosophy for A2 Level]

#### **Short Answer:**

- 1. Explain briefly what Francis Bacon saw as 'distempers' and 'idols'.
- 2. Describe Bacon's interpretation of induction.
- 3. What criticism can be made of this?

## **TEST PRACTICE: Contract Theory and Thomas Hobbes** A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in paragraph 5 in the most logical order. The first sentence has already been given. (5 points) Social contract theory, nearly as old as philosophy itself, is the view that persons' moral and/or political obligations are dependent upon a contract or agreement among them to form the society in which they live. Socrates uses something quite 1 a social contract argument to explain to Crito why he must remain in prison and accept the death penalty. However, social contract theory is rightly associated with modern moral and political theory and is given its first full exposition and defense by Thomas Hobbes. After Hobbes, John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau are the best known proponents of this enormously influential theory, which has been one of the most dominant theories within moral and political theory throughout the history of the modern West. In the twentieth century, moral and political theory regained philosophical momentum as a result of John Rawls' Kantian version of social contract theory, and was followed by new analyses of the subject by David Gauthier and others. Thomas Hobbes, 1588-1679, lived during the most crucial period of early modern England's history: the English Civil War, waged from 1642 to 1648. To describe this conflict in the most general of terms, it was a clash between the King and his supporters, the Monarchists, who preferred the traditional authority of a monarch, and the Parliamentarians, most notably led by Oliver Cromwell, who demanded more power for the quasi-democratic institution of Parliament. Hobbes represents a compromise between these two factions. On the one hand, he rejects the theory of the Divine Right of Kings, which is most eloquently expressed by Robert Filmer in his Patriarcha or the Natural Power of Kings, (although it would be left to John Locke to refute Filmer directly). Filmer's view held that a king's authority was invested in him (or, presumably, her) by God, that such authority was absolute, and therefore that the basis of political obligation lay in our obligation to obey God absolutely. 2\_\_\_\_\_\_ to this view, then, political obligation is subsumed under religious obligation. On the other hand, Hobbes also rejects the early democratic view, taken up by the Parliamentarians, that power ought to be shared between Parliament and the King. In rejecting both these views. Hobbes occupies the ground of one who is both radical and conservative. He argues, radically for his times, that political authority and obligation are based on the individual self-interests of members of society who are understood to be equal to one 3\_\_\_\_\_\_, with no single individual invested with any essential authority to rule over the rest, while at the same time maintaining the conservative position that the monarch, which he called the Sovereign, must be ceded absolute authority if society is to survive. Hobbes' political theory is best understood if taken in two parts: his theory of human motivation and his theory of the social contract, founded on the hypothetical State of Nature. Hobbes has, first and foremost, a particular theory of human nature, which gives rise to a particular view of morality and politics, developed in his philosophical masterpiece, Leviathan, published in 1651. The Scientific Revolution, with its important new discoveries that the universe could be both described and predicted in accordance with universal laws of nature, greatly influenced Hobbes. He sought to provide a theory of human nature that would parallel the discoveries 5 made at the time in the sciences of the inanimate universe. His psychological theory is therefore informed by mechanism, the general view that everything in the universe is produced by nothing other than matter in motion. From Hobbes' point of view, we are essentially very complicated organic machines, responding to the stimuli of the world mechanistically and in accordance with universal laws of human nature. Hobbes also infers from his mechanistic theory of human nature that humans are necessarily and exclusively self-interested. All men pursue only 6\_\_\_\_\_\_ they perceive to be in their own individually considered best interests - they respond mechanistically by being drawn to that which they desire and repelled by that to which they are averse. This is a universal claim: it is meant to cover all human actions under all circumstances – in society or out of it, with regard to strangers and friends alike. Everything we do is motivated solely by the desire to better our own situations, and satisfy as 7 of our own, individually considered desires as possible. We are infinitely appetitive and only genuinely concerned with our own selves. In 8 \_ to being exclusively self-interested, Hobbes also argues that human beings

are reasonable. They have in them the rational capacity to pursue their desires as efficiently and maximally as possible. From these premises of human nature, Hobbes goes on to construct a provocative and compelling argument for why we should be willing to submit ourselves to political authority. He does this by imagining persons in a situation **prior to** (*circle the best synonym*: *previously/more important than/precedent/before*)

the establishment of society. According to Hobbes, the justification for political obligation is this: given that men are naturally self-interested, yet they are rational, they will choose to submit to the authority of a Sovereign in order to be able to live in a civil society, which is conducive to their own interests. \_ In the State of Nature, which is purely hypothetical according to Hobbes, men are naturally and exclusively self-interested, they are more or less equal to one another, (even the strongest man can be killed in his sleep), there are limited resources, and yet there is no power able to force men to cooperate. It is indeed the state of perpetual and unavoidable war. Moreover, in the State of Nature, every person is always in fear of losing his life to another. Hobbes argues for this by imagining men in their natural state, or in other words, the State of Nature. Given Hobbes' reasonable assumption that most people want first and foremost to avoid their own deaths, he states that the State of Nature is the worst possible situation in which men can find themselves. \_, hopeless. Because men are reasonable, they can see their way The situation is not, 9 out of such a state by recognizing the laws of nature, which show them the means by 10\_ escape the State of Nature and create a civil society. The first and most important law of nature commands that each man be willing to **pursue** (circle the best synonym: seek/look/precede/live) peace when others are willing to do the same, all the while retaining the right to continue to pursue war when others do not pursue peace. Being reasonable, and recognizing the rationality of this basic precept of reason, men can be expected to construct a Social Contract that will afford them a life other than that available to them in the State of Nature. This contract is constituted by two distinguishable contracts. First, they must agree to establish society by collectively and reciprocally renouncing the rights they had against one another in the State of Nature. Second, they must imbue some one person or assembly of persons with the authority and power to enforce the initial contract. In other words, to ensure their escape from the State of Nature, they must both agree to live together under common laws, and create an enforcement mechanism for the social contract and the laws that constitute it. Society becomes possible because, whereas in the State of Nature there was no power able to "overawe them all", now there is an artificially and conventionally superior and more powerful men cooperate. While living under the authority of a Sovereign can be person who can 11 harsh, it is 12 least better than living in the State of Nature. According to this argument, morality, politics, society, and everything that comes along with it. all of which Hobbes calls 'commodious living' are purely conventional. Before the establishment of the basic social contract, according to which men agree to live together and the contract to embody a Sovereign with absolute authority, nothing is immoral or unjust - anything goes. After these contracts are established, however, society becomes possible, and people can be expected to keep their promises, cooperate with one another, and so on. The Social Contract is the most fundamental source of all that is good and that which we depend upon to live well. Our choice is 13 to abide by the terms of the contract, or return to the State of Nature, which Hobbes argues no reasonable person could possibly prefer. [By C. Friend] D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points) Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words. 1. Hobbes states that because man is driven by self-interest alone, he often behaves irrationally. 2. Social contract theory reached its peak of importance in the last century. 3. Hobbes states that people may suffer under a Sovereign, but never as much as in the State of Nature.

#### E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

4. Because of the ideas he held, Hobbes cannot be strictly classified either as a Monarchist or as a

1. What does the author mean by 'anything goes' in paragraph 7?

Parliamentarian.

**TEST PRACTICE: Hobbes and China** A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in para. IV in the most logical order (1-5). (EXAMPLE: a. <u>1</u>) (5 points) Thomas Hobbes, with his cynicism towards human nature and a predilection for absolute government, seems almost anachronistic to the modern citizen belonging to a country with cherished liberal democratic traditions. However, more than three hundred years after the publication of *Leviathan*, Hobbes' political vision appears to be given profound expression in other parts of the world today. The experiences of many developing countries follow a familiar trajectory of foreign domination and internecine war, approximating to a primaeval state of nature; an equally if not more destructive armed revolution; the eventual establishment of an authoritarian government, where the people are given a strongman leader consensually or otherwise; and finally the gradual loosening of state control as the people move toward peaceful development. A common characteristic among governments (1)\_ as these is wideranging coercive powers over the thoughts and actions of their people, not unlike Hobbes' hypothetical leviathan. This paper puts forward the *argument* (circle the best synonym: disagreement / discussion / case / П subject) that Hobbes provides a theoretically convincing justification of state legitimacy through the state of nature and social contract formula but falls short in explaining state formation in practice and their acts of coercion after the transcendence of the state of nature. For the subsequent discussion on the Chinese political experience, I will focus on the period from the demise of the Qing dynasty in 1911 to the present day. Hobbes' state of nature, where man wages a perpetual "war of all against all", is a chilling reflection Ш of war-torn China in the early 1900s. While we accept that Hobbes devised the state of nature to be a purely intellectual experiment that does not explicitly refer to any particular point in human history, it is definitely not against the spirit of *Leviathan* to compare it with the experiences of certain past or extant polities. Hobbes claimed that in mankind's natural condition, there is "continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Compare this to a description of early modern China given by Rudolph Rummel, a scholar on Chinese genocide: [The Chinese] experienced every manner of death for every conceivable reason: genocide, politicide, mass murder, massacres, and individually directed assassinations; burning alive, burying alive, starvation, drowning, infecting with germs, shooting, stabbing. Just as important as the outward manifestation of indiscriminate violence and death is the cause of this proliferation of chaos. Once again, we can analyze the cause of the miserable state of affairs in China using Hobbes' conjecture. Such egoism, when acted upon in a state of relative intellectual and physical equality among individuals, leads to a destructive struggle for supremacy. Hence, in the absence of the Qing government, there existed a dangerous equality among and within these various factions. He claims that individuals possess a vain sense of their own wisdom, which most think they have more of than the common herd. During this time frame, different provinces and regions operated like independent sovereign nations commanded by local bosses with their own private armies. This is precisely what happened after the fall of the Qing dynasty, for during the interlude between the death of military strongman Marshal Yuan Shikai in 1916 and the consolidation of power by the Nationalists in 1928 there was a period of warlordism in China notorious for its fragmentation and chaos. Hobbes predicted, each tried to overpower the rest through force or cunning. And (2) to popular Western belief that the 1949 victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the Kuomintang (KMT) government was an illegitimate seizure of power (Pepper), Mao Zedong's forces were actually immensely popular among the Chinese people, especially the peasantry. In other words, the Chinese people actually preferred Communist discipline as an alternative to Manchu domination, Japanese excesses and KMT corruption.

The people's conferral of their power and strength to the CCP can be demonstrated by sheer weight

when the total population of China was just about 5 times that -- 455,000,000 -- and the CCP was not even

effectively gained control of an area containing a population of over 95.5 (5)\_

April 1945, towards the end of the anti-Japanese war, the CCP had

in numbers. (4)\_

the legitimate government. The reason that ray beaming the Chinese people's support for the CCF also his
Hobbes's account nicely—a desire for peace and stability under a "common power" after years of continual
war and fear. The CCP undoubtedly seemed like an irresistibly attractive source of authority to the people
after years of Japanese rapacity and KMT tyranny. Even such an authoritarian a government as the CCP,
which went (6) to murder tens of millions of its own people, had its roots in popular
consent. Chinese state formation thus seems, up to this point, to support Hobbes's social contract model.
VII We now turn from the search for government legitimacy in principle to the justification of state
formation and coercion in practice. Here, we will examine the problems with Hobbes' framework from both a
welfarist and contractarian perspective. If the social contract model explains reasonably well the
philosophical motivations for instituting a central authority, it does not (7) sense when we
examine the formation of real governments. According to Russell Hardin in his paper, "Rationally Justifying
Political Coercion", Hobbes's welfarist argument that people consent to government coercion because it
contributes to their welfare (by protecting them from others) is wrong because the very act of choosing a
desired coercive government may be (8) costly that whatever potential benefits to be had
from the said government are outweighed by the transition costs (Hardin). This can be broken up into two
related questions. First, what if the people are not transitioning from no government to government but from a
less preferred coercive government to a preferred coercive government? Second, what if the costs of
transition entail the sacrifice of the very life and limb that the outcome of the transition is supposed to
protect? Consider the regime change from the KMT government to the CCP government. The Chinese people
already had a coercive "common power" that demanded absolute obedience. The incumbent KMT
government was as dictatorial and brutal as many other regimes of the previous century. In this type of
situation, the Chinese people were not forming a government <b>from scratch</b> by simply agreeing to the
reciprocal renunciation of individual rights. They were instituting another government by risking their lives.
Should they have conformed to Hobbes's laws of nature, according to (9) man is forbidden
to do anything that is destructive of his life or takes away his means for preserving his life, the civil war
would not have happened and the incumbent government would have always been preferred. The grievous
costs to each individual in the struggle for regime change far outweighed the potential benefits of the new
regime—1.2 million men died in battle in the Chinese Civil War. In history, unfortunately, human life is
usually the first casualty in the crafting of the social contract.
VIII The contractarian argument, which claims that the people consent to all future coercion once they
have given consent to the government through the social contract, is also deficient because actual
governments are almost always above the contract. Here, we establish that the constitution is the closest
parallel to the social contract in a modern political context. The legal document is more of a product of
governmental policy and political exigency (10) a binding contract. It only codifies the
legitimacy of the government into law without always having the power to limit its actions. Furthermore,
Hobbes claims that the government has a monopoly over the power of interpretation, stating that the
sovereign alone has the right of judging, i.e. of hearing and deciding any controversies that may arise
concerning (11) civil or natural laws. So by simply agreeing to a constitution that enables a
government does not automatically imply consent to all of its future coercive actions because the government
can change the constitution or interpret it as it <i>deems</i> ( <i>circle the best synonym: reckons / beliefs / reflects /</i>
think) fit.
IX In the Chinese constitution, just as Hobbes suggested, the government is the sole authority on truth.
During the early years of the communist revolution, the CCP redistributed land to be privately owned by
peasants, according to the communist tenet of labour ownership of the means of production. After the CCP
had consolidated its power, however, in an abrupt about-face, Mao Zedong emphasized collectivism—one of
the most ominous words in recent history. The state now owned everything from land, houses and farming
tools (12) even the peasants themselves. The village commune organized and disciplined
the peasants in military fashion—they ate in mess halls, slept in barracks and did not even own their own
clothes. (13) they known beforehand, none of the peasant soldiers who joined Mao
Zedong's ranks during the civil war would have possibly signed up for a monstrous social experiment of this
kind. Although Hobbes glossed over the economic dimension to security, he did not proceed to elaborate on
the importance of the protection of material security in government legitimacy. The Chinese government
routinely claims that its unpopular policies are necessary for economic growth. Notwithstanding Mao
Zedong's disastrous economic blunders, the Maoist era exorcised the twin specters of crushing poverty and
relentless war that haunted China in the KMT and Japanese occupation periods. His successors, after
inheriting a population with greater purchasing power and a demand for a greater choice of goods (Gray), had

to find another source of legitimacy so as to strengthen the staying power of the CCP. This took the form of economic liberalization and progress that continues to this day.

D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)  Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words
from the text.  1 The author uses the fact that almost 1 million people died during the Chinese Civil War as evidence against the welfarist argument.
2 The author dedicates the second half of the text to illustrating what she believes to be the limitations of Hobbes' theories when applied to an actual government.
3 Through collectivism, the CCP managed to redistribute land to the peasants, thus winning major support among this social class.
4 Rummel likens early modern China to Hobbes' state of nature to show the extent of the violence that occurred during this period.

**E. SHORT ANSWER:** Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points) What is meant by the expression 'from scratch' in para. VII?

# JOHN LOCKE

# Student 1:

A. Ask Student 2 for the missing information in the text (????).

B. Read	l the f	follow	ing te	xt and	l fil	l in eac	h blank w	vith <u>one</u> app	ropr	iate v	vord.		
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John Locke was born in ???? at Wrington, Somerset, and died seventy-two years later in 1704. After a thorough training in the classics at ????, Locke became a student at Oxford University, where he received the ???? degrees and was appointed Senior Student and later Censor of Moral Philosophy. He spent thirty years of his life in the city of Oxford. Though he continued his studies of Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, he was gradually drawn toward the newly developing experimental sciences, being influenced in this direction particularly (1) Sir Robert Boyle. His scientific interests led him to pursue the study of medicine, and in ???? he obtained his medical degree and was licenced to practise. As he considered what direction his future might take, there was added to the considerations of medicine and Oxford Tutor an alternative, diplomacy. He actually served in various capacities, (2) on becoming the personal physician and confidential advisor to the Earl of Shaftesbury, (3) of the leading politicians of London. (4), earlier influences, among them his reading of Descartes' works while at Oxford, confirmed his desire to devote his creative powers to working out a philosophical understanding of certain problems that perplexed his generation. He wrote such diverse works (5) The Reasonableness of Christianity, An Essay Concerning Toleration, and the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising
the Value of Money, indicating his active participation in the public affairs of his day.  In 1690, when he (6) fifty-seven years old, Locke published ????, which were to make him famous as a philosopher and as a political theorist: <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> and <i>Two</i>
Treatises of Civil Government. (7) other philosophers before him had written about human knowledge, Locke was the first one to produce a full-length inquiry into the scope and limits of the human mind. Similarly, (8) had written important works on political theory, but Locke's second of the Two Treatises came at a time when it could shape the thoughts of an era and later affect the course of events. The Two Treatises and Essay indicate Locke's way of uniting his practical and theoretical interests and abilities. The Two Treatises were expressly formulated to justify ????. Some of its ideas took such strong hold upon succeeding generations that phrases contained in it, as for example, that men are "all equal and independent" and possess the natural rights to "????," affected the shaping of the American Constitution. Regarding his Essay, he (9) us that it grew out of an experience that occurred about twenty years before this work was published. On that occasion, five or six friends met to discuss a point in philosophy, and before long they were hopelessly blocked, "without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us." Locke decided that before one could move directly into a subject like "the principles of morality and revealed religion," it was necessary "to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with." From this examination Locke eventually composed his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, (10) became the ???? in Britain.
Decide whether the following statements are true or false. Explain why using your own words.
1 Locke lived during the 16 <sup>th</sup> and 17 <sup>th</sup> centuries.
2 Locke became a doctor and advisor to many important politicians in London.
3 Unlike his predecessors, Locke was interested in the human mind, and he wrote about it in <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> .
4 While <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> discusses the human mind, Locke's <i>Two Treatises</i> deal with political theory; in fact, the latter had a great influence on the American Constitution.

# JOHN LOCKE

# Student 2:

- A. Ask Student 1 for the missing information in the text (????).B. Read the following text and fill in each blank with <u>one</u> appropriate word.

John Locke was born in 1632 at ????, and died seventy-two years later in 1704. After a thorough training in the classics at Westminster School, Locke became a student at ????, where he received the Bachelor's and Master's degrees and was appointed Senior Student and later Censor of Moral Philosophy. He spent ???? in the city of Oxford. Though he continued his studies of Aristotle's logic and metaphysics, he was gradually drawn toward the newly developing experimental sciences, being influenced in this direction particularly (1) the philosopher and scientist ????. His scientific interests led him to pursue the study of medicine, and in 1674 he obtained his medical degree and was licenced to practise. As he considered what direction his future might take, there was added to the considerations of medicine and Oxford Tutor an alternative, diplomacy. He actually served in various capacities, (2) on becoming the personal physician and confidential advisor to ?????, (3) of the leading politicians of London. (4), earlier influences, among them his reading of Descartes' works while at Oxford, confirmed his desire to devote his creative powers to working out a philosophical understanding of certain problems that perplexed his generation. He wrote such diverse works (5) The Reasonableness of Christianity, ????, and the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and Raising the Value of Money, indicating his active participation in the public affairs of his day.
In 1690, when he (6) fifty-seven years old, Locke published two books, which were to make him famous as a philosopher and as a political theorist: <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> and <i>Two Treatises of Civil Government</i> . (7) other philosophers before him had written about human
knowledge, Locke was the first one to produce a full-length inquiry into the scope and limits of the human mind. Similarly, (8) had written important works on political theory, but Locke's ???? of the <i>Two Treatises</i> came at a time when it could shape the thoughts of an era and later affect the course of events. The <i>Two Treatises</i> and <i>Essay</i> indicate Locke's way of uniting his practical and theoretical interests and abilities. The <i>Two Treatises</i> were expressly formulated to justify the revolution of 1688. Some of its ideas took such strong hold upon succeeding generations that phrases contained in it, as for example, that men are "????" and possess the natural rights to "life, health, liberty and possessions," affected the shaping of the American Constitution. Regarding his <i>Essay</i> , he (9) us that it grew out of an experience that occurred about ???? before this work was published. On that occasion, five or six friends met to discuss a point in philosophy, and before long they were hopelessly blocked, "without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us." Locke decided that before one could move directly into a subject like "the principles of morality and revealed religion," it was necessary "to examine our own abilities, and see what <i>objects</i> our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with." From this examination Locke eventually composed his <i>Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> , (10) became the foundation of empiricism in Britain.
Decide whether the following statements are true or false. Explain why using your own words.  1 Locke lived during the 16 <sup>th</sup> and 17 <sup>th</sup> centuries.
2 Locke became a doctor and advisor to many important politicians in London.
3 Unlike his predecessors, Locke was interested in the human mind, and he wrote about it in <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> .
4 While <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i> discusses the human mind, Locke's <i>Two Treatises</i> deal with political theory; in fact, the latter had a great influence on the American Constitution.

#### **TEST PRACTICE: Property**

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with <u>one</u> appropriate word. (13 points)

B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)

- There are extensive discussions of property in the writings of Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, and Mill. The range of justificatory themes they consider is very broad, and I shall begin with a summary. The ancient authors speculated about the relation between property and virtue, a natural subject for discussion since justifying private property *raises* (circle the best synonym: increases/solicitors/lifts/presents) serious questions about the legitimacy of self-interested activity. Plato (Republic, 462b-c) argued that \_\_ promote common pursuit of the common interest and collective ownership was necessary (1)\_\_\_ avoid the social divisiveness that would occur 'when some grieve exceedingly and others rejoice at the same happenings.' Aristotle responded by arguing that private ownership promotes virtues (2) prudence and responsibility. He also reflected on the relation between property and freedom, and the contribution that ownership makes to a person's being a free man and thus suitable for citizenship. The Greeks took liberty to be a status defined by contrast with slavery, and for Aristotle, to be free was to belong to oneself, to be one's (3) man, whereas the slave was by nature the property of another. Selfpossession was connected with having sufficient distance from one's desires to enable the practice of virtuous self-control. On this account, the natural slave was unfree because his reason could not prescribe a rule to his hesitation in extending this point beyond slavery to the bodily appetites. Aristotle had (4) conditions of 'the meaner sort of workman.' Obsessed with need, the poor are 'too degraded' to participate in politics like free men. 'You could no more make a city out of paupers,' wrote Aristotle, 'than out of slaves' (ibid., 1278a). They must be ruled like slaves, for otherwise their pressing and immediate needs will issue in envy and violence. In the medieval period, Thomas Aquinas continued discussion of the Aristotelian idea that virtue might be expressed in the use that one makes of one's property. But Aquinas gave it a sharper edge. Not only the rich have moral obligations to act generously, but the poor also have rights against the rich. Aquinas argued that no division of resources based on human law can prevail over the necessities associated with destitution. This is a theme which recurs throughout our tradition—most notably in Locke's First Treatise on Government, (Locke 1988 [1689], I, para. 42)—as an essential qualification of whatever else is said about the legitimacy of private property (Horne 1990). In the early modern period, philosophers turned their attention to the way in which property might have been instituted, with Hobbes and Hume arguing that there is no natural 'mine' or 'thine,' and that
- have been instituted, with Hobbes and Hume arguing that there is no natural 'mine' or 'thine,' and that property must (6) \_\_\_\_\_ understood as the creation of the sovereign state (Hobbes 1983 [1647]) or at the very least the artificial product of a convention 'enter'd into by all the members of the society to bestow stability on the possession of...external goods, and leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry' (Hume 1978 [1739], p. 489). John Locke (1988 [1689]), on the other (7) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_, was adamant that property could have been instituted in a state of nature without any special conventions or political decisions.
- Locke's theory is widely regarded as the (8)\_\_\_\_\_\_ interesting of the canonical discussions of property. In part this is a result of how he began his account; because he took as his starting point that God gave the world to men in common, he had to acknowledge from the outset that private entitlements pose a moral problem. (9)\_\_\_\_\_\_ do we move from a common endowment to the 'disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth' that seems to go along with private property? Unlike some of his predecessors, Locke did not base his resolution of this difficulty on any theory of universal (even tacit) consent. Instead, in the most famous passage of his chapter on property, he gave a moral defense of the legitimacy of unilateral appropriation.
- ...Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other Men. (Locke 1988 [1689], II, para. 27)
- The interest of Locke's account lies in the way he combines the structure of a theory of first occupancy with an account of the substantive moral significance of labor. In the hands of writers like Samuel Pufendorf (1991 [1673], p. 84), First Occupancy theory proceeded on the basis that the first human user of a

natural resource—a piece of land, for example—is distinguished from all others in (10) he did not have to displace anyone else in order to take possession. It did not particularly matter how he took possession of it, or what sort of use he made of it: what mattered was that he began acting as its owner without dispossessing anyone else. Now although Locke used the logic of this account, it did matter for him that the land was cultivated or in some other way used productively. (For this reason, he expressed doubts whether indigenous hunters or nomadic peoples could properly be regarded as owners of the land over (11) they roamed.) This is partly because Locke identified the ownership of labor as something connected substantially to the primal ownership of self. But it was also because he thought the productivity of labor (12) help answer some of the difficulties which he saw in First Occupancy theory. Though the first occupier does not actually dispossess anyone, still his acquisition may prejudice others' interests if there is not, in Locke's words, 'enough and as good left in common' for them to enjoy (Locke 1988 [1689], II, para. 27). Locke's answer to this difficulty was to emphasize that appropriation by productive labor actually increased the amount of goods available in society for others (ibid., II, para. 37).  The general merits of private property versus socialism became a subject of genuine debate in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. John Stuart Mill, with his characteristic open-mindedness, treated communism as a genuine option, and he confronted objections to the collectivist ideal with the suggestion that the inequitable distribution of property in actually existing capitalist societies already partakes of many others difficulties. He insisted, however, that private property be given a fair hearing as well:
Ifthe choice were to be (13) Communismand the present state of society with all its sufferings and injustices,all the difficulties, great or small, of Communism would be but as <b>dust in the</b> balance. But to make the comparison applicable, we must compare Communism at its best, with the regime of individual property, not as it is, but as it might be madeThe laws of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the justification of private property rests. (Mill 1994[1848], pp. 14–15)  Mill is surely right, at least so far as the aims of a philosophical discussion of property are concerned. Indeed, one way of looking at the history we have just briefly surveyed is that it is the history of successive attempts to tease out, from the mess of actually (circle the best synonym: truly/presently/likely/at the time) existing maldistribution and exploitation, some sense of the true principles on which the justification of an ideal system of private property would rest. (By Jeremy Waldron)  C. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)
Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.  1. John Stuart Mill firmly rejected any form of capitalism, viewing it as the cause of suffering and injustice.
2. While Plato and Aristotle both dealt with the question of private property, only the former focused on its merits.
3. Locke, not completely comfortable with the First Occupancy theory regarding property, incorporated the importance of productivity and labour into his discussion.
4. Locke was one of the few who subsequently took up the arguments posed by Aquinas regarding resources and destitution.

**D. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)** What do you think Mill means by the expression "dust in the balance" in para. 7?

#### E. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in the most logical order. (5 points)

- \_\_\_\_ For example, when someone says 'X is mine' and X is an action, we see interesting questions about intentionality, free-will, and responsibility, which philosophers will want to pursue.
  \_\_\_\_ This, indeed, was one of David Hume's conclusions; he believed that there is nothing natural about private property.
  \_\_\_\_ Or when someone says 'X belongs to person P,' and X is an event, memory, or experience, there are interesting questions about personal identity.
- \_\_\_\_ Is there any inherent philosophical interest in the nature of a person's relation to material resources? \_\_\_\_ But when X is an apple or a piece of land or an automobile, there does not appear to be any question of an inherent relation between X and P which might arouse our interest.

# Excerpts from John Locke, "Second Treatise on Government" (1690) CHAP. II.: Of the State of Nature.

Sec. 6. . . . The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.

#### CHAP. IX.: Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.

Sec. 123. IF man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said; if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no body, why will he part with his freedom? why will he give up this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and controul of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of others: for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very unsecure. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers: and it is not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in society with others, who are already united, or have a mind to unite, for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property.

Sec. 131. But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property; (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good; but is obliged to secure every one's property, by providing against those three defects above mentioned, that made the state of nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any common-wealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home, only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end, but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

#### CHAP. XIX.: Of the Dissolution of Government.

Sec. 212.... When any one, or more, shall take upon them to make laws, whom the people have not appointed so to do, they make laws without authority, which the people are not therefore bound to obey; by which means they come again to be out of subjection, and may constitute to themselves a new legislative, as they think best, being in full liberty to resist the force of those, who without authority would impose any thing upon them..

**TEST PRACTICE: David Hume** A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with one appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points) In the *Treatise*, Hume regards sympathy, not as a sentiment or passion (e.g., fellow-feeling, benevolence, or pity), but as a fundamental principle or mechanism of human psychology, in terms of which he hopes to explain the genesis and operation of our sentiments. Sympathy is that capacity "of easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another" (T 2.2.5.15). This distinction, his contemporaries (notably Mandeville and Rousseau) failed to make, represents a major theoretical advance in philosophical psychology. It enabled Hume to drive his explanations of the complexities of human passions and behavior to a much deeper level than had been possible without it. Hume also observes that sympathy is not limited to the human species; indeed, cross-species sympathy is a common occurrence (T 2.1.12). Likewise, it is not limited to the communication of suffering (again, (2) Mandeville and Rousseau thought), or even to the communication of passions and sentiments. In Hume's view, beliefs and opinions, no less than our sentiments—indeed, all the actions and contents of our minds can be communicated via sympathy. Hume offers a two-stage analytical model of the associative mechanism of sympathy (T 2.1.11.3, 3.3.1.7), the outlines of which are familiar. We can summarize it as follows. Stage 1: (3) encountered, for example, the suffering of another creature, we form the idea of its suffering (i.e., we form the belief that it is experiencing that pain or passion). Stage 2: this idea itself is amplified to the point that it "become[s] the very passion itself" as that suffered by the object of our sympathy. Important transitions occur at both stages: at stage 1, we form the idea of the other's suffering by a kind of "inference;" and at stage 2, that idea is converted into the very same kind of passion on the part of the sympathizer due to "the relation of objects to ourself . . . [which] is always intimately present to us" (T 2.1.11.4, 2.1.11.8). Both transitions are puzzling, but a crucial feature of the second transition is important for our purposes. Hume makes the relation or resemblance between the sympathizer and the object of her sympathy essential to sympathy's psychic movement. And the "stronger the relation is betwixt ourselves and any object, the more easily does the imagination make the transition" (T 2.1.11.5). However, Hume makes it clear that, (4)\_ sympathizer's self is crucial for this movement, the self is not in focus: "in sympathy our own person is not the object of any passion; nor is there any thing, that fixes our attention on ourselves" (T 2.2.2.17). Indeed, the typical effect of sympathy is "to take . . . us out of ourselves" (T 3.3.1.11). Hume took this model to be an analytical reconstruction, rather (5) phenomenological description, of the process by which we sympathize with another (T 2.1.11.3). Often the movements occur instantaneously and one is not aware of them; they may seem automatic, entirely involuntary. But this is not the only experience of sympathy that Hume has in view. He recognizes that sometimes an intentional act of imaginative attention to the sufferings of others generates the sympathetic response. Hume's model was intended to apply to the wide variety of forms that sympathy tends to take in human experience. They are best seen to fall along a *spectrum* (*circle the best synonym*: continuous/queue/range/varied) from very primitive responses to responses that depend (6) sophisticated, intentionally engaged exercises of imaginative projection. IV Typical cases of sympathy—or at least cases Hume thought were most familiar to us—are in which we respond directly to suffering immediately in our presence. We "observe" in the "countenance and conversation" of another creature the typical expressions of a familiar sentiment, from which we "infer" that it is experiencing the sentiment (T 2.1.11.3). We often need only to look each other in the face, to participate in the other's sentiments. In some cases, the "inference" from observation to idea concerning the other's experiencing the passion is instantaneous, and the other's passion floods over us. Hume offers many examples of such "contagion." Some of them are responses of children, but adults are


equally *apt* (circle the best synonym: active/likely/probably/similar) to experience sympathetic contagion (T 3.3.2.2, 3.3.1.7). Sympathy, in such cases, is immediate, involuntary, and unreflective. But Hume observes that at other times we engage more actively in the process. The "inference" from affect expression in behavior to cause in the mind of the other person, or from the cause in the circumstances or condition of the object to the experienced effect (T 3.3.1.7), may be explicit and actively entertained, as may be the resemblance between oneself and the object of our sympathy (T 2.2.4.6). It would be a mistake to assimilate these cases to instances of contagion or "emotional infection," for in these cases the sympathizer is engaged cognitively and imaginatively, and the process seems to be to a large under the sympathizer's voluntary control.

VI Furthermore, Hume recognizes that sympathy operates even when one is not immediately in the
presence of the suffering party. Mandeville insisted that the impression of another's suffering only "come[s]
in at the eye or ear," and (9) arise in the absence of the object of sympathy (Fable, 1:254, 256).
Hume rejected Mandeville's narrow view. "Resemblance" or "causation"—for example, relations of kinship
("causation"), acquaintance, or common heritage ("resemblance")—are often enough, in his view, to fuel the
process, even in the absence of the object of our sympathy (T 2.1.11.17, 2.2.4.5). The "resemblance" need not
be close, but it may take "a great effort of imagination" to rouse the sympathetic heart (T 2.2.9.14).
VII Imagination has even more remarkable powers. Sometimes all we need to observe are the conditions
or circumstances of a person to feel the sentiment we have associated with those conditions. Imagination
(10) the wheels of sympathy in motion. For example, seeing a stranger sleeping in a field in
danger of being trod underfoot by horses, we would run to protect him from the danger, Hume observes. In
doing so, I would be "actuated by the same principle of sympathy, which makes me concern'd for the present
sorrows of a stranger" whose sad countenance I observe (T 2.2.9.13; see also T 2.2.5.16, 3.3.1.7). In some
cases, it is not even necessary that one observe the circumstances or condition of the person with whom one
sympathizes (consider Hume's example of sympathy with the abducted infant prince at T 2.2.7.6). "Tis
certain," Hume writes, "that sympathy is not always limited to the present moment, but that we often feel by
communication the pains and pleasures of others, which are not in being and which we only anticipate by the
force of the imagination" (T 2.2.9.13). (11) is it even necessary, paradoxically, that the person
being sympathized with experiences the sentiments, or experiences them with the intensity that we feel them
for him (T 2.2.7.5–6). Sensing the paradox, Hume calls these cases of "partial" sympathy (ibid.).
VIII In this latter set of cases, the necessary relations of resemblance and contiguity are simulated or
enhanced through vivid imaginative representation of the object of sympathy or her circumstances. We
imaginatively insert ourselves into the circumstances of the other person and feel what she feels, or
(12)
in general we feel the same such emotions, because often in the past we being in such conditions with others
like the object of our sympathy, we experienced the same emotions. Imaginative projection into the other's
situation is a key form of sympathetic engagement for Hume's theory of passions, which becomes even more
important, of course, for the moral theory he develops in Book 3 of the <i>Treatise</i> . In (13) with
contagion at the other end of the spectrum, this form of sympathy is voluntary, self-aware, and reflective.
Under some circumstances it enables the sympathizer to transcend the immediate, momentary experiences of
the object of sympathy and to sympathize with the suffering individual as a temporally extended and socially
located person (T 2.2.9.14). (By G. Postema)
C. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)
Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each
answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.
1. Hume, as opposed to Mandeville, believed that one does not have to be face-to-face with someone to feel
sympathy.
sympatry.
2. 'Partial sympathy' occurs when the sympathizer is only 'partly' affected by the sentiments of another.
2. I dittal sympathy occurs when the sympathizer is only party directed by the sentiments of another.
3. According to Hume, sympathy is the mechanism through which not only sentiments but also beliefs can be
communicated.
Communicated.
4. Sympathetic 'contagion' is the least primitive form of sympathy and can be found to occur in both adults
and children.

# **D. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)** Why does the author use the pronoun 'she' in paragraph VIII?

E. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in the most logical order. (5 points)
Hume begins by dividing all mental perceptions between ideas (thoughts) and impressions (sensations and feelings), and then makes two central claims about the relation between them.
For example, my impression of a tree is simply more vivid than my idea of that tree.
Drawing heavily on John Locke's empiricism, the opening sections of both the <i>Treatise</i> and <i>Enquiry</i>
discuss the origins of mental perceptions.
First of all, advancing what is commonly known as Hume's <i>copy thesis</i> , he argues that all ideas are ultimately copied from impressions.
He goes on to reveal what we may call Hume's <i>liveliness thesis</i> , stating that ideas and impressions differ only in terms of liveliness.
Put the verbs in brackets into the correct form.  In 1714 Queen Anne, the last of the Stuart monarchs of England, (1)(die),
and on her death, the English crown was given to the dynasty of Hanover. The Hanoverian King
Georges succeeded in (2)(maintain) their throne against attempts to restore the
Stuart line. During the eighteenth century, the ablest philosophers writing in English at this time
were Irish or Scottish, though all of them believed they were (3)(continue) the
tradition of the Englishman John Locke.
Hume (4)(be) born in Edinburgh in 1711. He was a precocious
philosopher, and his major work, A Treatise of Human Nature, (5)(publish) in his
twenties. He (6)(try) unsuccessfully to obtain a professorship in Edinburgh. Unlike
today, where people (7)(think) of him as a philosopher, in his lifetime he was
better known as a historian, for between 1754 and 1761 he (8)(write) a six-volume
history of England. He was a genial man, who (9)(do) his best to befriend the
difficult philosopher Rousseau, and (10)(describe) by the economist Adam Smith
as having come as near to perfection as anyone possibly could.

#### **TEST PRACTICE: Utilitarianism** A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in para. VI in the correct order (EXAMPLE: a. \_1\_) (5 points) Bart Schultz and Georgios Varouxakis (eds.), Utilitarianism and Empire, Lexington Books, 2005, 263pp., \$26.95 Classical Utilitarianism, on one reading, is the view according to which an action, rule, policy or if it is designed to advance aggregate well-being. social institution is right if and (1) Relying on some version of this moral framework, the Classical Utilitarians -- Jeremy Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick -- advocated for a wide range of social, political and legal reforms. Both their reformist agenda (2) their historical context led each of the Classical Utilitarians to intellectual entanglements with British imperialism, colonialism and related issues, as race and slavery. However, the nature and extent of their involvement with and relationship to the British imperial project and colonialism in general has not (4) properly or fully analysed. The purpose of this nicely assembled and timely volume is to remedy this situation and 'to bring out, to engage with, the different aspects of the utilitarian legacy that bear directly on questions of race and empire' (5). Utilitarianism and Empire contains ten essays and an introduction by the editors. There are two essays on Jeremy Bentham, five on John Stuart Mill, and one each on James Mill, Herbert Spencer and Henry Sidgwick. Appropriately, the volume is interdisciplinary, with contributions by philosophers, historians, political scientists and cultural theorists, among others. It is an extremely valuable contribution to the literature devoted to making sense of the history and philosophical viability of utilitarianism. , a study of this sort is extremely timely, since we are ourselves living during a period in which empire building and imperialism continue to thrive and imperil. The two papers on Bentham are among the most interesting and illuminating in this volume. In his article, "Jeremy Bentham on Slavery and the Slave Trade", Fred Rosen responds to the view that Bentham failed to have the appropriate moral reaction to slavery and slave trading. Bentham's error, it is claimed, is that he held that the security of the property of slave owners had to be balanced against equality in deciding the right public policy to have regarding slavery. This problem is seen clearly, critics contend, in Bentham's advocacy of a gradual rather (6) immediate emancipation of slaves and the abolition of slavery. In reply, Rosen demonstrates how sophisticated and plausible Bentham's position was. Relying on a little-known letter published in the *Public Advertiser* (7) June 6, 1789, Rosen shows that Bentham was clear on the issue of slave trading: it should end without compensation to slave traders. He advocated gradual emancipation, not because he wrongly gave weight to the security and protection of private property, Rosen continues, (8) out of concern for the protection of slaves; he wanted to ensure that the abolition of slaveholding did not make slaves worse off. For in conjunction with emancipation, there would emerge the need for another economic and social system not based on slavery, 'one that provided subsistence and security for the newly freed slaves and did not leave them in a worse position' (45). IV Rosen's paper has many virtues; it situates Bentham's view in its historical context and demonstrates that it was rather in sync with the views of many at the time advocating the end of slave trading and slaveholding. Moreover, it shows how Bentham used the notion of slavery in many contexts (e.g., in his discussion of colonies) as a way of defining 'the human condition in terms of varying degrees of subjection' (43) in an effort to better determine how to politically engage with slavery and its cognates. In her contribution, "Jeremy Bentham: Legislator of the World?" Jennifer Pitts demonstrates how Bentham's views on colonization and empire building are quite distinct from and more palatable than the positions held by the Mills. Pitts contends that it was James and John Stuart Mill who turned utilitarianism an imperialist theory, making it appear intolerant of non-Europeans and dubious about their capacities for self-government. This leads her to conclude that there is nothing like a utilitarian position on colonization and empire building: 'with regard to colonies, there was no unitary utilitarian logic but rather a transformation of the tradition that reflected a broader shift in European thought on empire from the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, away from profound doubts about colonial aspirations and toward vehement and often self-righteous support for them' (61-62). On Pitts's analysis, Bentham is distinct from the Mills in having little doubt about the capacities and abilities (especially for self-government) of non-



D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)
Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each
answer in 1-2 sentences, <u>using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words</u>
<u>from the text</u> .
1 <i>Utilitarianism and Empire</i> examines the response of Utilitarianism in the past to such topics as race
and colonization.
2 According to Rosen, Bentham believed in a slow move toward emancipation in order to avoid an
even more precarious situation for freed slaves.
even more precurious situation for freed slaves.
3 Pitts demonstrates some of the differences in the thinking of Bentham and Mill, the former
embracing a more imperialistic position.
4 Half of the access in Utilitarianism and Empire are dedicated to L.S. Mill and his regist tendencies
4 Half of the essays in <i>Utilitarianism and Empire</i> are dedicated to J. S. Mill and his racist tendencies.
E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)
What type of text is this? Describe one feature that is specific to this text type.

#### **TEST PRACTICE: John Stuart Mill** A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points) Mill's difficulty with the problem of moral obligation and choice more apparent [in Utilitarianism] than when he deals with the question of what is the desirable mode of conduct for man. Upon this question, Mill thought, hangs the basic principle of utilitarianism, for to answer it requires some proof that this principle is correct or that happiness is indeed the ultimate end of human conduct. But how can we prove that happiness is the true and desirable end of human life and conduct? Mill answers that "the only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it; and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. ..." No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable except that "each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness." Clearly, however, there is no similarity between the examples Mill has here given, 2 desirable is not related to desired in the same way that visible is to seen. The difference between these two terms turns upon an important moral distinction, for whereas visible means simply that something is capable of being seen, desirable implies that something is worthy of being desired, that, moreover, it 3 to be desired. For this reason, it is quite true that a thing's being seen proves that it is visible, but it does not follow that because a thing is desired it is for that reason desirable. The logical difficulties here seem to be insurmountable, and the more so as Mill seemed to go beyond mere pleasure as the criterion of goodness to the internal region of 'conscience' as the agency of moral sanction. Not happiness alone but a sense of *duty* directs our moral thought. Mill thus departed from Bentham's external standard of goodness and turned inward, concluding that the basis of morality is a "powerful natural sentiment" and "a subjective feeling in our own minds and, finally, "the conscientious feelings of mankind". \_\_\_\_ much concerned with the problems of society as was Bentham. The principle of the greatest happiness inevitably led all utilitarians to consider how the individual and the government should be related. Bentham had put his faith in democracy as the great cure for social evils inasmuch as in a democracy the interests of the rulers and the ruled are the same because the rulers are the ruled. But Mill did not have the same implicit faith in democracy that Bentham had. 5 agreed that democracy is the best form of government, he set forth in his essay On Liberty certain dangers inherent in the democratic form of government. Principally, he warned that the will of the people is most often the will of the majority, and it is entirely possible for the majority to oppress the minority. In addition, there is in a democracy the tyranny of opinion, a danger as great as oppression. Even in a democracy, therefore, it is necessary to set up safeguards against the forces that would deny men their free and full selfdevelopment. In this respect, in his concern to eliminate clear social evils, Mill reflected Bentham's desire for reform. But Mill was particularly concerned to preserve liberty by 6 limits to the actions of government. Mill argued that "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightly exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent **harm** (circle the best synonym: destructibility/injury/problems/sadness) to others." There is, of course, a legitimate role for government, but, said Mill, no government should interfere with its subjects (1) when the action can be done better by private persons; (2) when, although the government could possibly do the action better than private individuals, it is desirable for the individuals to do it for their development and education; and (3) when there is danger that too much power will unnecessarily accrue to the government. Mill's argument for liberty was, therefore, an argument for individualism. Let each individual pursue his happiness in his 7 way. Even in the realm of ideas, men must be free to express their thoughts and beliefs, because truth is most quickly discovered when opportunity is given to refute falsehoods. Mill took the position that "there is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not

As he considered the ideal goal of man, Mill asked "what more or better can be said of any condition of human affairs than that it brings human beings themselves nearer to the best thing they can be?" But is it

known, and his whole concept of liberty, unlike Bentham's, was conceived as the precondition for developing

permitting its refutation." He assumed, however, that it is important that the truth should 8\_

the full possibilities of human nature.

the function of government to make numan beings the best thing they can be? Mill had a deep dislike for the
totalitarian state even though he lived too soon to see <b>its ugliest manifestations</b> . When he set forth the limits
beyond 9 the government must not go, Mill argued forcefully that a man must not, except to
prevent harm, be subject to the power of government, and especially "his own good, 10 physical
or moral, is not a sufficient warrant."
Still, Mill had departed sufficiently from Bentham's version of utilitarianism to set in motion subtle
forces that moved Mill from his clear individualism to tepid forms of collectivism. If he was concerned with
quality instead of quantity in pleasures, and if this quality is based upon human beings' being "the best thing
they can be," and, finally, if only those persons who have experienced the higher pleasures can know them,
there is the natural urge for those $11_{\underline{}}$ know these qualitatively higher pleasures to want others to
have them also. But what is to be done if individuals who do not know and appreciate the higher values do
not want them? It is not surprising that in this situation Mill <b>advocated</b> ( <i>circle the best synonym</i> : <i>fought</i>
against/positioned/legalized/backed), for example, compulsory education, 12 reversing his
earlier view that men must not interfere with the liberty of any member of mankind even for "his own good."
It is most often in the name of man's good that the state moves into the area of man's freedom.
13 Mill said about liberty has particular relevance in the twentieth century, which has witnessed
the encroachment of government upon the actions and thoughts of men everywhere. But the difficulties of
stating utilitarianism as a consistent philosophy are nowhere better seen than in Mill's own attempts to defend
its principle.
C. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)
Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each
answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.
1. Mill states that governments can inflict harm on individuals when they break the law.
2. Mill's views on compulsory education support the ideas presented in " <i>On Liberty</i> ".
3. While Mill and Bentham both favoured democracy as a form of government, the former expressed some
concerns about it.
4. According to the author of this text, 'desirable/desired' can be logically likened to 'visible/seen'.
D. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)
1. What does the author mean by 'its ugliest manifestations' in paragraph 5?
E. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in the most logical order. The first and last sentences (1
and 7) are already given. (5 points)
1. Whereas Bentham had said that "pushpin is as good as poetry," Mill said that he would "rather be Socrates
dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."
a Hence, the pleasures of the intellect, of feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments have a
higher value than the pleasures of mere sensation.
b With these famous words, he sided with the ancient Epicureans, who had also been attacked for their
'degrading' emphasis upon pleasure as the end of all behaviour.
c Indeed, pleasures, said Mill, differ from each other in kind and quality, not only in quantity.
d But this assumption is obviously false, said Mill, because "human beings have faculties more
elevated than the animal appetites".
e To their accusers the Epicureans replied that it was they, the accusers, who had a degrading
conception of human nature, for <i>they</i> assumed that the only pleasures men are capable of are those of which
only swine are capable.
7. Though Mill had referred to these higher pleasures originally in order to answer the critics of utilitarianism,
his concern over higher pleasures led him to criticize the very foundation of Bentham's doctrine of utility: he
mo concern over inguer predoutes rea min to enderze the very roundation of benthall a docume of utility. He

said that "it would be absurd that...the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity

alone."

#### TEST PRACTICE: Mill and Slavery

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points)

B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)

points) In 1849 Fraser's Magazine, the popular London literary periodical, published an anonymous attack on the nature of black people under the title, "Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question." The vicious essay so happened to be written by Thomas Carlyle. Outraged by the incivility of its language, if not distressed by the sentiment it expressed, literate liberals in Britain and the northern states in the American Union openly objected to the attack. Chief among the responses was a particularly impassioned essay published again anonymously in the following issue of Fraser's under the title, "The Negro Question." This time the author was England's leading public intellectual of the day, John Stuart Mill. Four years later, fueled no doubt by his increasingly acrimonious feud with Mill, Carlyle published in pamphlet form a revised and expanded version of the attack under the more pointed title, "Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question." And there the matter was left to stand (1)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_1971, when the texts by Carlyle and Mill were first brought together with an introductory commentary by the editor Eugene August. It is curious that from their initial appearance to August's edition, no commentary exists on this exchange, (2) offers a particularly revealing window to the excesses and limits of nineteenth-century racialized discourse. This semi-anonymous exchange exemplifies the parameters of Victorian sentiment, explicitly racist in one direction (Carlyle) and seemingly egalitarian in the other (Mill). as August hopefully has it. Carlyle on race was to mid-nineteenth-century Britain what Dinesh D'Souza is to late twentieth-century America, offering a rationalization of the sorry state of black folk in the most extreme, and thus eye-catching terms. By contrast, Mill's singular contribution to "The Negro Question" - in the same way that his "On the Subjection of Women" was his seminal and remarkable contribution to "The Woman Question" - nevertheless marks the implicit limits to racialized egalitarianism for liberal Victorianism. The socio-historical background to the exchange between Mill and Carlyle concerned the fading prospects and conditions of the British plantation owners in the West Indies, though we have to understand the questions of race addressed here in terms of the colonial condition more broadly. Emancipation of slaves in the British empire in 1833 limited the supply of desperately cheap labor and reduced the profit margins of the West Indies sugar planters. In 1846 the British parliament ended plantation subsidies, thus plantation owners in the islands to compete unprotected on the world market. (3) IV Carlyle represented the bald claim to 'the Negro's' inherent inferiority articulated by racist science \_\_\_, was the principal spokesman for the European's of the day: Mill, on the other (4) historically developed superiority (though he did acknowledge the influence of ancient Egyptians on the Hellenic Greeks). To support his degraded image of the inherently inferior 'Negro', Carlyle was driven to reduce the debilitating effects of slavery's experience for people of African descent. Carlyle accordingly insisted that the debilitations of slavery were 'much exaggerated'. Slavery, and so mastery too, were considered 'natural' conditions: slaves. (5) Aristotle once put it, are slaves by nature. Blacks are born to be servants of whites who 'are born wiser...and lords' over them. Indeed, Carlyle insisted that there is a slavery far worse than the slavery of 'Negroes' in the colonies; this, he remarked without a hint of irony, is the 'slavery' throughout Europe of "the great and noble-minded to the small and mean!" Thus, Carlyle diminished the horrible experience and effects of real slavery historically by reducing them to less than the 'platonic' manifestations of a metaphorical servitude of the strong and wise to the weak and ignorant. In Carlyle's view, the Negro was born to serve, to have masters. With little wit of (6) he would flourish only in servitude and in being told what to do. Carlyle concluded from this claim of inherent servility that the "Black gentleman" should (7) hired "not by the month, but ... for life'." It was Carlyle's call to reinstitute slavery that Mill principally objected to in his response. This perhaps is predictable, given Mill's longstanding and well-known commitment to abolition. Mill's critical concern with Carlyle's racist sentiment, however, was only secondary and much more understated. Moreover, not only (8)\_ Mill not object to colonial domination, he insisted upon it *albeit* (circle the best synonym: despite/instead/though/together) in 'benevolent' form. After all, Mill spent the better part of his working life administering colonialism. Thus, Mill opened his letter to the editor of Fraser's with the claim that abolition was "the best and greatest achievement yet performed by mankind" in "the history of human improvement". Slavery was wrong for Mill in (9)\_\_ it produced much more pain than would liberty and equal opportunity, and it is for this reason that Mill considered slavery inherently inhumane. In objecting to Carlyle's racist hierarchical naturalism, however, Mill inscribed in its place an

attribution of the historical inferiority of blacks. Mill implied that this assumption of inferiority, because historically produced and contingent, was not always the case (e.g. the Egyptians' influence on the Greeks) and might one day be overcome. Yet Mill's statement barely hid beneath the surface the polite racism of his Eurocentric history. Contingent racism is still a form of racism – not so vituperative, but condescending nevertheless even as it is committed to equal opportunity.

The very title of his response to Carlyle - "The Negro Question" - indicates Mill's presumption that blacks are a problem, rather than that people of African descent in the New World faced problems - least of all that those problems were imposed by their masters. This interpretation is justified (10) placing Mill's response to Carlyle in the context of Mill's views on development, modernization, and race. These were views he developed most fully in terms of India and his experience in the English East Indies Company but which he generalized to Africa and the West Indies as (11)\_ that these premises indeed lay at the heart of Mill's liberal egalitarianism, it is necessary to examine his views Mill worked as an examiner for the English East Indies Company from 1823 to 1856 and then as VII chief examiner until his retirement to politics in 1858. In fact, he was central in, and ultimately charge of, all bureaucratic correspondence between the British government and its colonial representation in India. It was in the context of India, then, that he worked out his views on colonial intervention in those 'underdeveloped' countries which he considered stagnant and inhibiting of progress, and he generalized from this context to other areas. The difference between a developed and undeveloped country, between those more or less civilized, was defined by Mill in terms of the country's capacity to enable and promote representative self-government and individual self-development. In short, in terms of its capacity for autonomy and good government. 'Good government' would enable a society, as Mill once said of himself, "to effect (bring about/ bring up/bring to/bring down) the greatest amount of good compatible with ... opportunities" with a view to maximizing well-being and so happiness. Civilized countries like Britain limited government intervention in individuals' lives; those less civilized he thought should be ruled by those more so with the view to promoting their capacity for self-development. This would require greater restriction in the ruled country on people's freedoms, and so more government regulation. Australia and Canada were "capable of, and ripe for, representative government," India by contrast was far from it, for India had stagnated for many centuries under the hand of Oriental despotism. In India's case, and even more perpetually in the case of the West Indies and African colonies, "benevolent despotism" – a paternalistic "government of guidance" imposed by more advanced Europeans –

was the rational order of the day.

VIII Thus, for Mill, the justification of colonization was to be measured according to its aid in the progress of the colonized, its education of superstitious colonial subjects in the virtues of reason, and the generation of new markets for capital accumulation. Mill considered progress to consist in being socialized in the values of liberal modernity, that is, in the sort of social, political, economic, cultural, and legal commitments best represented by the British example. As a colonized country exemplified such progress, the colonizing country progressively would give way to the colonized's self-governance.

## C. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points) Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text. 1. Prior to entering politics, Mill spent over three decades working for the English East Indies Company and thus played an important role in Indian colonization. 2. In the mid 19th century, Carlyle published two pamphlets on people of African descent in which he overtly expressed his racist views. 3. \_\_\_\_\_ In his signed response to "Occasional Discourse on the Negro Question" in Fraser's Magazine, Mill attacked Carlyle primarily for the latter's position on slavery. 4. The author of this text is surprised by the lack of attention paid to the Carlyle-Mill debate on "The Negro Question", viewing it as an important source of information concerning Victorian ideas on race. D. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in the most logical order (1-5). The first sentence has already been given. (EXAMPLE: a. 1) (5 points) So what we have here in the debate between Mill and Carlyle are the following. The other admitted that the black and colonial subjects were indeed less evolved but argued that such a state was not ordained by nature and therefore could be overcome by contact with civilization. b. \_\_\_\_\_ In other words, they believed that in order to become fully human and a citizen, the colonial and black subject had to master the protocols of Western civilization, to become in the words of the 19th-century English writer Anthony Trollope a 'Creole Negro'. \_ In one current of English political thought, difference was innate, created by nature, and as a consequence there was no chance of political and social equality for those who were nonwhite subjects of the empire. Both of these currents were united in their belief about black inferiority but disagreed on its root causes and naturalness. For those who thought that this so-called inferiority could be overcome, we should note that the goal which they envisioned was in terms of white normativity.

E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

Why does Mill mention the ancient Egyptians and Greeks?

#### From John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863)

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit- they designate as utterly mean and grovelling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast's pleasures do not satisfy a human being's conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former- that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it; but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in

exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.

Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness- that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.

It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.

It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favourable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether any one who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is suspectible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous.

#### **TEST PRACTICE: John Dewey**

1. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points)
2. VOCABULARY: In the text you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)
John Dewey was a leading proponent of the American school of thought 1\_\_\_\_\_\_ as pragmatism,
a view that rejected the dualistic epistemology and metaphysics of modern philosophy 2\_\_\_\_\_\_ favour of a naturalistic approach that viewed knowledge as arising from an active adaptation of the human organism to its environment. Inquiry should not be understood as consisting of a mind passively observing the world and drawing from this ideas that correspond to reality, but rather as a process which initiates with a check or obstacle to successful human action, proceeds to active manipulation of the environment to test hypotheses, and issues in a re-adaptation of the organism to the environment that allows once again for human action to

proceed. With this view as his starting point, Dewey developed a broad body of work encompassing virtually all of the main areas of philosophical concern in his day. He also wrote extensively on social issues in 3\_\_\_\_\_ popular publications as the *New Republic*, thereby gaining a reputation as a leading social commentator of his time.

Dewey's mature thought in ethics and social theory is not 4\_\_\_\_\_\_ intimately linked to the theory of knowledge in its founding conceptual framework and naturalistic standpoint, but also complementary to it in its emphasis on the social dimension of inquiry both in its processes and its consequences. In fact, it would be reasonable to claim that Dewey's theory of inquiry cannot be fully understood in the meaning of its central tenets or in the significance of its originality without considering how it applies to social aims and values, the central concern of his ethical and social theory.

Dewey rejected the atomistic understanding of society of the Hobbesian 5\_\_\_\_\_ contract theory, according to 6\_\_\_\_\_ the social, cooperative aspect of human life was grounded in the rational interests of individuals. Dewey's claim in *Experience and Nature* that the collection of meanings that constitute the mind have a social origin expresses the basic contention, one that he maintained throughout his career, that the human individual is a social being from the start, and that individual satisfaction and achievement 7\_\_\_\_\_ be realized only within the context of social habits and institutions that promote it.

Moral and social problems, for Dewey, are concerned with the guidance of human action to the achievement of socially defined ends that are productive of a satisfying life for individuals within the social context. Regarding the nature of 8\_\_\_\_\_\_ constitutes a satisfying life, Dewey was intentionally vague, out of his conviction that specific ends or goods can be defined only in particular socio-historical contexts. In the *Ethics* (1932) he speaks of the ends simply as the cultivation of interests in goods that recommend themselves following calm reflection. In other works, such as *Human Nature and Conduct* and *Art as Experience*, he speaks of (1) the harmonizing of experience (the resolution of conflicts of habit and interest both within the individual and within society), (2) the release from tedium in favor of the enjoyment of variety and creative action, and (3) the expansion of meaning (the enrichment of the individual's appreciation of his or her circumstances within human culture and the world 9\_\_\_\_\_\_ large). The attunement of individual efforts to the promotion of these social ends constitutes, for Dewey, the central issue of ethical concern of the individual; the collective means for their realization is the **paramount** (*circle the best synonym: principle/chief/peripheral/supporting*) question of political policy.

Conceived in this manner, the appropriate method for solving moral and social questions is the same as that required for solving questions concerning matters of fact: an empirical method that is tied to an examination of problematic situations, the gathering of relevant facts, and the imaginative consideration of possible solutions that, when utilized, bring about a reconstruction and resolution of the original situations. Dewey, throughout his ethical and social writings, stressed the need for an open-ended, flexible, and experimental approach to problems of practice aimed 10\_\_\_\_\_\_ the determination of the conditions for the attainment of human goods and a critical examination of the consequences of means adopted to promote them, an approach that he called the "method of intelligence."

The central focus of Dewey's criticism of the tradition of ethical thought is its tendency to seek solutions to moral and social problems in dogmatic principles and simplistic criteria which 11\_\_\_\_\_\_ his view were incapable of dealing effectively with the changing requirements of human events. In *Reconstruction of Philosophy* and *The Quest for Certainty*, Dewey located the motivation of traditional dogmatic approaches in philosophy in the forlorn hope for security in an uncertain world, forlorn because the conservatism of these approaches has the effect of inhibiting the intelligent adaptation of human practice to the ineluctable changes in the physical and social environment. Ideals and values must be evaluated with respect to their social consequences, 12\_\_\_\_\_\_ as inhibitors or as valuable instruments for social progress, and Dewey **argues** (*circle the best synonym: agrees/acclaims/maintains/quarrels*) that philosophy, because of

the breadth of its concern and its critical approach, can play a crucial role in this evaluation. The social condition for the flexible adaptation that Dewey believed was crucial for human advancement is a democratic form of life, not instituted merely by democratic forms of governance, but by the inculcation of democratic habits of cooperation and public spiritedness, productive of an organized, selfconscious community of individuals responding to society's needs by experimental and inventive, rather than dogmatic, means. The development of these democratic habits, Dewey argues in School and Society and Democracy and Education, must begin in the earliest years of a child's educational experience. Dewey rejected the notion that an education should be viewed as merely a preparation for civil life, during which disjoint facts and ideas are conveyed by the teacher and memorized by the student only to be utilized later on. The school should rather 13 viewed as an extension of civil society and continuous with it, and the student encouraged to operate as a member of a community, actively pursuing interests in cooperation with others. It is by a process of self-directed learning, guided by the cultural resources provided by teachers, that Dewey believed a child is best prepared for the demands of responsible membership within the democratic community. [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy] 3. TRUE/FALSE: (10 points) Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences. 1. Though Hobbes and Dewey had differences in their views on society, they both stressed the importance of the individual regardless of his social context. 2. Dewey rejected a dogmatic approach to dealing with social issues, preferring instead one based on experiment.

3. According to Pragmatism, there is a link between human knowledge and adaptation.

4. According to Dewey, teachers should adopt a passive role in the classroom.

5. Most of Dewey's writings were published in periodicals like the *New Republic*.

#### 4. LOGICAL ORDER: Put the sentences in the most logical order. (5 points)

In The Ethics of Democracy Dewey sought to rebut Sir Henry Maine's devastating attack on democracy. In
book of essays titled Popular Government (1886), Maine had declared that the cultural disorganization that so
troubled the nineteenth century was the result of the growth of popular government, or democracy. 1
2345 Ethical though democracy may be, can any society afford it?

- A. This conviction that democracy is the most ethical form of human association because it allows all to participate in the creation of the common good became the single most important notion in his social and political philosophy.
- B. But at this stage of Dewey's intellectual career, this notion precipitated more problems than it solved.
- C. In his rebuttal to Maine, the young Dewey focuses on a philosophical question: "What is democracy?"
- D. For, if one accepts the construction of democracy as an ethical form of association, the objections Sir Henry Maine raised come back with renewed force: the participation of all people simply leads to social instability.
- E. Democracy, for Dewey, is an ethical conception.

#### **TEST PRACTICE: Dewey on Racism**

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points)

B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)

C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in the first part of paragraph VIII in the <u>most</u> logical order (1-5). (EXAMPLE: a. \_1\_) (5 points)

[...] One of America's most prolific scholars and philosophers of the twentieth century, Dewey had played a role in the founding of the NAACP (the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People) and had attacked capitalist threats to democracy, but he had written hardly (1)\_\_\_\_\_\_about racism in American society. Dewey biographer Jay Martin describes Dewey's view at the turn of the century: "In 1909, Dewey saw the time had come when racial antagonism and race prejudice might be effectively challenged not so (2)\_\_\_\_\_\_ through legislation as by the operations of voluntary associations." Shannon Sullivan writes, "Given Dewey's insistence that philosophy be informed by the context of 'real life,' it is dismaying that Dewey wrote very little about the contradictive role that race and racism play in lived experience." Yet Dewey's lack of writing on race does not show a lack of interest, but rather a different conceptualization of the problem. Dewey's actions over time give us a greater understanding of how he was trying to grasp America's complex race problem. An astute observer of political, economic and social problems, Dewey had trouble understanding its complexity and cultural manifestations, particularly in the South.

II Dewey had experienced racism first hand. Shortly after the founding of the NAACP, his wife, Alice Dewey, began to invite African American women to the Dewey home, "in an attempt to join them to the women's suffrage movement." When the owner of the building found out, he forbade the Dewey's to hold further integrated meetings.

Dewey's trips to Japan and China, first in 1919, further opened his eyes to racism. He was deeply Ш concerned by the growing aggressive foreign policy of Japan and how the Japanese were using racial discrimination to secure their power and influence in China. Although treated with respect during his trip to Japan, Dewey did not feel the Japanese were interested in his democratic ideals. (3)\_ China, Dewey read a paper entitled "Race Prejudice and Friction" before the Chinese Social and Political Science Association, one of his broadest statements on race. In the paper Dewey referred to racism as a "deep seated and widespread social disease," a prejudice that comes before and blinds us to clear judgment; "it is a desire or emotion which makes us see things in a particular light and gives a slant to all our beliefs." For Dewey, prejudice comes from our habits or incorporated experiences. While prejudice was probably due to lack of experiences, Dewey tied it also to our natural aversion to something different or strange to us, "originating probably in the self-protective tendencies of animal life. . . . The basis of racial prejudice is instinctive dislike and dread of (4) is strange." He found that political forces come into play because they can change "race prejudice into racial discrimination," the dominant group seeking "facts to quote in support of their belief in their own superiority." This domination led to "the most rational factor in the confirming of racial animosities, the economic." Dewey pointed (5) tradition, custom, religion and politics are added to the mix, racial friction is enhanced. While Dewey did seem to understand the social forces behind prejudice, he still gave the greater emphasis to political and economic forces and clearly states so in his writings. He emphasized that political and economic forces have the potential to turn race prejudice into outright race discrimination and believed science and psychology had always been used to ground racism in absolutes and inherent qualities.

IV In the 1920s Dewey began to show deep concern about the rise of individualism fostered by a capitalist economy. Dewey perceived a moral crisis, enhanced by crass materialism and the lack of a central purpose in education and social and political policy. He discussed limits to individual freedom and believed one of the primary goals of education was to train people "for intelligent organization, so that they can unite with each other in a common struggle to combat poverty, disease, ignorance, credulity and low standards of appreciation and enjoyment." (6)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_, Dewey did not challenge the difficulty for African American citizens legally denied such an education and thus denied equality of opportunity.

V In November 1929 Dewey addressed a largely Jewish audience on the subject of *Understanding and Prejudice*. Reiterating earlier themes, he defined prejudice (7)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ "something that precedes judgment and tends to represent and to distort it." He believed that if we were to understand prejudice, we had to see it beyond the intellectual. "Understanding means something intellectual," he writes, "but it means something that is more than intellectual. We sometimes say comprehension, but comprehension is an inclusive word— it signifies coming together, bringing things together; and when we say that human beings

reach an understanding, we mean to say that they have reached a common outlook from which they see the same things and feel the same way about them." This statement implies that Dewey had the beginning of an understanding of the social forces underlying prejudice; a moral and even emphatic desire to seek dialogue, to listen, and in essence move to democratic community. But did Dewey fully grasp the difficulty in this type of community in the American South? In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey wrote, "We are always biased (circle the best synonym: extreme / imbalanced / subjective / stable) beings, tending in one direction instead of (9) As a member of the League for Independent Action, Dewey was aware of conditions of racism and poverty in the South. The League for Independent Action was a group of progressive intellectuals committed to the organization of a third political party modeled on the British Labour Party. In March 1930 the Executive Secretary of the League brought back promising news following a twenty-four day trip in twelve southern states. The Secretary found some progress, if slow, was evident in inter-racial relations and justice in the courts. The report emphasized that justice for African Americans could be dealt with best as a part of the whole economic and social picture, rather than as a separate problem. Dewey echoed this optimism in a radio address in October 1931. He argued, "Mass production and uniform regimentation have grown in the degree in which individual opportunity has waned. The current (10)\_ \_ to be reversed", following the motto, "Learn to act with and for others while you learn to think and to judge for yourself." Still, Dewey's understanding of propaganda seems more related to political and economic than social forces, including prejudice. Dewey underestimated, along (11) other liberals, the educational power of social propaganda that fomented deep prejudice in the South. On May 19, 1932, Dewey addressed the twenty-third annual conference of the NAACP in VII Washington. In perhaps the worst year of the Depression and before New Deal legislation, Dewey directly addressed the African Americans in his audience. "Doubtless you are the first, on the whole, to lose employment and the last to be taken on . . . but nonetheless, the cause from (12)\_ suffering is the same . . . and so the thing that I should like to say to you tonight is the same sort of thing that I would say to representatives of any white group that is also at a disadvantage politically in comparison with the privileged few." Dewey then went on (circle the best synonym: kept on / continues / argued / proceeded) to attack the two-party system in the United States, arguing that the solution to America's problems could come through a viable third political party. This political organization, Dewey's third party, could attack the competitive order which "has to set man against man, brother against brother, group against group." Dewey ended his speech saying, "Now I will submit to you the thing I would submit to any white group that is also at a disadvantage, since your fundamental difficulties do not come through color or any other one thing. They come from the fact that in a society which is economically and industrially organized as ours is, those who want the greatest profits and those who want the monopoly, power and influence that money gives can get it by creating dislike and division among the mass of the people." Unfortunately, Dewey neglected the true significance of color in his analysis of the problem. He de-emphasizes what W. E. B. DuBois in 1903 claimed was the problem of the twentieth century, i.e. "the color line." This was a serious oversight by Dewey. One can only wonder what southern African Americans attending the meeting must thought. Dewey seems to suggest that a change in economics through political change would give African Americans equality of opportunity. Most in the south, however, could not vote and Dewey still failed to see the power of tradition, culture and colour deeply embedded in these social forces and their manifestation through racism. VIII \_ In it, Dewey attacked the notion that human nature was fixed, an assumption racists tended to accept and often supported through science and religion. His essay, "Contrary to Human Nature," in Frontiers of Democracy, would seem to support such a view. By 1939, Dewey had become acutely aware of the rise of National Socialism and its attacks on democracy as well as its racist ideology. d. He wrote, "it is often said that human nature is so unalterable by its very constitution that the proposal is bound to fail and therefore shouldn't be tried. In the past, changes in institutions, that is in fundamental custom, have been opposed on the ground that they were contrary to Nature in its most universal sense, and hence to the will and reason of God as the Founder of Nature. One has only to go back to the arguments advanced against the abolition of human slavery to see that such was the case." Did the racist ideology of this current push Dewey to re-examine racism beyond its connection to the means of production or economic forces?

Within his sense of pragmatism Dewey was suggesting that habits, traditions, customs, beliefs and values are not unchangeable. The excuse that God ordained or fixed human nature, that it had always been this or that way, was not good enough. By the onset of World War II, Dewey seemed on the verge of a better understanding of American racism and began to attack it through this pragmatic understanding of experience.

D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)  Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, <u>using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text</u> .
1 Dewey shared DuBois' opinion regarding 'the color line' and sought to resolve it through the creation of a third political party.
2 Both Martin and Sullivan have dedicated studies to Dewey and racism, the former accusing the philosopher of not writing more on such a key topic.
3Dewey did not condone the actions of Japan in China, nor did he welcome his rude treatment by the Japanese.
4 According to Dewey, the factors at the core of racism were more economic and political in nature than social.
F. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences, (2 points)

What kind of text is this? Give at least two reasons to justify your answer.

# TEST PRACTICE: VOCABULARY AND READING COMPREHENSION Chapter 1 "Traditional vs. Progressive Education" in Dewey, Experience and Education

Mankind likes to think in terms of extreme opposites. It is given to formulating its beliefs in terms of Either-Ors , between which it recognizes no intermediate possibilities. When forced to recognize that the extremes cannot be acted upon, it is still inclined to hold that they are all right in theory but that when it comes to practical matters circumstances compel us to compromise. Educational philosophy is no exception. The history of educational theory is marked by opposition between the idea that education is development from within and that it is formation from without; that it is based upon natural endowments (donations/attributes/presentations/inheritances) and that education is a process of overcoming natural inclination and substituting in its place habits acquired under external pressure.

At present, the opposition, so far as practical affairs of the school are concerned, tends to take the form of contrast between traditional and progressive education. If the underlying ideas of the former are formulated broadly, without the qualifications required for accurate statement, they are found to be about as follows: The subject-matter of education consists of bodies of information and of skills that have been worked out in the past; therefore, the chief business of the school is to transmit them to the new generation. In the past, there have also been developed standards and rules of conduct; moral training consists in forming habits of action in conformity with these rules and standards. Finally, the general **pattern** (decoration/instruction/arrangement/motif) of school organization (by which I mean the relations of pupils to one another and to the teachers) constitutes the school a kind of institution sharply marked off from other social institutions. Call up in imagination the ordinary schoolroom, its time-schedules, schemes of classification, of examination and promotion, of rules of order, and I think you will grasp what is meant by "pattern of organization." If then you contrast this scene with what goes on in the family, for example, you will appreciate what is meant by the school being a kind of institution sharply marked off from any other form of social organization.

The three characteristics just mentioned fix the aims and methods of instruction and discipline. The main purpose or objective is to prepare the young for future responsibilities and for success in life, by means of acquisition of the organized bodies of information and prepared forms of skill which comprehend the material of instruction. Since the subject-matter as well as standards of **proper** (appropriate/personal/felicitous/solid) conduct are handed down from the past, the attitude of pupils must, upon the whole, be one of docility, receptivity, and obedience. Books, especially textbooks, are the chief representatives of the lore and wisdom of the past, while teachers are the organs through which pupils are brought into effective connection with the material. Teachers are the agents through which knowledge and skills are communicated and rules of conduct enforced.

I have not made this brief summary for the purpose of criticizing the underlying philosophy. The rise of what is called new education and progressive schools is of itself a product of discontent with traditional education. In effect it is a criticism of the latter. When the implied criticism is made explicit it reads somewhat as follows: The traditional scheme is, in essence, one of imposition from above and from outside. It imposes adult standards, subject-matter, and methods upon those who are only growing slowly toward maturity. The gap is so great that the required subject-matter, the methods of learning and of behaving are foreign to the existing capacities of the young. They are beyond the reach of the experience the young learners already possess. Consequently, they must be imposed; even though good teachers will use devices of art to cover up the imposition so as to relieve it of obviously brutal features.

But the gulf between the mature or adult products and the experience and abilities of the young is so wide that the very situation forbids much active participation by pupils in the development of what is taught. Theirs is to do--and learn, as it was the part of the six hundred to do and die. Learning here means acquisition of what already is incorporated in books and in the heads of the elders. Moreover, that which is taught is thought of as essentially static. It is taught as a finished product, with little regard either to the ways in which it was originally built up or to changes that will surely occur in the future. It is to a large extent the cultural product of societies that **assumed** (hoped/was afraid/deemed/idealized) the future would be much like the past, and yet it is used as educational food in a society where change is the rule, not the exception.

If one attempts to formulate the philosophy of education implicit in the practices of the newer education, we may, I think, discover certain common principles amid the variety of progressive schools now existing. To imposition from above is opposed expression and cultivation of individuality; to external discipline is opposed free activity; to learning from texts and teachers, learning through experience; to acquisition of isolated skills and techniques by **drill** (repetition/tool/force/boredom), is opposed acquisition of them as means of attaining ends which make direct vital appeal; to preparation for a more or less remote future is opposed making the most of the opportunities of present life; to static aims and materials is opposed acquaintance with a changing world.

Now, all principles by themselves are abstract. They become concrete only in the consequences which result from their application. Just because the principles set forth are so fundamental and far-reaching, everything depends upon the interpretation given them as they are put into practice in the school and the home. It is at this point that the reference made earlier to Either- Or philosophies becomes peculiarly pertinent. The general philosophy of the new education may be **sound** (audible /healthy/ orthodox/reasonable), and yet

the difference in abstract principles will not decide the way in which the moral and intellectual preference involved shall be worked out in practice. There is always the danger in a new movement that in rejecting the aims and methods of that which it would supplant, it may develop its principles negatively rather than positively and constructively. Then it takes its clew in practice from that which is rejected instead of from the constructive development of its own philosophy.

I take it that the fundamental unity of the newer philosophy is found in the idea that there is an intimate and necessary relation between the processes of actual experience and education. If this be true, then a positive and constructive development of its own basic idea depends upon having a correct idea of experience. Take, for example, the question of organized subject-matter--which will be discussed in some detail later. The problem for progressive education is: What is the place and meaning of subject-matter and of organization within experience? How does subject-matter function? Is there anything inherent in experience which tends towards progressive organization of its contents? What results follow when the materials of experience are not progressively organized? A philosophy which proceeds on the basis of rejection, of sheer (precipitous/absolute/transparent/restricted) opposition, will neglect these questions. It will tend to suppose that because the old education was based on ready-made organization, therefore it suffices to reject the principle of organization in toto, instead of striving to discover what it means and how it is to be attained on the basis of experience. We might go through all the points of difference between the new and the old education and reach similar conclusions. When external control is rejected, the problem becomes that of finding the factors of control that are inherent within experience. When external authority is rejected, it does not follow that all authority should be rejected, but rather that there is need to search for a more effective source of authority. Because the older education imposed the knowledge, methods, and the rules of conduct of the mature person upon the young, it does not follow, except upon the basis of the extreme Either-Or philosophy, that the knowledge and skill of the mature person has no directive value for the experience of the immature. On the contrary, basing education upon personal experience may mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts between the mature and the immature than ever existed in the traditional school, and consequently more, rather than less, guidance by others. The problem, then, is; how these contacts can be established without violating the principle of learning through personal experience. The solution of this problem requires a well thought-out philosophy of the social factors that operate in the constitution of individual experience.

[...] It is not too much to say that an educational philosophy which professes to be based on the idea of freedom may become as dogmatic as ever was the traditional education which is reacted against. For any theory and set of practices is dogmatic which is not based upon critical examination of its own underlying (simple/highlighted/emphasized/basic) principles. Let us say that the new education emphasizes the freedom of the learner. Very well. A problem is now set. What does freedom mean and what are the conditions under which it is capable of realization? Let us say that the kind of external imposition which was so common in the traditional school limited rather than promoted the intellectual and moral development of the young. Again, very well. Recognition of this serious defect sets a problem. Just what is the role of the teacher and of books in promoting the educational development of the immature? Admit that traditional education employed as the subject-matter for study facts and ideas so bound up with the past as to give little help in dealing with the issues of the present and future. Very well. Now we have the problem of discovering the connection which actually exists within experience between the achievements of the past and the issues of the present. We have the problem of ascertaining how acquaintance with the past may be translated into a potent instrumentality for dealing effectively with the future. We may reject knowledge of the past as the end of education and thereby only emphasize its importance as a means. When we do that we have a problem that is new in the story of education: How shall the young become acquainted with the past in such a way that the acquaintance is a potent agent in appreciation of the living present?

- 1. What are Dewey's thoughts on 'Either-Or' philosophies?
- 2. What are the main differences between traditional and progressive education?
- 3. What factor(s) are important to Dewey in his educational philosophy?

## **Grammar and Vocabulary**

## A. (Word Formation)

If William James was the most brilliant of the pragmatists, John Dewey was in the final
(1)(analyze) the most influential. By the time of his death at the age of ninety-two,
Dewey had brought about a reconstruction of philosophy and had influenced the workings of many American
(2)(institute), (3)(particular) the schools and the legislative and
judicial processes. His influence was felt beyond the boundaries of the United States, especially in Japan and
China, where his lectures made a lasting (4) (impress). While a professor at the
University of Chicago, he became known for his pragmatic concepts of education. As
(5)(direct) of the Laboratory School for children at the University of Chicago, he
experimented with a more permissive and (6)(create) atmosphere for learning, setting
aside the more (7)(tradition) method of learning by listening, encouraging instead the
pupil's initiative and individual (8)(involve) in projects. Dewey produced an enormous
number of (9)(write) even after his retirement in 1929. His interests covered a wide
range, as can be seen in his work on logic, metaphysics, and the theory of (10)(know).
B. (Verbs)
John Dewey, probably the most influential of all American philosophers and the one who
(1) (be) best remembered in the future, (2) (be) from Vermont. After
graduation from the University of Vermont, he received a Ph.D. from The Johns Hopkins University and
(3) (teach) at a number of major universities. By the time of his death in 1952, he
(4) (gain) an international reputation for his pragmatic approach to philosophy,
psychology and liberal politics.
In all likelihood, Dewey's most enduring influence (5) (lie) in the field of
education. (6) (believe) in the unity of theory and practice, Dewey not only
(7) (write) on the subject, but for a time also participated in the "laboratory school" for
children connected with the University of Chicago. His chief early work in this field, Democracy and
Education (1916), was the most comprehensive statement of his position. The work contained in this volume,
Experience and Education, (8) (write) more than two decades later and still today
(9) (represent) the best concise statement on education by the most important educational
theorist of the twentieth century. Moreover, it is probably the simplest and most readable statement on the
subject that anyone to this day (10) (make).

#### TEST PRACTICE: Karl Popper

#### VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym.

In *Unended Quest*, Popper recounts how, as a politically conscious adolescent, he flirted with Communism. He was quickly disillusioned when he judged Communist actions irresponsible in leading to the deaths of some demonstrators. (Individual autonomy, responsibility, Socratic fallibilism and the obligation to reduce suffering are the keynotes of his scattered remarks about ethics.) In the 1920s he began a critique of Marx and Marxism, first **tried out** (*tested/attempted/analysed/given*) in a talk of 1935, 'The Poverty of Historicism'. 'Historicism' is Popper's name for the idea that there are inexorable laws of historical development: the demand that if natural science can predict eclipses then social science ought to be able to predict political revolutions. In a highly systematic way, Popper **set out** (*aimed/left/departed/arranged*) to show how both those who think the social sciences are not at all like the natural sciences (the 'antinaturalists') and those who think the social sciences very like the natural sciences (the 'naturalists'), share the aim of predicting history. Both recommend the methodology of historicism, which he sees as impoverished and inclined to treat societies as wholes responding to the pressures of inchoate social forces.

Instead, Popper recommends 'methodological individualism': rules to the effect that the behaviour and actions of collectives should be explained by the behaviour of human individuals acting appropriately to the logic of their social situation as best they can and as best they see it. Not only was the alternative unfruitful, he argued, but the best social explanations of Plato and Marx were individualist. What look like holistic phenomena are to be explained as the 'unintended consequences' of such individual actions reverberating through the social set-up.

According to methodological individualism, social theories are tested not by historical predictions, which are little more than prophecies, Popper argues, but by attempts to invent institutions that correct social faults by social engineering. Man-made social institutions are hypotheses in action, he says. If we are to refute these hypotheses we need to avoid complicating matters with large-scale experiments, or too many at once, otherwise assessment will be impossible. For we must also reckon with the interference factor of 'the Oedipus effect', that is, the way in which a prediction about the future becomes an altering factor in the situation as human beings are aware of it, thus 'interfering' with the outcome.

The Open Society and Its Enemies was a 'truly unintended consequence' of an attempt to expand aspects of The Poverty of Historicism to satisfy puzzled friends. When it grew too large, Popper made it a separate work. On publication in 1945 it elevated him from academic obscurity to academic fame. He became a controversial and well-known public intellectual.

Described modestly as a 'critical introduction to the philosophy of politics and of history', *The Open Society* had become, in the seven years of its gestation, a major treatise on the intellectual and social ills of the time, offering an explanation of how totalitarianism had gained intellectual respectability and how purging post-war society of it would involve rethinking politics, education and social morality. Its title refers to two ideal-types used throughout. A closed society is one which takes a magical or tabooistic attitude to tradition and custom, which does not differentiate between nature and convention. An open society marks that difference and confronts its members with personal decisions and the opportunity to reflect rationally on them. Heraclitus, Aristotle and Hegel are briefly discussed, but the book's two intellectual anti-heroes are Plato in volume 1 and Marx in volume 2.

The volume entitled 'The Spell of Plato' answers two questions: first, why Plato espoused totalitarian ideas and second, why students of Plato have whitewashed that fact and beautified him. The answer to the first question, a deeply sympathetic piece of writing, sketches a portrait of the young Plato contemplating with dismay the closed world of tribal Athens giving way to a more liberal and open society, with loss of social privilege and chaos arriving hand in hand. Popper insists on the brilliance of Plato's sociological analysis of the causes of change and of his proposals to arrest it and staunch the deterioration it brings. In answer to the second, Popper courts controversy by suggesting that Plato's intellectual followers, flattered by the role offered them, engaged in a long-running *trahison des clercs* by presenting as liberal and enlightened the doctrine of the philosopher king.

To expose the commitment of Plato and Platonists to totalitarianism, Popper had to clarify our ideals of a liberal and democratic social order and show how Plato indulges in persuasive definitions, while attempting to show that his totalitarian Republic is 'just'. (Popper also mounts a general attack on the idea that philosophy should **seek out** (*hunt for/research/look for/understand*) the essence of universal words such as justice, democracy and tyranny. He argues that natural science uses the methodology of nominalism, not of essentialism, and social science and philosophy would do well to follow suit.) Mindful of Plato's distaste for majority rule, as rule of the mob or rule of the worst, Popper carefully discusses tyranny, and concludes that

the problem is not the question of what is popular, for certain kinds of tyrants are very popular and could easily be elected. So an open and liberal society is not to be identified with a popularly elected government. No more is it a matter of what is just, good or best, for none of these offers insurance against tyranny in their name. In line with his theory of science, and of knowledge generally, he proposes a via negativa. The issue is not what regime we want, but what to do about ones we do not want. The problem with tyranny is that the citizens have no peaceful way in which to rid themselves of it, should they want to. Popper proposes a now famous and generally endorsed criterion for democracy as that political system which permits the citizens to rid themselves of an unwanted government without the need to resort to violence. He exposes Plato's question, 'Who should rule?', and all similar discussions of sovereignty as subject to paradoxes because the question permits an inconsistency to develop between the statement designating the ruler (for example, the best or wisest should rule) and what the ruler commands (for example, the best or wisest may then tell us: obey the majority, or the powerful). Popper noticed that the question carries the authoritarian implication that whoever is so named is entitled to rule. He replaces them with the practical question 'how can we rid ourselves of bad governments without violence?', with its implication that rulers are on permanent parole. Popper's is a fundamentally pessimistic view that all governments are to one extent or the other incompetent and potentially criminal in their misbehaviour, and that only a political system which allows them to govern at the sufferance of citizens who can withdraw their support readily is one with more or less effective checks against abuse. Even so, the fallibility of our institutional hypotheses enjoin upon us an eternal vigilance.

The second volume, 'The High Tide of Prophecy, Hegel and Marx', argues that the prophetic tendency in Heraclitus and Plato produced in Hegel a damaging incoherence and charlatanry, and in Marx a project for the scientific study of society that, despite noble emancipating aims, foundered, especially among the followers, on the confusion of prediction with unscientific historical prophecy and hence on a fundamental misconstruction of scientific method. The chapters on Marx are among the most penetrating commentaries ever written on him, and are both sympathetic in their appreciation and unremitting in their criticism. Although Popper clearly regards Plato as the deeper thinker, he argues that Marx has much to teach us about how moral and emancipatory impulses can go awry. Marxists and the radical experimenters of the Soviet Union are judged harshly, as are all forms of nationalism.

Appearing in 1945 just after the end of the war, a war that had forged an alliance with the Soviet Union, the book antagonized many powerful intellectual interest groups. Platonists were **taken aback** (returned/astonished/surprising/criticized) to be accused of being apologists for totalitarian tendencies in Plato (even though Popper was not the first to **point** these **out** [explain/draw attention to/sign/face]) and Marxists were equally affronted. The aftermath was strange. Although Popper was at first widely read and indignantly denounced, it later became bad form among Marxists and classicists to mention him by name. Yet, to an extraordinary extent, in the following decades his work set the agenda for apologetic Platonists, Hegelians and Marxists. In many cases a book or article makes most sense when seen as covertly engaged in trying to confute some point Popper made in The Open Society . (By I. Jarvie)

#### D. TRUE/FALSE:

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. Popper holds that a true democracy is one in which people have the power to do away with an unfit government without resorting to violence.
- 2. Jarvie is both critical of and sympathetic to the way in which Popper analyses Marx.
- 3. According to Popper, Plato's followers misrepresented their teacher's doctrine by presenting the philosopher king as an enlightened figure instead of as a totalitarian.
- 4. After its publication just prior to the end of World War II, Popper's work met with criticism from various circles.
- 5. Popper, a firm supporter of historicism, gave his first talk on the subject in the mid-1930s.

#### **CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE: John Rawls**

In his discussion with Crito, Socrates provides us with a classic statement of the problem of civil disobedience: whether the individual has the right to disobey the law if he or she believes it unjust. As we have seen, Socrates' argument is based on a kind of 'social contract' theory, which maintains that just as a citizen enjoys the benefits of the state, so he or she must obey the laws of that state. While it is, therefore, quite proper for people to try to change the law, they must always do so within the law and never commit any action that would do violence or injury to the law. To do so is to destroy the contract they have with the state and its laws. More specifically, then, individuals must accept the decisions of the courts, even though a particular verdict may be unjust. They may appeal against the verdict, but in the end, whatever the outcome, they must abide by that decision. Thus, even if an error of justice persists to the end and even if it results in the death of an innocent person, the sentence of the court must be upheld and carried out. For Socrates, the consequences of *not* doing this would be socially catastrophic and far outweigh all considerations of injustice in particular cases.

This is not to say that Socrates rules out all forms of civil disobedience. It is quite clear from his argument that if, for instance, a man believed that the laws of the state were corrupt, and if one of these laws prevented him from leaving the country, then the contract that bound him to obedience could be ignored and the law disobeyed. Unfortunately, however, matters are not always as straightforward as this. Often the problem is not whether the laws in general are unjust, but whether the injustice of a particular law outweighs the justice of the law in general. In other words, what should the law-abiding citizen do when he or she comes face to face with a law which they find quite intolerable?

In the following extract, the contemporary philosopher, John Rawls, introduces a 'social contract' theory similar to that of Socrates and based on his influential notion of 'fair play': if it is socially necessary that everyone should behave in a certain way, then it is unfair to the rest if someone gains an advantage by acting otherwise. To this extent, the injustice of a law is not a sufficient reason for not complying with it.

#### John Rawls: "Justice as Fairness"

...Fundamental to justice is the concept of fairness which relates to right dealing between persons who are co-operating with or competing against one another, as when one speaks of fair games, fair competition, and fair bargains. The question of fairness arises when free persons, who have no authority over one another, are engaging in a joint activity and amongst themselves settling or acknowledging the rules which define it and which determine the respective shares in its benefits and burdens. A practice will strike the parties as fair if none feels that, by participating in it, they or any of the others are taken advantage of, or forced to give in to claims which they do not regard as legitimate. This implies that each has a conception of legitimate claims which he thinks is reasonable for others as well as himself to acknowledge...

Now if the participants in a practice accept its rules as fair, and so have no complaint to **lodge** against it, there arises a ... duty (and a corresponding... right) of the parties to each other to act in accordance with the practice when it falls upon them to comply. When any number of persons engage in a practice, or conduct a joint undertaking according to rules, and thus restrict their liberty, those who have submitted to these restrictions when required have the right to similar acquiescence on the part of those who have benefitted from their submission. These conditions will obtain if a practice is correctly acknowledged to be fair, for in this case all who participate in it will benefit from it...But one cannot, in general, be released from this obligation (to follow a rule) by denying the justice of the practice only when it falls on one to obey. If a person rejects a practice, he should, so far as possible, declare his intention in advance, and avoid participating in it or enjoying its benefits.

This duty I have called that of fair play, but it should be admitted that to refer to it in this way is, perhaps, to extend the ordinary notion of fairness. Usually acting unfairly is not so much the breaking of any particular rule, even if the infraction is difficult to detect (cheating), but taking advantage of **loop-holes** or ambiguities in rules, availing oneself of unexpected or special circumstances which make it impossible to enforce them, insisting that rules be enforced to one's advantage when they should be suspended, and more generally, acting contrary to the intention of a practice. It is for this reason that one speaks of the sense of fair play: acting fairly requires more than simply being able to follow rules; what is fair must often be felt, or perceived, one wants to say. It is not, however, an unnatural extension of the duty of fair play to have it include the obligation which participants who have knowingly accepted the benefits of their common

practice owe to each other to act in accordance with it when their performance falls due; for it is usually considered unfair if someone accepts the benefits of a practice but refuses to do his part in maintaining it. Thus one might say of the **tax-dodger** that he violates the duty of fair play: he accepts the benefits of government but will not do his part in releasing resources to it; and members of labour unions often say that fellow workers who refuse to join are being unfair: they refer to them as '**free riders**', as persons who enjoy what are the supposed benefits of unionism, higher wages, shorter hours, job security, and the like, but who refuse to share in its burdens in the form of paying dues, and so on...


The conception at which we have arrived, then is that the principles of justice may be thought of as arising once the constraints of having a morality are imposed upon rational and mutually self-interested parties who are related and situated in a special way. A practice is just if it is in accordance with the principles which all who participate in it might reasonably be expected to propose or to acknowledge before one another when they are similarly circumstanced and required to make a firm commitment in advance without knowledge of what will be their peculiar condition, and thus when it meets standards which the parties could accept as fair, should occasion arise for them to debate its merits. Regarding the participants themselves, once persons knowingly engage in a practice which they acknowledge to be fair and accept the benefits of doing so, they are bound by the duty of fair play to follow the rules when it comes their turn to do so, and this implies a limitation on their pursuit of self-interest in particular cases....

The difficulty is that we cannot frame a procedure which guarantees that only just and effective legislation is enacted. Thus even under a just constitution unjust laws may be passed and unjust policies enforced. Some form of the majority principle is necessary but the majority may be mistaken, more or less wilfully, in what it legislates. In agreeing to a democratic constitution...one accepts at the same time the principle of majority rule. Assuming that the constitution is just and that we have accepted and plan to continue to accept its benefits, we then have an obligation and a natural duty (or in any case the duty) to comply with what the majority enacts even though it may be unjust. In this way we are bound to follow unjust laws, not always, of course, but provided the injustice does not exceed certain limits. We recognize that we must run the risk of suffering from the defects of one another's sense of injustice; this burden we are prepared to carry as long as it is more or less evenly distributed or does not weigh too heavily. Justice binds us to a just constitution and to the unjust laws which may be enacted under it in precisely the same way that it binds us to any other social arrangement. Once we take the sequence of stages into account, there is noting unusual in our being required to comply with unjust laws...

#### **Short Answer:**


- 1. What is the principle of 'fair play'? With the help of a practical example, how far do you think this principle justifies obedience to an unjust law?
- 2. To what extent does Rawls allow disobedience to the law? Can you think of an instance in which you would feel morally bound to go against the principle of 'fair play'?
- 3. Find synonyms for the words in bold.

# READINGS ON COLONIALISM, SLAVERY, IMMIGRATION AND GLOBALIZATION



#### A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (14 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in paragraph 8 in the most logical order. (4 points) (By Eliott Robert Barkan) Americans remember and commemorate their immigrant ancestors in different ways. Two-thirds of all European immigrants to the United States first **set foot** (circle the best synonym: arrived /entered /reached/stood up) on American soil on Ellis Island, in New York harbor. Today, two million people annually visit the National Park Service's impressive Ellis Island Immigration Museum and millions more search its database for information on their ancestors. By contrast, 700 miles to the south is Sullivan's Island. Through most of the eighteenth century, 2 over half of all emigrants from sub-Saharan Africa who came to land that would become the United States made their initial stop on this flat, four-by-one mile stretch of sand. These were not free-will immigrants their lot in a new land but enslaved persons sold initially along Africa's Atlantic Coast and conveyed across the ocean, shackled and stacked like cargo, to work for another's gain. There is no grand museum, no database to search - only a sandy beach lapped by the tides of the ocean that connects North America to the coast of West Africa 4000 miles 2 , the one-time home of these unwilling immigrants who had survived the painful passage. Although it began much earlier, 94 percent of all African forced immigration to what would become the United States occurred between 1700 and 1808, and nearly all of it in vessels flying 3 Union Jack or (after 1783) the Stars and Stripes. The heaviest part of this movement was over the four decades prior to the onset of the American Revolution, 1730-1770, with the exception of the five years after 1802, when planters wanted to top 4 \_ their labor supply in anticipation of Congress outlawing the slave trade. Following the trade's banning by law on January 1, 1808, the flow of Africans to the United States all but stopped, and between 1808 and 1861, when the Civil War brought the issue of slavery to final than 10,000 captive Africans entered the United States. Nearly all Africans arriving in America before 1808 came from lands bordering the Atlantic and for several hundred miles inland between Senegal in the north and Angola in the south, a coastline of approximately 3000 miles. As such, they came from a variety of culture areas and spoke a number of different languages. What they shared more than anything else were cultures that venerated kinship, age, and protective spirits in the surroundings, and extended families were the basis of social organization. Most Africans coming to America before recent times did so as the result of being captured in warfare or raids by other Africans, often with the intention of rounding up persons to sell. A person's enslavement might have occurred six months or a year or more before his or her sale to a captain of a ship at the Atlantic waterside, and that year often involved movement from a point of capture to the coast, almost always by walking with a group of others being marched along for the same purpose. Health conditions on the march were appalling, and 6\_\_ \_ many may have perished in capture and transportation to the coast as were ultimately sold to waiting slavers. They were part of a broader transatlantic slave trade that brought 12 million Africans to the Americas over three and one-half centuries. It is likely that 7\_\_\_ group of American immigrants faced a greater task in acculturating and forming families and communities than Africans migrating to the North American mainland. Few other groups came from an area where cultures were so completely different from the largely European-based culture they were to live among. Planters referred to newly arrived Africans as "outlandish" because their ways of acting and seeing the world were so entirely foreign to them. To a large extent, it was the Africans to adjust, clinging to some of the ways and practices they brought from their homeland and adopting new ones when necessary or practical. The result was the slow creation of a subculture in America that was distinctly African American. Some early African arrivals had an advantage over others by coming from areas along Africa's coast where interaction with European merchants and shippers had occurred since the fifteenth century. These "Atlantic creoles," already familiar with European languages and customs, sometimes took advantage of limited opportunities. Among the earliest Africans sold to English settlers of Jamestown, Virginia, in 1619 were men and women from coastal Angola, who likely came from an urban setting and knew the rudiments of Christianity. In the evolving society of early Virginia and Maryland, rigid racial barriers to personal advancement did not yet exist. For example, in Northampton County, Virginia, between 1664 and 1677, ten of 53 black males were free householders, who, like some whites, owned land, grew crops,

**TEST PRACTICE: Africans and African Americans, to 1870** 



#### D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. African customs yielded or persisted depending on the context in which slaves found themselves, eg. on plantations or in private homes, respectively.
- 2. Of the twelve million slaves who came to the United States (or what was to become the United States), over half landed at Sullivan's Island.
- 3. The vast majority of the slave trade in the North American mainland took place over an approximately 100-year period, with a peak during the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century.
- 4. During the early period of enslavement, most Atlantic creoles who ended up in the English settlements in America actually owned their own land.

#### E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

Bearing in mind its components, what do you think the word 'outlandish' in paragraph 6 means?

\_in placing their


#### TEST PRACTICE: The British Presence in India in the 18th Century A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points) C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in paragraph 13 in the most logical order (5 points) By Professor Peter Marshall At the start of the 18th century, the East India Company's presence in India was one of trade outposts. But by the end of the century, the Company was militarily dominant over South India and rapidly extending northward. British involvement in India during the 18th century can be divided into two phases, one ending and 2 beginning at mid-century. In the first half of the century, the British were a trading the 1 presence at certain points along the coast; from the 1750s they began to wage war (circle the best synonym: make battle/enter conflict/go at war/fight) on land in eastern and south-eastern India and to reap the reward of successful warfare, which was the exercise of political power, notably over the rich province of Bengal. By the end of the century British rule had been consolidated over the first conquests and it was being extended up the Ganges valley to Delhi and over most of the peninsula of southern India. By then the British had established a military dominance that 2 enable them in the next fifty years to subdue all the remaining Indian states of any consequence, 3 by conquering them or by forcing their rulers to become subordinate allies. At the beginning of the 18th century English commerce with India was nearly a hundred years old. It 3 was transacted by the East India Company, which had been given a monopoly of all English trade to Asia by royal grant at its foundation in 1600. Through many vicissitudes, the Company had evolved into a commercial concern only matched in size by 4\_ \_Dutch rival. Twenty or thirty ships a year were sent to Asia and annual sales in London were worth up to £2 million. Towards the end of the 17th century India became the focal point of the Company's trade. At the time, cotton cloth woven by Indian weavers was 5 imported into Britain in huge quantities to supply a worldwide demand for cheap, washable, lightweight fabrics for dresses and furnishings. The Company's main settlements, Bombay, Madras and Calcutta were established in the Indian provinces where cotton textiles for export were most readily available. These settlements had evolved from 'factories' or trading posts into major commercial towns under British jurisdiction, as Indian merchants and artisans moved in to do business with the Company and with the British inhabitants who lived there. The East India Company's trade was built on a sophisticated Indian economy. India offered foreign traders the skills of its artisans in weaving cloth and winding raw silk, agricultural products for export, such as sugar, the indigo dye or opium, and the services of substantial merchants and rich bankers. During the 17th century at least, the effective rule maintained by the Mughal emperors throughout much of the subcontinent provided a secure framework for trade. The Company's Indian trade in the first half of the 18th century seemed to be established on a stable and profitable basis. 6 who directed its affairs in London could see no case for military or political intervention to try to change the status quo. The British did, however, start to intervene in Indian politics from the 1750s, and revolutionary changes in their role in India 7\_\_\_\_\_\_to follow. This change of course can best be explained partly in terms of changed conditions in India and partly as a consequence of the aggressive ambitions of the local British themselves. Conditions in India were certainly changing. The Mughal empire had disintegrated and was being replaced by a variety of regional states. This did not produce a situation of anarchy and chaos, once used to be assumed. Indeed, some of the regional states maintained stable rule and there was no marked overall economic decline throughout India. There were, however, conflicts within some of the new states. Contestants for power in certain coastal states were willing to seek European support for their ambitions and Europeans were only too willing to give it. In part, they acted on behalf of their companies. By the 1740s rivalry between the British and the

French, who were latecomers to Indian trade, was becoming acute. In southern India the British and the French allied with opposed political factions within the successor states to the Mughals to extract gains for their own companies and to weaken the position of their opponents. Private ambitions were also involved.

Indian clients on the thrones for which they were contending. A successful kingmaker, like Robert Clive, could become prodigiously rich. The Anglo-French conflicts that began in the 1750s ended in 1763 with a

Great personal rewards were promised to the European commanders who 9\_

British ascendancy in the southeast and most significantly in Bengal. What came to be recognised as a new British empire in India remained under the authority of the East India Company, even if the importance of the national concerns now involved meant that the Company had to submit to increasingly close supervision by the British state and to periodical inquiries by parliament. In India, the governors of the Company's commercial settlements became governors of provinces and, although the East India Company continued to trade, many of its servants became administrators in the new British regimes. Huge armies were created, largely composed of Indian sepoys but with some regular British regiments. 10 The new Company governments were based on those of the Indian states that they had displaced and much of the effective work of administration was initially still 10 by Indians. Collection of taxes was the main function of government. About one third of the produce of the land was extracted from the cultivators and passed up to the state through a range of intermediaries, who were entitled to keep a proportion for themselves. 11 its armies and finance its trade, British officials tried to fix 11 seemed to them to be an appropriate balance between the rights of the cultivating peasants and those of the intermediaries, who resembled landlords. British judges also supervised the courts, which applied Hindu or Islamic rather than British law. There was as yet little belief in the need for outright innovation. On the contrary, men like Warren Hastings, who ruled British Bengal from 1772 to 1785, believed that Indian institutions were well adapted to Indian needs and that the new British governments should try to restore an 'ancient constitution', had been subverted during the upheavals of the 18th century. 13 provinces like Bengal would naturally recover their legendary past prosperity. By the end of the century, however, opinions were changing. India seemed to be suffering not 12 merely from an unfortunate recent history but from deeply ingrained backwardness. It needed to be 'improved' by firm, benevolent foreign rule. Various strategies for improvement were being discussed. Property relations should be reformed to give greater security to the ownership of land. Laws should be The ignorance and superstition thought to be inculcated by Asian religions should be challenged by systematic way lay in the future, but commitment to governing in Indian ways through Indians was waning (circle the best synonym: rising/disappeared/fading/declined) fast. The conquests that had begun in the 1750s had never been sanctioned in Britain and both the 13 national government and the directors of the Company insisted that further territorial expansion must be curbed.



#### D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. In addition to providing raw materials to the British, the Indians offered their know-how as well.
- 2. Prior to being under the control of the powerful Mughal Empire, many parts of India were administrated by the East India Company
- 3. Both Hastings and his successors were alike in that they experienced a period of military escalation and shared similar views on the role of the British government in India.
- 4. Robert Clive was just one of many leaders who became wealthy from ruling in India.

#### E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

What were some of the ways in which the East India Company had evolved by the end of the 18th century?

**TEST PRACTICE: Colonialism and the American West** 

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points)

B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)

C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in para. IX in the <u>most</u> logical order (1-5). (EXAMPLE: a. <u>1</u>) The first and last sentences are given. (5 points)

- Not too long ago, historians of the American West joined artists in celebrating what we now think of as the "Old West." For historians and artists, the "winning of the West" was a glorious achievement that heralded the triumph of "civilization" over "savagery." Indeed, by the conventional scholarly wisdom and orthodox artistic vision, the vanquishing of Indians and the march of manifest destiny made America great and made Americans special. But in recent decades, most historians have rejected this perspective, and newer studies have exhumed the human casualties and environmental costs of American expansion. Offering little glory, these interpretations of how the West was lost have accented the savagery of American civilization.

  II Back in the 19th century, celebrations of territorial expansion were commonplace among American
- historians. In his multi-volume account of *The Winning of the West* and other historical writings, Theodore Roosevelt admitted that the shedding of blood was not always "agreeable," but deemed it the "healthy sign of the virile strength" of the American people. As president of the American Historical Association and as president of the United States, Roosevelt exulted in "our manifest destiny to swallow up the land of all adjoining nations who were (1)\_\_\_\_\_\_ weak to withstand us."
- Popular as Roosevelt's histories were in his time, it was his contemporary, Frederick Jackson Turner, who put forward the interpretation that gained enduring scholarly support. Most prominently in his 1893 essay on "The Significance of the Frontier in American History," Turner assigned westward expansion the central role in the history of the United States. He contended that it had not (2)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ enlarged the nation's territory, but had also accounted for the individualistic and democratic character of its people and its institutions. In Turner's view, the process of moving west separated Americans from their European roots (and in Turner's imagination, the designation "American" referred exclusively to people of European ancestry). Subsequent generations of historians of the American West took their cues from Turner's "frontier thesis." Some echoed it. Some extended it. Some amended it. Through the first half of the 20th century, however, few **sought** (circle the best synonym: searched for / succeeded / tempted / looked) to challenge Turner's belief in the fundamental importance of the frontier to American development or to question the exaltation of westward expansion.
- IV That has changed over the last half century. Protests against the Vietnam War and the spread of various civil rights movements had a profound impact on the interpretation of American history in general, and western American history in particular. If American expansion led to Vietnam, a conflict that drew frequent metaphorical comparison to the supposed lawless violence of the Wild West, then it was not something to be cheered. At the same time, liberation struggles at home inspired historians to look beyond the white, male protagonists who had previously dominated frontier epics. In step with other American histories, scholars of the American West began to focus their attention on the expectations and experiences of the unsung and the undone.
- With a wider cast and an anti-imperial angle of vision, interpretations of the western past veered from the triumphant to the tragic. The titles of the two most influential surveys of the so-called "new western history" attested to this shift in orientation: *The Legacy of Conquest* by Patricia Limerick (1987) and *It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own* by Richard White (1991). Synthesizing scholarship from the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, these books asserted that conquest and its legacy brought misfortunes both to the defeated and to the supposed victors. The more general misfortunes included the environmental blowback that followed efforts to turn the land into what it was not, to transform a mostly arid and sparsely populated region into an agricultural "garden" and a home for multiplying millions of residents. In the revisionist mirror, the Great West did not look very great anymore, a gloom and doom view that not all historians, and certainly not all Americans, embraced. Critics claimed the new western history overlooked the achievements and exaggerated the evils of American expansion. The unbalanced exposition, complained the novelist Larry McMurtry, unfairly presented the western past as an unrelenting course in "failure studies."
- VI Similar debates erupted among art historians and grabbed much public notice in 1991. That year, the Smithsonian American Art Museum presented "The West as America: Reinterpreting Images of the American Frontier, 1820-1920." In the exhibition, the curators challenged both the realism and the romance of western art. (3)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to the exhibition's gallery guide, the assembled works were "not so

much records of activities or places" (4) they were "a means of persuading people that
westward expansion was good for the nation and would benefit all those who participated in it." This
proposition put western art and western artists in the service of manifest destiny, an ideology that led painters
sculptors, and photographers to mask "the problems created (5) westward expansion."
"The West as America" exhibition was quite controversial. In response to the uproar, several congressmen
(6) that the museum be defunded for allowing this blasphemy to be perpetrated against
western art. That campaign failed, (7) the planned national tour of the exhibition was
cancelled.
VII In terms of public notice, by far the greatest impact of changing views about the history of the
American West registered at the movies. The social currents emanating from the 1960s that rewrote western
histories and reinterpreted the meaning of still images also dramatically upended the art of motion pictures.
(8) decades, "Westerns" ruled Hollywood. "Epics" and "B-westerns" filled movie theaters
from the 1920s to the 1950s—and dominated American television programming in the 1950s. But during the
mid 1960s, traditional, heroic Westerns began losing their popular appeal. Far (9) were
produced. Those that were produced often inverted the genre's conventions about heroes and villains and the
righteousness of violence and manifest destiny. In landmark films like Sergio Leone's <i>The Good, the Bad,</i>
and the Ugly (1966), Sam Peckinpah's <i>The Wild Bunch</i> (1969), Arthur Penn's <i>Little Big Man</i> (1970), and
Robert Altman's <i>McCabe and Mrs. Miller</i> (1971), the Old West became a stage on (10)
1960s critiques of American capitalism and imperialism played out. Arguably, though, the reversing of
traditional western roles only reached its apotheosis in 1991, when <i>Dances with Wolves</i> won eight Academy
Awards.
VIII Dances with Wolves reigned at the box office and at the Oscars, but over the last quarter century, the
best historical scholarship has aimed at more than mere inversion of old myths about the Old West. One
important direction has been to compare and connect (11) happened in the American West
with parallel places and processes elsewhere. Departing from Turner's claims that the frontier set the U.S.
apart and made it unique, historians of the American West have instead emphasized the commonalities
between American and other "colonialisms." More specifically, the construct of "settler colonialism" has
emerged as a key to situating the American experience in a broader global context. Further depriving the
American West of its uniqueness, historians have adopted the lens of "ethnic cleansing," or worse
"genocide," to understand American expansions and the accompanying displacement and sometimes
devastation of indigenous peoples.
IX The most compelling western histories written in the last quarter century confront the complexities
of past and present.
aThis new understanding rescues indigenous people from the condescension of New Age romanticism
which had turned them into ever peaceful, perfect ecologists, showing instead how Indians also resisted
European colonialism and how in some parts of North America they carried out their own expansions.
b First of all, they begin with the recognition of how deep that past is.
c Most visibly, this intercourse produced mixed-race offspring, but historians have also tracked a wide
range of exchanges that led to a blending or amalgamation of cultures.
d From these archaeological sources, historians have now recovered rich pre-colonial worlds and
complex societies that continued after Indians encountered people from Europe and Africa, reaching a
fascinating new understanding of how natives and newcomers met and mingled.
e In fact, the histories commence well before the West was American and with excavations that reveal
the diversity and dynamism of Native America prior to the arrival of European colonizers.
Such amalgamations have remained a hallmark of western American cultures in the 20th and now the 21st
centuries.
X The history of the American West, like the art of the American West, is not what it used to be. No
doubt, many lament the changes and <i>pine</i> (circle the best synonym: regret / need / desire / long) for the
myths that western histories (and western art) once celebrated. But if we are to make sense of the West's
multi-faceted evolutions and figure (12) how we can live together, and live sustainably, in
this region, we do not need one-dimensional tales. (13), we need histories and art that
respect the past, wrestling, as historians and artists must, with the complexities that challenge us still.
(By S. Aron, 2016)
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Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text.
1 It was not until the second half of the last century that historians really began to question Turner's views, as evidenced by White's <i>It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own</i> and prior to that by Limerick's <i>The Legacy of Conquest</i> .
2 Aron stresses the transformation experienced by the Western film genre, a process which began in the Sixties and culminated over three decades later with the multiple award-winning <i>Dances with Wolves</i> .
3 Though both Roosevelt and Turner were considered reputable thinkers of the early 19 <sup>th</sup> century, it was the latter whose 'frontier thesis' wielded the greatest influence over future historians.
4 Aron uses the example of the Smithsonian exhibit in the 90s to reveal the extensive criticism for the way in which the American West was being reinterpreted, to such an extent that the show was prevented from travelling across the country.
E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)  Give some pieces of evidence to indicate that this text was published in an American academic publication

#### **TEST PRACTICE: Colonialism** A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in the most logical order (1-5). (5 points) (By Margaret Kohn) Colonialism is not a modern phenomenon. World history is full of examples of one society gradually expanding by incorporating adjacent territory and settling its people on newly conquered territory. The colonies, as did the Romans, the Moors, and the Ottomans, to name just a ancient Greeks set 1 few of the most famous examples. Colonialism, then, is not restricted to a specific time or place. Nevertheless, in the sixteenth century, colonialism changed decisively because of technological developments in navigation that began to connect more remote parts of the world. Fast sailing ships 2 possible to reach distant ports and to sustain close ties between the center and colonies. Thus, the modern European colonial project emerged when it became possible to move large numbers of people across the ocean and to maintain political sovereignty in spite of geographical dispersion. The difficulty of defining colonialism stems from the fact that the term is often used as a synonym for imperialism. 3 colonialism and imperialism were forms of conquest that were expected to benefit Europe economically and strategically. The term colonialism is frequently used to describe the settlement of North America, Australia, New Zealand, Algeria, and Brazil, 4 controlled by a large population of permanent European residents. The term imperialism often describes cases in which a foreign government administers a territory without significant settlement; typical examples include the scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century and the American domination of the Philippines and Puerto Rico. The distinction between the two, however, is not entirely consistent in the literature. The confusion about the meaning of the term imperialism reflects the way that the concept has changed over time. Although the English word imperialism was not commonly used before the nineteenth century, Elizabethans already described the United Kingdom as "the British Empire." As Britain began to acquire overseas dependencies, the concept of empire was employed more frequently. Imperialism was understood as a system of military domination and sovereignty over territories. The day to day work of government might be exercised indirectly through local assemblies or indigenous rulers who paid tribute, but sovereignty rested with the British. The shift away from this traditional understanding of empire was influenced by the Leninist analysis of imperialism as a system oriented towards economic exploitation. According to Lenin, imperialism was the necessary and inevitable result of the logic of accumulation in late capitalism. Thus, for Lenin and subsequent Marxists, imperialism described a historical stage of capitalism rather than a trans-historical practice of political and military domination. The lasting impact of the Marxist approach is apparent in contemporary debates about American imperialism, a term which usually means American economic hegemony, regardless of 5\_ such power is exercised directly or indirectly (Young 2001). The legitimacy of colonialism was a topic of debate among French, German, and British philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant, Smith and Diderot were critical of the barbarity of colonialism and challenged the idea that Europeans had the obligation to "civilize" the rest of the world. At first it might seem relatively obvious that Enlightenment thinkers would develop a critique of colonialism. The system of colonial domination, which involved some combination of slavery, quasi-feudal forced labor, or expropriation of property, is antithetical to the basic Enlightenment principle that each individual is capable of reason and self-government. The rise of anti-colonial political theory, however, required more than a universalistic ethic that recognized the shared humanity of all people. Given the tension between the abstract universalism of natural law and the actual cultural practices of indigenous peoples, it was easy to interpret native difference as evidence of the violation of natural law. This became a justification for exploitation. in 6 Diderot was one of the most forceful critics of European colonization. Unlike many other eighteenth and nineteenth century political philosophers, Diderot did not *assume* (circle the best synonym: quess/hire/take for granted/take on) that non-Western societies were necessarily primitive (e.g. lacking political and social organization) nor did he assume that more complex forms of social organization were

necessarily superior. One of the key issues that distinguished critics from proponents of colonialism and imperialism was their view of the relationship between culture, history and progress. Many of the influential philosophers writing in France and England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had assimilated some version of the developmental approach to history that was associated with the Scottish Enlightenment.

According to the stadial theory of historical development, all societies naturally moved from hunting, to herding, to farming, to commerce, a developmental process that simultaneously tracked a cultural arc from "savagery," through "barbarism," to "civilization." "Civilization" was not 7 a marker of material improvement, but also a normative judgment about the moral progress of society. (Kohn and O'Neill 2006) 6 The language of civilization, savagery, and barbarism is pervasive in writers as diverse of Edmund Burke, Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill. It 8 therefore be incorrect to conclude that a developmental theory of history is distinctive of the liberal tradition; nevertheless, given that figures of the Scottish Enlightenment such as Ferguson and Smith were 9 its leading expositors, it is strongly associated with liberalism. Smith himself opposed imperialism for economic reasons. He felt that relations of dependence between metropole and periphery distorted self-regulating market mechanisms and worried that the cost of military domination would be burdensome for taxpayers (Pitts 2005). The idea that civilization is the culmination of a process of historical development, however, proved useful in justifying imperialism. According to Uday Mehta, liberal imperialism was the product of the interaction between universalism and developmental history (1999). A core doctrine of liberalism holds that all individuals share a capacity for reason and self-government. The theory of developmental history, however, modifies this universalism with the notion that these capacities only emerge at a certain stage of civilization. For example, according to John Stuart Mill (hereafter Mill), savages do not have the capacity for self-government because of their excessive love of freedom. Serfs, slaves, and peasants in barbarous societies, on the other 10, may be so schooled in obedience that their capacity for rationality is stifled. Only commercial society produces the material and cultural conditions that e
government (and Mill doesn't hesitate to use this term) is a means to the end of improvement and ultimately
self-government.
7 Mill, a life-long employee of the British East India Company, recognized that despotic government
by a foreign people could lead to injustice and economic exploitation. These abuses, if unchecked, could undermine the legitimacy and efficacy of the imperial project. In Considerations on Representative Government (1861), Mill identifies four reasons why foreign (e.g. European) peoples are not suited to governing colonies. First, foreign politicians <i>are unlikely to have</i> ( <i>circle the best synonym: dislike having/don't like to have/may not have/must not have)</i> the knowledge of local conditions that is necessary to solve problems of public policy effectively. Second, given cultural, linguistic, and often religious differences between colonizers and colonized, the colonizers are unlikely to sympathize with the native peoples and are
likely to act tyrannically. Third, even if the colonizers really try to treat the native peoples fairly, their natural tendency to sympathize with those similar to themselves (other foreign colonists or merchants) would likely lead to distorted judgment in cases of conflict. Finally, according to Mill, colonists and merchants go abroad to acquire wealth with little effort or risk, 12
the colonized country rather than developing it. These arguments echo points 13in Edmund Burke's voluminous writings assailing the misgovernment in India, most notably Burke's famous Speech on Fox's East India Bill (1783).
For Mill, parliamentary oversight was no solution.
a Furthermore, given that members of the House of Commons were accountable to their domestic electors, it would guarantee that imperial policy would aim exclusively to maximize British self-interest
instead of promoting good government and economic development in the colonies.
b Paid by the government, they would not personally benefit from economic exploitation and could
fairly arbitrate conflicts between colonists and indigenous people.
c Members of this specialized body would have the training to acquire relevant knowledge of local
conditions.
d It would politicize decisions, making imperial policy a result of the factional struggles of party politics rather than technocratic expertise.
e Instead, Mill's solution to the problem of imperial misgovernment was to shun parliamentary
oversight in favor of a specialized administrative corps.
Mill, however, was not able to explain how to ensure good government where those wielding political power were not accountable to the population. In this sense, Mill's writing is emblematic of the failure of liberal imperial thought.
<u>F</u> <u></u>

#### D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. Mill held the view that more developed countries should act as a civilizing force for less developed countries; in so doing, they do not have to abuse their power.
- 2. The author of this text finds flaws in Mill's argumentation, as does Uday Mehta.
- 3. The term *imperialism* has undergone changes in meaning over the centuries and nowadays has distinctive economic connotations.
- 4. Diderot, along with many fellow thinkers of the Enlightenment, expressed criticism of colonial practices and the idea of self-government.

### E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

Why does the word *civilize* appear in inverted commas in paragraph 4?

#### **TEST PRACTICE: Apartheid in South Africa**

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points)

B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)

#### The End of Apartheid: Diary of a Revolution. By Robin Renwick. Biteback; 184 pages; £16.99.

- I Ask readers of the *Guardian* what Margaret Thatcher's view of apartheid was and they would probably guess she was in favour, and regarded Mandela as a fanatic best kept in jail. Such is the power of stereotype. Yet Thatcher opposed apartheid and she lobbied Pretoria incessantly for Mandela's release. She parted company with the liberal consensus only on the efficacy of sanctions as a lever on the South African government. On that she was probably right.
- II Few diplomats nowadays get an opportunity to play a significant role in the affairs of their host country. So when Robin Renwick was appointed ambassador to South Africa in 1987, he can hardly have expected a thrilling time. He had helped negotiate the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia in 1979, but its South African neighbour was then securely in the grip of white nationalists. The regime had an efficient army and a repressive police force. Insurgency was minimal, despite hostile frontline states across the borders in Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique. Trade sanctions had reinforced Pretoria in its self-righteous isolation, incidentally ridding the country of foreign profit-takers. South Africa's economy was Africa's strongest. The sports boycott was irritating, but not remotely such as to induce Afrikaners to capitulate to a black majority.
- III Covering South Africa for the *Economist* in the 1980s, I could see 1\_\_\_\_\_\_ reason why this should change any time soon. The whites were entrenched. The most effective opposition came not from the banned African National Congress but from a minority of liberals led by the English language press and the solitary anti-apartheid MP, Helen Suzman. Then suddenly in 1989-91 came a revolution. The period covered by this book is so embedded in the history of popular struggle that reality is often hopelessly mixed with make-believe. This is largely due to the eagerness of so 2\_\_\_\_\_\_ players outside South Africa to claim credit for the downfall of apartheid and Mandela's subsequent apotheosis. In reality, the ending of apartheid was the outcome of a specific crisis within Afrikanerdom, in 3\_\_\_\_\_\_ outsiders played little or no part. The immediate catalyst was banal. In 1989 the bigoted and intransigent Botha had a mild stroke. He was unable to assert authority over his cabinet colleagues, and National Party moderates, "or verligtes", moved into the ascendant, cohering round the Transvaal leader, FW de Klerk, as Botha's natural successor. De Klerk had no previous record 4\_\_\_\_\_\_ a liberal.
- IV What happened next was equally crucial. De Klerk had a Damascene conversion, boldly and emphatically *turning to* (*circle the best synonym*: *renouncing/embracing/moving away from/rotating toward*) reform. He realised that apartheid was losing intellectual and moral sway over the white minority. He could see the game was up. So-called "separate development" was administrative chaos, with black immigrants pouring into the lucrative mining sector and spreading south into the Cape Province. Most whites sensed change 5\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ to come, but they were terrified of 6\_\_\_\_\_\_ it might mean. Within months of Botha's illness, De Klerk won the election as leader, and negotiations began with Mandela, now released from prison into comfortable house arrest. Within three years De Klerk's nationalists won an election, bitterly fought by an emergent rightwing. A whites-only referendum on ending apartheid was passed and a new constitution was introduced. In 1994 Mandela became president in the most moving election I have 7\_\_\_\_\_\_ witnessed, the only time in modern history that an authoritarian oligarchy peacefully ceded power to a majority.
- Renwick is clearly frustrated at the neglect of Britain's role in all this. He shows himself as a hyperactive diplomat, never out of the limelight. He has contacts everywhere, in the cabinet, the press, the Afrikaner establishment, the radical opposition, even the banned ANC. With apartheid crumbling and power shifting uneasily from group to group, Renwick, Pinocchio's conscience, admonishes all and sundry to be good. 8\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ significant this was to the course of events is unclear. Certainly, Renwick appears to have operating at the limits of diplomatic courtesy. The diary entries become frenetic. Whomever he addresses, "I advised him to release detainees ... I warned him against the advice of the head of the security police ... I raised the issue of the abolition of the death penalty." When the die for reform is cast, Renwick is in full proconsular mode. "I asked the ANC to consider suspending the sports boycott ... I asked for the state of emergency to be restricted to Natal ... I congratulated Mandela on the suspension of the armed struggle."
- VI To the question, did Thatcher will all this, the answer is plainly yes. She was kept well informed and supported Renwick, even when there was no certainty of outcome. She wrote to Botha in 1988 calling for Mandela's release, warning of what might happen 9\_\_\_\_\_\_ he died there. At Renwick's instigation she

subsequently engaged with De Klerk, actually inviting him to meet with her. He later said she "was far tougher with me than any other European leader". She also received the wife of the veteran activist, Walter Sisulu, gave an interview to the black newspaper, the Sowetan, and pleaded in every communication for Mandela's release.

VII Even ambassadors are mortal and Renwick in 1991 was rewarded with promotion to the embassy in Washington. The South Africans, he implies, would now have to fend for themselves. "I left with an unaccustomed sense of humility," he writes, though he does insist that the transition was achieved by South Africans themselves, "not by any outsider, however well intentioned". Renwick was clearly in a position rare for an ambassador. The politics of boycott had stripped even a Republican US president, George Bush Snr, of leverage over Pretoria. Britain had kept in touch. It shared a language and an imperial history with South Africa. Insofar as any outside country mattered to at least moderate South Africans, Britain did. Renwick exploited even the smallest leverage this offered.

VIII 10\_\_\_\_\_\_ De Klerk and Mandela were afterwards explicit in thanking Thatcher for what they perceived as her support. Mandela thanked her for pressing for his release. On hearing of her fall in 1990 he said: "We have much to be thankful to her for." Of her handling of De Klerk, she had intuited how best to assist a country facing a great upheaval and uncertainty. She was doing much the same, albeit more directly, with Gorbachev at the time.

I would have liked more from Renwick on sanctions, if only because those on South Africa are so often cited as a rare success, because *eventually* (*circle the best synonym: most likely/lately/ultimately/perhaps*) South Africa did change. Clearly, at the end, the possible dismantling of sanctions was a reward on the horizon. The eternal arrogance of western policymakers is to think the world hangs on their every measure. Sanctions may "hurt", but that does not 12\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ them "effective". In this they are like dropping bombs. Reality is usually eccentric. 13\_\_\_\_\_\_ Botha not had a stroke or had Mandela died in prison, more rabid elements (notably in South Africa's security apparat) might have seized control of events. As it was, fortune blessed South Africa with two leaders – Mandela and De Klerk – of courtesy, clarity of thought and generosity of spirit. Renwick was privileged with a front seat in this drama and did all that his profession allowed to urge it forward. As for Thatcher, he has at the very least **put the record straight**.

# C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in paragraph in the $\underline{most}$ logical order (1-5). (EXAMPLE: a. $\underline{1}$ ) (5 points)

- a.\_\_\_\_Nonetheless, all together they urged strikes, boycotts and general defiance campaigns to demonstrate their unhappiness with these laws.
- The African National Congress was the first group to organize against the laws of racial segregation.
- c.\_\_\_\_Among this young generation was Nelson Mandela.
- d.\_\_\_\_\_It was founded in 1912 as a traditionally moderate party, attempting to change the laws themselves, but by the 1940s the ANC had developed a more dynamic young leadership that was trying to move toward a mass protest, a mass movement.
- e.\_\_\_\_At the same time that the ANC was organizing, there were other groups, the most famous of which is probably the Pan Africanist Congress, and these other groups had other ideas, the latter envisioning a more African centered government.

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, <u>using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text.</u>

- 1 The idea of economic sanctions on South Africa had many opponents, including Renwick, Suzman and for a time Desmond Tutu.
- 2. The author of this journal entry believes that the end of apartheid was due to events within the Afrikaner party itself.
- 3. According to the author, when De Klerk was first named to replace Botha, his supporters did not think he would make any drastic reforms.
- 4. According to the author, Renwick experienced frustration at Britain's inability to support apartheid in South Africa.

# E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

1. In what way has Renwick **put the record straight** (para. X)?

TEST PRACTICE: Post-colonial language and literature A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points) C. LOGICAL ORDER: Put paragraphs A-E in the appropriate spaces. (5 points) Why should post-colonial societies continue to engage with the imperial experience? Since all the post-colonial societies we discuss have achieved political independence, why is the issue of coloniality still \_\_ all? This question of why the empire needs to write back to a centre once the imperial structure has been dismantled in political terms is an important one. Britain, like the other dominant colonial powers of the nineteenth century, has been relegated to a relatively minor place in international affairs. In the spheres of politics and economics, and increasingly in the vital new area of the mass media, Britain and the other European imperial powers have been superseded by other emergent powers. 2 , through the literary canon, the body of British texts which all too frequently still acts as a touchstone of taste and value, and through RS English (Received Standard English), which asserts the English of south-east England as a universal norm, the weight of antiquity continues to dominate cultural production in much of the postcolonial world. This cultural hegemony has been maintained through canonical assumptions about literary activity, and through attitudes to post-colonial literatures which identify them as isolated national **offshoots** (circle the best synonym: develops/branches/arms/bursts) of English literature, and which therefore relegate them to marginal and subordinate positions. More recently, as the range and strength of these literatures has become undeniable, a process of incorporation has begun in which, employing Eurocentric standards of judgement, the centre has sought to claim those works and writers of which it approves as British. 3 to focus on the complex wavs in which the English language has been used in In 3 these societies, and to indicate their own sense of difference, we distinguish in this account between the 'standard' British English inherited from the empire and the english which the language has become in postcolonial countries. Though British imperialism resulted in the spread of a language, English, across the globe, the english of Jamaicans is not the english of Canadians, Maoris, or Kenyans. We need to distinguish between is proposed as a standard code, English (the language of the erstwhile imperial centre), and the linguistic code, english, which has been transformed and subverted into several distinctive varieties throughout the world. For this reason the distinction between English and english will be used throughout our text as an indication of the various ways in 5 the language has been employed by different linguistic communities in the post-colonial world. II 5 In practice the history of this distinction between English and english has been between the claims of a powerful 'centre' and a multitude of intersecting usages designated as 'peripheries'. The language of these 'peripheries' was shaped by an oppressive discourse of power. Yet they have been the site of some of the most exciting and innovative literatures of the modern period and this has, at 6\_ the result of the energies uncovered by the political tension between the idea of a normative code and a variety of regional usages. III The alienation of vision and the crisis in self-image which this displacement produces is frequently found in the accounts of Canadian 'free settlers' as of Australian convicts, Fijian-Indian or Trinidadian-Indian indentured labourers, West Indian slaves, or forcibly colonized Nigerians or Bengalis. Although this is pragmatically demonstrable from a wide range of texts, it is difficult to account for by theories which see this social and linguistic alienation as resulting only from overtly oppressive forms of colonization such as slavery or conquest. An adequate account of this practice must go beyond the usual categories of social alienation such as master/slave, free/bonded, or ruler/ruled, 8 important and widespread these may be in post-colonial cultures. After all, why should the free settler, formally unconstrained, and theoretically free to continue in the possession and practice of 'Englishness', also show clear signs of alienation even within the first generation of settlement, and manifest a tendency to seek (circle the best synonym: look/search/research/try to find) an alternative, differentiated identity? IVThat imperialism results in a profound linguistic alienation is obviously the case in cultures in which a pre-colonial culture is suppressed by military conquest or enslayement. So, for example, an Indian writer like Raja Rao or a Nigerian writer such as Chinua Achebe have needed to transform the language, to use it in a different way in its new context and so, as Achebe says, quoting James Baldwin, make it 'bear the burden' of their experience (Achebe 1975:62). Although Rao and Achebe write from their own place and so have not

suffered a literal geographical displacement, they have to overcome an imposed gap resulting from the
linguistic displacement of the pre-colonial language by English. This process occurs within a more
comprehensive discourse of place and displacement in the wider post-colonial context. Such alienation is
shared by those whose possession of English is indisputably 'native' (in the sense of being possessed from
birth) yet who begin to feel alienated within its practice once its vocabulary, categories, and codes are felt to
be inadequate or inappropriate to describe the fauna, the physical and geographical conditions, or the cultural
practices they have developed in a new land This is not to say that the English language is inherently
incapable of accounting 9postcolonial experience, but that it needs to develop an 'appropriate'
usage in order to do so (by becoming a distinct and unique form of english). The energizing feature of this
displacement is its capacity to interrogate and subvert the imperial cultural formations.
V
A The use of these terms asserts the fact that a continuum exists between the various linguistic
practices which constitute English usage in the modern world. 10linguistically the links between
English and the various post-colonial englishes in use today can be seen as unbroken, the political reality is
that English sets itself apart from all other 'lesser' variants and so demands to be interrogated about its claim
to this special status.
<b>B</b> The pressure to develop such a usage manifests 11early in the development of
'english' literatures. It is therefore arguable that, even before the development of a conscious de-colonizing
stance, the experience of a new place, identifiably different in its physical characteristics, constrains, for
instance, the new settlers to demand a language which will allow them to express their sense of 'Otherness'.
Landscape, flora and fauna, seasons, climatic conditions are formally distinguished from the place of origin
as home/colony, Europe/New World, Europe/Antipodes, metropolitan/provincial, and so on, although, of
course, at this stage no effective models exist for expressing this sense of Otherness in a positive and creative
way.
C One of the main features of imperial oppression is control over language. The imperial education
system installs a 'standard' version of the metropolitan language as the norm, and marginalizes all 'variants'
as impurities. As a character in Mrs. Campbell Praed's nineteenth-century Australian novel <i>Policy and</i>
Passion puts it, 'To be <i>colonial</i> is to talk Australian slang; to beeverything that is abominable' (Campbell
Praed 1881:154). Language becomes the medium through which a hierarchical structure of power is
perpetuated, and the medium through which conceptions of 'truth', 'order', and 'reality' become established.
Such power is rejected in the emergence of an effective post-colonial voice. For this reason, the discussion of
post-colonial writing which follows is largely a discussion of the process by which the language, with its
power, and the writing, with its signification of authority, has been wrested from the dominant European
culture.
<b>D</b> The most widely shared discursive practice within which alienation can be identified is the
construction of 'place'. The gap which opens between the experience of place and the language available to
describe it forms a classic and all-pervasive feature of post-colonial texts. This gap occurs for those whose
language seems inadequate to describe a new place, for those whose language is systematically destroyed by
enslavement, and for those whose language has been rendered unprivileged by the imposition of the language
of a colonizing power. Some admixture of one or other of these models can describe the situation of all post-
colonial societies. In each case a condition of alienation is inevitable until the colonizing language has been
replaced or appropriated as English.
E A major feature of post-colonial literature is the concern with place and displacement. It is here that
the special post-colonial crisis of identity 12into being, the concern with the development or
recovery of an effective identifying relationship between self and place. Indeed, critics 13as
D.E.S. Maxwell have made this the defining model of post-coloniality A valid and active sense of self may
have been eroded by <i>dislocation</i> , resulting from migration, the experience of enslavement, transportation, or
'voluntary' removal for indentured labour. Or it may have been destroyed by <i>cultural denigration</i> , the
conscious and unconscious oppression of the indigenous personality and culture by a supposedly superior
racial or cultural model. The dialectic of place and displacement is always a feature of post-colonial societies
whether these have been created by a process of settlement, intervention, or a mixture of the two. Beyond
their historical and cultural differences, place, displacement, and a pervasive concern with the myths of
identity and authenticity are a feature common to all post-colonial literatures in english.
(By B. Ashcroft et al)

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. The theme of alienation is prevalent in post-colonial literatures, even in ex-colonies in which conditions of oppression or slavery were lacking, eg. Canada.
- 2. English with a capital letter is used to designate the traditional, standardized language; the writers of the text use it to demonstrate its superiority to the numerous existing variants.
- 3. Rao and Acebe, from Africa and Asia respectively, are examples of writers who have found themselves displaced linguistically though not geographically.
- 4. Britain still has a strong influence on post-colonial societies, given the import of its economic and political status.

# E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

What do the authors mean by 'dislocation' and 'cultural denigration' and which country/countries could be associated with each term?

### TEST PRACTICE: Africana Philosophy A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points) C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in paragraph VII in the most logical order (1-5). (EXAMPLE: a. \_1\_) (5 points) The various peoples on the continent that came to be called "Africa" had constructed a variety of more or less complex societies of varying scale and scope (1) generations before fifteenth century encounters with acquisitive explorers and adventurers from the varying configurations of polities, regions, cities, and states that have been identified as Europe and form elsewhere. Several of these ancient societies—the kingdoms of Mali and Ghana and the royal dynasties of Kemet (Ancient Egypt), for example —had evolved complex social strata that included persons of accomplished learning. Some of these persons were stationed in institutions devoted to the production and distribution of knowledge and creative expression and to the preservation of that knowledge and expression in written and artistic works stored in libraries and other repositories and, in the case of works of art, incorporated into the ontologically-structured routines of daily life. Others, in social orders in (2) advanced knowledge was produced and mediated via oral literatures and traditions, were selected and trained to be *griots*, that is, persons with rigorously structured memories who thus became the living repositories, guardians, and mediators of a people's and/or a political community's genealogies and intellectual legacies, their keepers of wisdom. And in order to preserve shared, adaptive life across generations in all of the various social orders, it was socially necessary to construct and maintain interpretive orderings of natural and social realities, as (3)\_ creatively imagined origins and genealogies and constructed histories, by which to meaningfully order individual and shared life. The production of these interpretive and expressive orderings, the working out of the norms by II which to structure, justify, and legitimate the interpretations so as to order personal and social life, were, indeed, "philosophical" pursuits: that is, labors devoted to the production of successful, time-tested, enduring thought-praxis and aesthetic strategies by which to resolve emergent and recurrent challenges to transgenerational survival and flourishing. These were experience-conditioned thoughtful means by which to provide knowledge to guide the ordering of meaningful individual and shared life integrated across generations past, present, and future. Such efforts are as old as the peoples now routinely referred to as "Africans." And the efforts were destroyed neither by the holocausts of imperialist colonization and by racialized enslavement and apartheid-oppression, fostered by Europeans domination (4)\_ and others. Still, the philosophizing efforts were disrupted and distorted to various degrees in many instances, but were creatively adaptive in many others. For example, during twentieth century anti-colonial and decolonizing struggles to regain freedom Ш from the domination and authoritative jurisdiction of white racial supremacy over the lives, lands, and resources of African peoples, the disruptions and distortions would compel reinvigorated and determined adaptive creativity on the part of African peoples who *endeavored* (circle the best synonym: helped / sought / tempted / proved) to recover and repair old and/or to invent new agendas and strategies for living in keeping with their will to endure. There is a long history of efforts by scholars African and of African descent to reclaim Egypt from the intellectual annexation to Europe that was urged by Hegel in his *The Philosophy of* History. It is still the case that many people throughout Europe and the United States regard Egypt as in "the Middle East" rather than constituting the northern portion of the African continent. This costly mis-education of popular imaginations persists, as well, in historical accounts of various areas of thought (though increasingly less so in historiography related to Africa). Few in academic philosophy not engaged in the work of Africana philosophy are likely to know of a long tradition of scholarship contesting the claims of the Greco-Roman "origins" of Philosophy, an example of which is the controversial work by George G.M. James, Stolen Legacy (James 1954), in which he argues, the title declares, that Greek thinkers "stole" Egyptian intellectual legacies that have since been attributed erroneously to Greek thinkers as their creations. A provocative and controversial argument, indeed. Still, widespread disciplinary ignorance regarding the histories of ancient peoples and civilizations other than those stipulated as being ancestors of European White peoples is a direct and continuing consequence of racism in the formation, organization, and

practices of communities of discourse and scholarship and the development of racially segregated ideaspaces, intellectual traditions and networks, and scholarly organizations throughout Europe and North America. For example, few academic philosophers and workers in other disciplines who are not African or of

African descent are likely to know of the Association for the Study of Classical African Civilizations, an
international organization of scholars and intellectuals African and of African descent who are determined to
"rescue and rehabilitate" the histories, intellectual traditions, and wisdom philosophies of Ancient Africa.
Thus, few academic philosophers are likely to know of the scholarship of various persons in the Association
such as Maulana Karenga (1986) and Jacob H. Carruthers (1984). Both scholars have contributed additional
research and scholarship to studies devoted to reclaiming Egyptian thought-traditions as <i>African</i> traditions of
thought. These (7) efforts and (circle the best synonym: occupations / jobs / writings /
<b>labours)</b> works are paradigmatic examples of the determined production and mediation of new knowledge of
African and African-descended peoples by African and African-descended, and other, scholars who have
deliberately worked independently of the mainstream organizations of academic professionals in Philosophy
and other disciplines.
V With (8) to no evidence in much of the canonical literature and curricula of
academic philosophy that Western philosophers have focused attention on questions of historical relations
between Egyptian and Greco-Roman thinkers, or on African thinkers and traditions of thought, a number of
the pioneers of Africana philosophy have turned to independent, often controversial figures and scholarly
projects outside of academic, professional philosophy for their inspiration and for intellectual resources and strategies in taking on the challenges of creating intellectual spaces in academic philosophy for "matters"
African." A major resource and intellectual mentor continue to be works by and the person of Cheikh Anta
Diop, the intellectually daring and pioneering Senegalese scholar who, in <i>The African Origin of Civilization</i> :
Myth or Reality, published in the (9) 1970s, argued for the reality of the African origin.
Diop had begun the challenging work of reclaiming African heritages decades earlier (10)
arguing in a dissertation submitted for the Ph.D. at the University of Paris that ancient Egyptian civilization
was a black African civilization. His explorations in support of his claims have enormous implications for
revisions to histories of the origins of Western philosophy. Similarly, Martin Bernal's loudly and heatedly
contested multi-volume <i>Black Athena</i> : <i>The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilization</i> is by far the most
widely read, and intensely debated, work in this vein to which many have turned. (11),
Bernal's work, which acknowledges a long line of African and African-descended scholars who are his
precursors, Diop included, has raised hardly a ripple in academic philosophy. The discipline has thus long
been overdue for a spirited and disciplined critical reconsideration of the possibilities and realities of
informing Greco-Roman <i>and</i> African Egyptian contributions to the histories of emergence and development
of philosophical thought that has been canonized as foundational to the genealogy of Western Philosophy.
Africana philosophy has been forged as a novel context of provocations for such critical reconsiderations.
VI Meanwhile, (12) several decades academic philosophers in Africa, and elsewhere,
have been involved in intense debates and discussions that have prompted reconstructions of disciplinary
enterprises of Philosophy (both departments in educational institutions and national and international
organizations of professional philosophers). The initial focal question at the center of the debates and
discussions was (13) or not there were proper instances of Philosophy in traditional (i.e.,
pre-Modern) Sub-Saharan Africa, in particular. The publication in 1945 of Placide Tempels' <i>La Philosophie</i>
Bantoue triggered much of the debate.
VII
a Immanuel Kant (1764) as well elaborated his own theory of inferior and superior racial types in his
writings on anthropology (Kant 1798).
b This rationalizing work was aided significantly by the intellectual efforts of canonical European
philosophers.
c Since successive generations of European and Euro-American White people had been educated into
widely-shared common senses of their racial superiority to inferior Africans by such supposedly
philosophically well-reasoned, science-verified, and theologically sanctioned teachings, the claim that there
were Africans capable of producing thought of the caliber of Philosophy was regarded by most of them as
utterly preposterous.
d David Hume, in a footnote in his "Of National Characters," philosophized about the "natural
inferiority" of Negroes to White people (Hume 1742).
e The historical context in which these debates and discussions emerged and in which they were
waged was conditioned thoroughly by European colonial domination and exploitation of African peoples
rationalized through rank-ordering racial characterizations. <b>VIII</b> At the core of the controversy was the pressing question whether African persons were fully and
<b>VIII</b> At the core of the controversy was the pressing question whether African persons were fully and sufficiently human and capable intellectually in comparison to the model human par excellence: the <i>man</i> of
ournered in man and capable interfectually in comparison to the model namen par executive, the man of

Europe, the White Man, the avatar for all White people and for humanity proper, whose defining characteristics were capacities for reasoning and articulate speech (logos). Consequently, the claim of Bantu Philosophy made by Placide Tempels, a Belgium priest engaged in missionary work in the then-called Belgium Congo, that Bantu Africans (related ethnic groups identified by the dominant language group, Bantu, spoken by the related groups) had an indigenous philosophy was a serious challenge to the racialized philosophical ontology-cum-anthropology that undergirded colonial domination and exploitation. D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points) Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text. 1. \_\_\_\_\_ The author questions the validity of some theses presented by Hegel, Kant and James. 2. \_\_\_\_\_ In their books, Bernal and Diop share similar ideas on the African origins of philosophy; indeed, the latter credits the former for being a great influence. \_\_ The role of *griots* was to preserve a large store of information regarding their cultural history; for this reason a superior memory was required. \_\_ Tempels' claims were controversial in that they challenged some tenets on which colonialism was founded, e.g. the intellectual inferiority of the African people.

## E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

Would you consider this text biased or unbiased? Give at least two reasons to justify your answer.

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (14 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points) (By Joyce Goodfriend) The outstanding sociological feature of colonial New York City, its melange of peoples, presents historians with a challenge of considerable magnitude. Asked to explain how settlers of diverse backgrounds a basis for coexistence following the English conquest of New Netherland, they soon concede the inadequacy of conceptual models drawn from the era of mass immigration. Theories of assimilation that postulate a sequence of events in which immigrants enter a well-defined host society with a unified culture and gradually modify their actions and values to harmonize with 2\_ majority fail to account for the behavior of English newcomers in this historical context. Since men of their nation had seized the reins of government, English immigrants had 3 intention of adopting the ways of the majority Dutch population. In short, the predicted roles of the players in the process of ethnic interaction do not mesh with the social experience of early New York City. An alternative explanation of the social and cultural rearrangements that occurred following the commencement of English rule takes as a point of departure the fact that imperial expansion entails the subduing of an indigenous population. Displacing the vanquished involves not only seizing their privileges but reducing their culture to an inferior status. Ample evidence of English cultural imperialism in the early modern era exists in the cases of Wales, Scotland, and Ireland. In New York historiography this scenario, dubbed "Anglicization," depicts the revamping of the local social order after the English takeover as Dutch men were ousted from the heights of wealth and power by newly arrived English men who rapidly installed their culture in the city. But, as this study 4\_ shown, the course of social and cultural development in the city did not follow this pattern for a variety of reasons. The numerical ratios and consequently the positions of host society and immigrant group were reversed in seventeenth-century New York City. Unlike voluntary immigrants, the Dutch had not chosen to place themselves under English dominion but had been forced to recognize the authority of a victorious foreign power in an imperial contest. Expecting the city's Dutch majority to be absorbed by the few English newcomers and to accept their culture not only defies the logic of assimilation theory, but discounts the impress of decades of settlement in New Amsterdam. The Dutch "charter group" had deep roots in a society in 5 its culture was dominant. 4 New York's English rulers never doubted the superiority of their own culture, they acknowledged the difficulty of imposing their values on the Dutch. Coercion, in the form of punitive laws, might have been a suitable tactic to bring about cultural uniformity in Wales or Ireland, but the circumstances of New York's conquest mitigated against its use there. The large resident population was an offshoot of a formidable economic and naval power and a Protestant nation to boot. 7\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_ the Dutch colonists to adhere to English norms was never seriously considered. Instead, realism led the English to endorse a policy of toleration in New York and to **rely** (*circle the* best synonym: answer/depend/look/take interest) on strategies of cooptation and conversion to wean foreigners from their compatriots. Despite the ethnocentric strain in English culture, precedents existed for the toleration of cultural diversity. England had allowed foreign groups - communities of Dutch and French Protestants and even a small number of Jews - to flourish in its midst for religious and economic reasons. Furthermore, during the late seventeenth century, England was 8\_ \_ toward a more liberal religious settlement, formalized in the Act of Toleration of 1689 - in which dissenters were to be left unmolested. Proprietary New York was, in a sense, a testing ground for some of these advanced notions. It is not surprising, then, that a new pattern of social relations was forged in New York City, 9 accommodate the interests of diverse groups while affirming the supremacy of English law and institutions. The pluralism that took shape in seventeenth-century New York City was the product of an age of toleration, not an age of equality. Guaranteeing the right to express beliefs without persecution was a great step forward in the seventeenth century, but it was light years away from the notion of celebrating cultural differences which forms the underpinning of modern theories of cultural pluralism. Though not all contemporaries shared the goal of cultural uniformity implicit in Charles Lodwick's assessment that New York City was "too great a mixture of nations," his opinion was 10\_ to the mainstream than the philosophy of tolerance and inclusion implemented by William Penn in Pennsylvania. In the eyes of English imperial authorities, pluralism was not an ideal to be treasured, but a condition to be endured. Their predecessors on Manhattan Island shared this view. But the administrators of the Dutch West

EXTRA PRACTICE: Before the Melting Pot: Colonial New York City

India Company had forestalled the appearance of a genuine pluralism in the settlement by upholding the
orthodoxy of the Reformed church and prohibiting the small groups of foreigners from founding religious
institutions of their 11 Despite New Amsterdam's heterogeneous makeup, cultural change had
essentially flowed in one direction as individuals of diverse nationalities gradually conformed to Dutch
culture. 12 the time of the English conquest, many of the town's Germans, Scandinavians,
French, and English had become culturally Dutch. After England assumed power, however, the
agglomeration of diverse peoples that had been loosely bound together by the institutions of a trading
company in New Amsterdam was transformed into a pluralistic society divided along ethnic and racial lines.
The open economic and political environment of the new English city, along with the latitude
granted the Dutch and other groups in cultural matters, set the stage for social processes that <b>eventuated in</b>
(circle the best synonym: perhaps occurred/possibly led to/may have caused /in the end resulted in) the
crystallization of ethnic groups and ultimately a pluralistic society. Obliged to make only minimal
concessions to the fact of English governance and secure in their family and church life, most Dutch saw little
reason to break with the ways of the past. Contact with the English indeed energized the Dutch population to
defend its own customs and values. In short, the city's Dutch coalesced into an ethnic group in a process
resembling that labeled "ethnicization" by historians of nineteenth- and twentieth-century immigrant groups.
The Dutch ethnic group in colonial New York City, however, was primarily the creation of Dutch creoles
(people born or raised in the colony) and not immigrants from the Netherlands. Moreover, it was the creation
of a majority group, not a minority.
9 The French Huguenots rapidly took their place in New York City's pluralistic social order. Already
a self-conscious minority as a result of persecution and exile, the Huguenots easily organized a church
13 arrival in the city. French ethnicity in New York City centered around religion. The newly
formed French ethnic group was more fragile than other groups, since its attachment to French culture was
tenuous as a result of negative associations with Catholic France. Added to the immigrants' sense of gratitude
to English benefactors, this made the maintenance of French culture in New York City problematic.
Religion was the linchpin of the city's Jewish community as well. Wherever they settled around the
world, Jews always came together to practice their faith.
Though the denial of freedom to African newcomers set them apart from the city's Europeans, one
can detect a parallel process of ethnicization at work here as 14 Excluded from white society,
but able to open channels of communication among themselves in the compact settlement, people of African
origin began to discover common ground.

- The sharpening of ethnic boundaries in seventeenth-century New York City and the emergence of ethnic communities brought a degree of order to a diverse society otherwise lacking in sources of cohesion. Forces that might have united New Yorkers across ethnic lines were barely perceptible in this vertically organized society. The social cement that naturally bound homogeneous populations had to be fabricated in New York City's ethnic communities.
- Ethnic institutions flourished in early eighteenth-century New York City, but individual French and Dutch men, largely from the upper ranks, found their interests converging with British men of similar economic standing. Inevitably, the ties held by such individuals to their ethnic communities became more attenuated. Concurrently, the more aggressive Anglicanism of the early eighteenth century lured increasing numbers of foreigners into the English fold. For most Dutch and some French, however, newly reinforced traditions proved more durable even as conditions changed. Ethnic identity would become less salient for them only as supra-ethnic loyalties were generated by the wave of evangelical religion of the 1740s and the republicanism of the revolutionary era.
- Though individuals might desert their ethnic communities, the ethnic institutions created in early New York City and sustained through three generations constituted a model for future groups of newcomers to the city. The legitimacy of pluralism, though yet to be articulated, was not the least part of the historical legacy of the earliest New Yorkers.

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. The Dutch and the English had different approaches to dealing with cultural pluralism in New Amsterdam and New York, the latter favouring toleration and the former restriction.
- 2. The English, a minority in 17<sup>th</sup>-century New York, used a series of harsh laws to achieve cultural uniformity among its European inhabitants.
- 3. The patterns of assimilation in early colonial New York were repeated during the subsequent centuries, in particular during the period of mass immigration.
- 4. Of all the immigrant populations in English New York, the French were the ones who offered the most resistance and sought to preserve their cultural identity.

### E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

What does the author mean when she says "...pluralism was not an ideal to be treasured, but a condition to be endured" (paragraph 6)?

# A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 C. LOGICAL ORDER: Five of the paragraphs (I, III, V, VII and IX) have been removed from the text and are listed below (A, B, C, D, E). Write the correct letter in each blank. (EXAMPLE: I \_\_B\_\_) INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, by Satvinder Singh Juss. Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2006. 350pp. Hardcover. \$99.95/£55.00. ISBN: 0754646718. I: First, to support his argument that immigration restrictions are aberrations to a system of open migration, Juss cites theorists like Emmerich de Vattel, Hugo Grotius, and Samuel Pufendorf, and he also relies on James Nafziger's more recent essay on the admission of aliens under international law. Juss concedes that influential theorists like Vattel are problematic. In one of the more infamous Chinese Exclusion Cases, for example, Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court cited this passage from Vattel's LAW OF NATIONS (1758): "Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the country, when he cannot enter without putting the nation in evident danger, or doing it a manifest injury." (Fong Yue Ting v. US, at 707). Yet Juss insists that the classical publicists "fail to provide a basis for the proposition that a sovereign has an unfettered right to exclude all aliens" (p.14). In particular, he states that Vattel himself mentioned the need for states to offer asylum, as (1) as the duty of nations to offer "just assistance." III: IV: Similarly, among contemporary liberal theorists, there is hardly a consensus for open migration. For example, John Rawls wrote that "people must recognize that they cannot make up for failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, or by migrating into another people's territory without their consent" (Rawls 2001, at 8). These are just two examples of how many influential theorists have defended the right of liberal commonwealths to exclude unwanted persons, irrespective of broader commitments to human equality. Juss does not address these types of arguments, nor (2) he give reasons for why these arguments are so inconsistent with liberal norms. V: VI , Juss does not discuss in detail the particular problems associated with largescale, unskilled immigration from the developing world into advanced industrial nations. He does not engage, for example, with scholars who have long insisted that these unskilled migrations have had a detrimental effect on the economic fortunes of the least well-off in countries like the United States. He also fails to discuss political debates where politicians and scholars have insisted that the immigration of the poor should be decreased and otherwise heavily controlled, because poorer migrants stress (circle the best synonym: emphasize / accentuate / pressurize / strain) the social welfare and criminal justice systems of advanced industrial nations. Many countries now deport more persons for a larger number of reasons precisely to reduce these costs. Juss might not agree with economists like George Borjas, but his work would be more persuasive and well-rounded if he addressed these types of concerns (see Borjas 1991; 2001). VII: VIII This has occurred even though wealthier nations, through their military adventures and political and economic policies, have caused much of the displacement throughout the world. Again, Juss makes claims that appear uncontroversial for anyone paying attention to current affairs: "Western intervention through military action is surely responsible to some degree for the ungovernable state of (4) countries as Iraq and Afghanistan." (p.229). And Juss points toward this solution: "What is needed . . . is an approach to refugee law that integrates immigration law and refugee law into human rights laws, in the context of more general rights to free movement" (p.239). Later, Juss writes: "Should richer countries really want to alleviate hardship, to increase prosperity, and to bring real benefits of globalization to bear on the poorer world, there would be (5) better way to do that than to lift the barriers to control in the developed world." (p.296). And, "[if] people want to sign the social contract and become full contributing members of a society, they should, wherever possible, be permitted to do so, because this is compatible with the idea of equal moral worth of all individuals" (p.57). In such sentences, Juss provides articulate statements for persons who agree with him, including me; but (6)\_ he does not do is confront counterarguments to these positions, counter-arguments that explain better why liberal nation states have not moved

in the directions that (7)\_\_\_\_\_\_ he and I would like. He tends to be dismissive of these other

**TEST PRACTICE: International Migration** 

points of view; indeed, he says that they are inconsistent with liberal norms or economically irrational or perhaps just plain racist. IX:
(by John S.W. Park)
A They might in fact be all these things, and yet by not taking these positions more seriously, Juss misses many opportunities to show why citizens in liberal states have often been so hostile to persons who are culturally different, poor, or both. In its tone and substance, his book resembles a lengthy law review article advocating a particular point of view, rather (8) a balanced account of a complex set of social, political, and legal problems. Therefore, there is little likelihood (circle the best synonym: probable / positive / prospect/perspective) that his book will persuade anyone who does not already agree with him.  B Vattel is instructive because his work is an example of how classical, modern, and contemporary liberal theorists have always been confused and contradictory when it (9) to international migrations. Liberal theorists might be deeply committed to principles of human equality, as they are manifest in liberal constitutions or in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but they have also embraced principles of sovereignty that have justified restrictions against immigration and other forms of discrimination based on ascriptive status. John Locke, (10) instance, said in the SECOND TREATISE that one of the primary functions of a liberal, consent-based commonwealth was to "prevent or redress foreign injuries, and secure the community from inroads and invasion" (Macpherson 1980, §131). (Justice Gray and a majority of his Court argued that Chinese immigration amounted to an "invasion.") Locke suggested that a liberal commonwealth could deal with individuals outside its boundaries by considering them as though they were still in a state of nature. In his other works, Locke was more blunt: foreigners should only be in need of "what they bring with them, either their estates or industry" (Goldie 1997, at 324). In (11) words, anyone who was "unprofitable" could not claim a right to admission.  C
rules are lacking in persuasion.  D Instead, Juss focuses most of his concern about poorer immigrants by looking at refugee law and policy. Indeed, about half of his book is aimed (13) expanding the definition of refugees, and then arguing that more refugees should be admitted into wealthier countries. Many of his observations are uncontroversial: "displaced persons" now lose their homes because of natural disasters, industrial accidents, political instability, and war; the current definition of a "refugee" captures a very small fraction of this displaced population; and "events in the current decade confirm that the rich countries of the North are probably not going to accept a proportionately fair share of the world's refugees in the future" (p.231). In short, the need for sanctuary is gigantic, and yet the political will to meet that need through refugee admissions has dwindled.  E In terms of how immigration rules function to exclude poorer immigrants from wealthy countries,
Juss spends just one chapter arguing for a more realistic set of rules based on concerns about utility and fairness. "My argument here is that the developed world needs to recognize that there is a market for immigration. Provided it recognizes that fact, it may then move to regulate that market in a way that promotes its interests, cultivates an intercourse with the developing world, and is cost effective" (p.67). He notes that in the postwar era skilled workers began to move from developing countries to developed nations, and that this movement has been critical for several industries in affluent countries.

D. TRUE/FALSE: (8 points)  Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text.
1 Thanks to his thorough analysis on the topic, Juss successfully demonstrates that immigrants with limited skills and income are necessary to wealthier nations, in that they are an economical source of labour.
2 Park would have preferred to read more about the views of contemporary scholars and politicians concerning the immigration debate.
3 Though he is deemed liberal in his thinking, not all of Vattel's policies regarding immigration can be considered as such.
4 In his analysis concerning the state of immigration around the world, Juss supports a reduction in the number of restrictions on movement between nations.
<b>E. SHORT ANSWER:</b> Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points) What kind of text is this? Give specific reasons to justify your answer.


### **TEST PRACTICE: Border control**

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (12 points)

B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)

**C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in paragraph 3 in the most logical order. (6 points)** (By Christopher Heath Wellman)

- There are a variety of important issues surrounding the morality of immigration, including difficult questions regarding the definition and moral status of refugees, the circumstances (if any) in which it is permissible to use guest workers, what obligations a rich country incurs when it actively recruits skilled workers from a poor state, and whether there are any limitations on the selection criteria a country may use in deciding among applicants for immigration. This entry addresses each of these topics below, but first it reviews the most prominent arguments on both sides of the central debate in this area, whether states have the moral right to exclude potential immigrants.
- The 1\_\_\_\_\_\_ popular argument for the permissibility and importance of closing borders to outsiders is that this exclusion is necessary in order to preserve a state's distinctive culture. The appeal of cultural continuity is easy to appreciate. As David Miller explains, "the public culture of their country is something that people have an interest in controlling: they want to be able to shape the way that their nation develops, including the values that are contained in the public culture. They may not of course succeed: valued cultural features can be eroded by economic and other forces that evade political control. But they may certainly have good reason to try, and in particular to try to maintain cultural continuity over time, so that they can see themselves as the bearers of an identifiable cultural tradition that stretches backward historically." (Miller 2005: 200) Given this, the concern to preserve one's native culture seems to provide a reasonable justification for restricting immigration.
- This line of argument invites a number of empirical and moral questions.
- a.\_\_\_\_In particular, even if citizens have an understandable interest in maintaining cultural continuity, it remains an open question as to whether they have a corresponding moral right.
- b.\_\_\_\_\_Is the immigrants' culture really that distinctive? And are we sure that these newcomers will resist assimilation? Also, how can we be sure that the cultural changes will be rapid and detrimental?
- c.\_\_\_\_Among the empirical questions, we might ask how confident we can be about the numbers and influence of the potential immigrants.
- d.\_\_\_\_\_Even if all of these descriptive objections can be definitively answered, important moral challenges remain.
- e.\_\_\_\_Skeptics of this line of argument often object that people tend to exaggerate how distinctive—and distinctively valuable—their existing cultures are (it is notoriously difficult to characterize "American" culture, for instance), irrationally fear change, and underestimate how much their culture is changing anyway, in the absence of immigration.
- f.\_\_\_\_Outsiders may also have competing interests in, and/or rights to, enter the country in question, and thus they may permissibly be excluded only if the rights of insiders to preserve their cultural continuity outweigh any rights of foreigners to enter the political territory.
- Another popular argument against open borders is that the influx of newcomers will hurt the economy. In its most straightforward version, this argument simply assumes that the domestic economy can support only a certain number of workers, but more nuanced renditions allege more specifically that at least some types of foreigners should be excluded because, given the cultural differences between insiders and these particular outsiders, the inclusion of the 2\_\_\_\_\_\_ would not be conducive to economic growth (perhaps because these outsiders lack the requisite work ethic, for instance).
- The most common response to this argument is simply to contest that allowing immigrants will have negative economic consequences. It seems clear that some in the domestic economy may be harmed (typically the less skilled workers disproportionately **bear the brunt** (*circle the best synonym*: *sustain/are weighed down/feel the strain/support the effects*) of the costs, since they must now compete with immigrants 3\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ presence drives down wages), but the economy as a whole often benefits, as firms are able to hire cheaper labor (and pass along correspondingly lower prices to consumers), and there is an increased demand for various goods and services. More generally, even if a given domestic economy might suffer if it did not restrict immigration, economists tend to agree that the global economy as a 4\_\_\_\_\_\_ would profit from fewer restrictions on who can work where. (From a purely economic perspective, the inefficiencies of barring Africans from competing for work in European countries are costly, just as those which resulted from prohibiting women from working in a 'man's' job were.) This recognition that there will



Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. According to the author, foreigners who do not share the same work ethic of a country should not be allowed to live there.
- 2. This excerpt was most likely taken from a journal dedicated to immigration issues.
- 3. In this text, the author discusses various reasons for restricting entry into a country, some of which concern the economy, health care and security of a given country.
- 4. Kukathas, author of a text published in 2005, is skeptical that restrictive immigration laws could lead to a reduction in terrorism.

# E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

What pattern does the author use in constructing this text?

TEST PRACTICE: Immigration: The right thing to do
A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points)
B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2
points)
C. LOGICAL ORDER: Five of the paragraphs (II, IV, VI, VIII and X) have been removed from the
text and are listed below (A, B, C, D, E). Write the correct letter in each blank. (EXAMPLE: II <u>B</u> )
(5 points)
In announcing the Department of Homeland Security's policy on June 15 stating that undocumented
nigrant youths who meet certain conditions would no (1) be deported, President Obama said
that "It was the right thing to do." However, he did not say whether he meant "the right thing" legally or
morally.
II:
III Nor (2) such developments restricted to the resource-rich countries of the Northern
Hemisphere. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Singapore, Israel and Jordan are countries with the highest
percentage share of migrants among their total population, while the United States, the Russian Federation,
Germany, Saudi Arabia, Canada and France lead in the actual number of international migrants. Migrations
are now global, challenging many societies in many parts of the world. Whereas from 1910 to 2012, the
world's population increased slightly more than fourfold, from 1.6 billion to more than 7 billion, the number
of people living in countries other than their own as migrants increased nearly sevenfold, from roughly 33
million to more than 200 million.
[V:
So (3) not advocate a "world without borders"? From a moral point of view, no child
deserves to be born on one side of the border instead of another, and it is deeply antithetical to our moral
principles to punish individuals for what they cannot help being or doing. Punishment implies responsibility
and accountability for one's actions and choices; clearly, children who through their parents' choices find
hemselves on one side of the border rather than another cannot be penalized for these choices. A strong
advocate of the right to self-government might retort that rewarding certain children for the wrongs
committed by their parents, in this case illegal immigration, by legalizing undocumented youths is illogical as
(4) as immoral and that "the right thing to do" would be to deport <i>all</i> undocumented migrants –
parents and children alike. Apart from the sheer impracticality of this solution, its <b>advocates</b> ( <i>circle the best</i>
synonym: lawyers / sustainers / supports / proponents) seem to consider undocumented "original entry"
nto a country as the analog of "original sin" that no amount of subsequent behavior and atonement can alter.
VI:
VII (5) though morally the right to hospitality is an individual right, the socioeconomic and
cultural causes of migrations are by and large collective. Migrations occur because of economic,
environmental, cultural and historical "push" and "pull" factors. "We are here," migrants (6) us,
'because in effect you were there." "We did not cross the border; the border crossed us." We do have special
obligations to our neighbors, as opposed to moral obligations to humanity at large, if, for example, our
economy has devastated theirs, if our industrial output has led to environmental harm or if our drug
dependency has encouraged the formation of transnational drug cartels.
VIII:
IX Migratory movements are sites of imperfect justice in that they bring into play the individual right to
freedom of movement, the universal right to hospitality and the right of collectives to self-government in
addition to specific associative moral obligations. As we have seen, these rights cannot always be easily
reconciled. Furthermore, international law does not as yet recognize a "human right to citizenship" for
migrants, and considers this a sovereign prerogative of individual states. Nonetheless, the responsible
politician is the one who acts with a lucid understanding of the necessity to balance these principles rather
giving in to a punitive rigorism that would deny, in Thomas Jefferson's words, "the right
which nature has given to all men of departing from [and I would add, from joining with] the country in
which choice, not chance has placed them" (1774).
X:
(July 2012)

A But such punitive rigor unfairly conflates the messy and often inadvertent reasons that lead one to become an undocumented migrant with no criminal intent to break the law. If conditions in a person's native

survive, his right to survival, from a moral point of view, carries as much weight as does the new country's claim to control borders against migrants. Immanuel Kant, therefore, called the moral claim to seek refuge or respite in the lands of another, a "universal right of hospitality," provided that the intentions of the foreigner upon arriving on foreign lands were peaceful. This right, he argued, belonged to each human being placed on this planet who had to share the earth with others.
Obviously, he considered the action to be legal; nonetheless, this invocation of his administration's power drew strong criticism from many, (9) as Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia. But the president's grounds for believing it moral were much less clear. This should come as no surprise: the morality and politics of migration are among the most divisive issues in much of the world. In the United States, discussions of immigration flow seamlessly into matters of national security, employment levels, the health of the American economy, and threats to a presumptive American national identity and way of life. Much the same is true in Europe. Not a week goes by without a story of refugees from Africa or Asia perishing as they try to arrive at the shores of the European Union.
C Whether or not President Obama considered all these moral aspects of the matter, his handling of this issue shows that he acted as a "responsible politician," and not opportunistically. It was "the right thing to do."
Migrations pit two moral and legal principles, foundational to the modern state system, against each other. The human right of individuals to move across borders whether for economic, personal or professional reasons or to seek (circle the best synonym: find / look after / research / search for) asylum and refuge is guaranteed (10) Articles 13 and 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Yet at the same time, Article 21 of the declaration recognizes a basic right to self-government, stipulating that "the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government." Under the current regime of states, that fundamental right includes control over borders in addition to determining who is to be a citizen as distinguished from a resident or an alien. The international system straddles these dual principles but it has not been (11) to reconcile them. The irony of global developments is that while state sovereignty in economic, military, and technological domains is eroded and national borders have become more porous, they are still policed to keep out aliens and intruders. The migrant's body has become the symbolic site upon which such contradictions are enacted.
These claims of interdependence require a third moral principle — in addition to the right of universal hospitality and the right to self-government — to be brought into consideration: <i>associative obligations</i> among peoples arising through historical factors. States cannot ignore such associative obligations. Migration policies, though they are often couched in nation-centric terms, always have transnational causes and consequences. It is impossible to address Mexican migration into the United States, for example, if we fail to address the decades-long dependency of the rich California agricultural fields (12) the often undocumented and unorganized labor of Mexican workers, some of (13) children have now grown up to become "Dreamers" (so named after the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act introduced to Congress in 2001). Among the three million students who graduate from United States high schools, 65,000 are undocumented. The United States owes these young people a special duty of hospitality, not only because we, as a society, have benefited from the circumstances that led their parents to enter this country, but also because they have formed strong affiliations with this society through being our friends, students, neighbors and coworkers. In a liberal-democratic society the path to citizenship must follow along these associative ties through which an individual shows him or herself to be capable and worthy of citizenship.

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, <u>using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text.</u>

- 1 The author of this text questions Obama's decision regarding young migrants.
- 2. Almost 20% of high school graduates in the United States reside in the country illegally.
- 3. According to Kant, under no condition should an endangered migrant be denied hospitality in another country.
- 4. The author sees a contradiction in the decreased ability of individual nations to maintain their sovereignty in various fields as compared to the extensive energy spent limiting immigration.

# E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

1. Using your own words, describe the analogy of 'original entry' and 'original sin' (para. V).


#### **TEST PRACTICE: The Silk Roads**

A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points)

B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points)

- There is an endless popular fascination with the "Silk Roads," the historic routes of economic and cultural exchange across Eurasia. The phrase in our own time has been used as a metaphor for Central Asian oil pipelines, and it is common advertising copy for the romantic exoticism of expensive adventure travel. One would think that, in the century and a third since the German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen coined the term to describe (1)\_\_\_\_\_\_ for him was a quite specific route of east-west trade some 2,000 years ago, there might be some consensus as to what the Silk Roads were and when they were actually used; but many aspects related to the route are still subject to vigorous scholarly debate.

- IV (4)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ it is difficult to locate the Pazyryk pastoralists within any larger polity controlling the center of Eurasia, the Xiongnu—the Huns—who emerged around the beginning of the 2nd century BCE, established the first of the great Inner Asian empires and in the process stimulated the beginnings of the Silk Roads. Evidence about the Xiongnu supports a growing consensus that Inner Asian peoples formerly considered purely nomadic in fact were mixed societies, incorporating (5)\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ sedentary elements as permanent settlement sites and agriculture into their way of life. Substantial quantities of Chinese goods now (6)\_\_\_\_\_\_ their way into Inner Asia and beyond to the Mediterranean world. This flow of goods included tribute the Han Dynasty paid to the nomad rulers, and trade, in return for which the Chinese received horses and camels. Chinese missions to the "Western Regions" also resulted in the opening of direct trade with Central Asia and parts of the Middle East, although we have (7)\_\_\_\_\_\_ evidence whatsoever that Han merchants ever reached the Mediterranean or that Roman merchants reached China.
- V The Han Dynasty expanded Chinese dominion for the first time *well* (*circle the best synonym: certainly /distant /far /in a positive way*) into Central Asia, in the process extending the Great Wall and establishing garrisons. While one result of this was a shift in the balance of power between the Xiongnu and the Chinese in favor of the latter, Xiongnu tombs of the late 1st century BCE through the 1st century CE in north-central Mongolia contain abundant Chinese lacquerware, lacquered Chinese chariots, high-quality bronze mirrors, and stunning silk brocades. There is good reason to assume that much of the silk passing through Xiongnu hands was traded farther to the west.
- VI During the 2nd century CE, Buddhism began to spread vigorously along the Silk Roads into Central Asia and China with the active support of local rulers. The earliest clearly documented Chinese translations of Buddhist scriptures date from this period, although the process of expanding the Buddhist canon in China and adapting it to Chinese religious traditions extended over subsequent centuries. Understandably, many of the key figures in the transmission of the faith were those from Central Asia who *commanded* (*circle the best synonym*: *controlled /possessed / patronised/ were in charge of*) a range of linguistic skills acquired in multiethnic oasis towns such as Kucha. Buddhism also spread east via the coastal routes. By the time of the Northern Wei Dynasty in the 5th and early 6th centuries, there were major Buddhist cave temple sites along the route in the Chinese north and extending across to the fringes of the Central Asian deserts. Perhaps the best known and best preserved of these is the Mogao Caves at the commercial and garrison town of Dunhuang, where there is a continuous record of Buddhist art from the early 5th century down to the time of




Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, <u>using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text.</u>

- 1. By the 10<sup>th</sup> century, all ranks of Chinese society had come in contact with foreign traditions, including sport, performing arts and everyday customs.
- 2. Although Buddhism spread east from India predominantly by coastal routes, cave temples could be found along the overland roads.
- 3. The Silk Roads were a means by which to exchange not only commodities like silk but also customs and religious ideas.
- 4. The most intense period in the ceramics trade between the Middle East and China occurred under the Mongol empire in the 1200s and 1300s, thanks in part to a mutual interest in such products.

### E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

1. What is meant by the expression 'temper the view' in paragraph IX?

# **TEST PRACTICE: Globalization in the History of Ideas** A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (14 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the paragraphs in the most logical order (4 points) (By William Scheuerman) European intellectuals have **hardly** (circle the best synonym: almost/in no way/difficulty/firmly) been alone in their fascination with the experience of territorial compression, as shown by the key role played by the same theme in early 1 -century American thought. In 1904, the literary figure Henry Adams diagnosed the existence of a "law of acceleration," fundamental to the workings of social development, in to make sense of the rapidly changing spatial and temporal contours of human activity. Modern society could only be properly understood if the seemingly irrepressible acceleration of basic technological and social processes was given a central place in social and historical analysis (Adams 1931 [1904]). John Dewey argued in 1927 that recent economic and technological trends implied the emergence of a "new world" no less noteworthy than the opening up of America to European exploration and conquest in 1492. For Dewey, the invention of steam, electricity, and the telephone offered formidable challenges to relatively static and homogeneous forms of local community life that had long represented the main theatre for most human activity. Economic activity increasingly exploded the confines of local communities to a degree that would have stunned our historical predecessors, for example, while the steamship, railroad, automobile, and airplane considerably intensified rates of geographical mobility. Dewey went beyond previous discussions of the changing temporal and spatial contours of human activity, however, by that the compression of space posed fundamental questions for democracy. Dewey observed 3 that small-scale political communities (for example, the New England township), a crucial site for the exercise of effective democratic participation, seemed ever more peripheral to the great issues of an interconnected world. Increasingly dense networks of social ties across borders rendered local forms of selfgovernment ineffective. Dewey wondered, "How can a public be organized, we may ask, when literally it does not stay in place?" (Dewey 1927, 140). To the extent that democratic citizenship minimally presupposes the possibility of action together with others, how might citizenship be sustained in a social world subject to ever more astonishing possibilities for movement and mobility? New high-speed technologies attributed a shifting and unstable character to social life, as demonstrated by increased rates of change and turnover in many arenas of activity (most important perhaps, the economy) directly affected by them, and the relative fluidity and inconstancy of social relations there. If citizenship requires some amount of constancy and stability in social life, however, did not recent changes in the temporal and spatial conditions of human activity bode poorly for political participation? How might citizens come together and act in concert (circle the best synonym: as one/altogether/uniquely/unison) when contemporary society's "mania for motion and speed" made it difficult for them even to get acquainted with one another, let alone identify objects of common concern? (Dewey 1927, 140). The term globalization 4 only become commonplace in the last two decades, and academic commentators who employed the term as late as the 1970s accurately recognized the novelty of doing so (Modelski 1972). At least since the advent of industrial capitalism, however, intellectual discourse has been filled with allusions to phenomena strikingly similar to those that have captured the attention of recent theorists of globalization. Nineteenth and twentieth-century philosophy, literature, and social commentary include numerous references to a widely shared awareness that experiences of distance and space are inevitably transformed by the emergence of high-speed forms of transportation (for example, rail ) and communication (the telegraph or telephone) that dramatically heighten possibilities for human interaction across existing geographical and political divides (Harvey 1989; Kern 1983). Long before the introduction of the term globalization entered 6 recent popular and scholarly debate, the appearance of novel high-speed forms of social activity generated extensive commentary about the compression of space. The unabated proliferation of high-speed technologies is probably the main source of the numerous references in intellectual life since 1950 to the annihilation of distance. The Canadian cultural critic Marshall McLuhan made the theme of a technologically based "global village," generated by social "acceleration at all levels of human organization," the centerpiece of an anxiety-ridden analysis of new media technologies in the



Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, using your own words.

- 1. Both Dewey and Heidegger had some qualms with territorial compression, the latter seeing it as detrimental to democracy.
- 2. Though the term 'global village' only emerged in the Sixties, the idea behind it had been debated for generations.
- 3. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the American philosopher John Dewey dedicated some of his writings to the effects of high-speed transportation on democracy.
- 4. All of the intellectuals cited provide a negative view of globalization.

# E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences. (2 points)

What data can you ascertain about Heinrich Heine from the reading?

# TEST PRACTICE: Globalization and Sovereignty A. CLOZE: Read the text and fill in each blank with an appropriate word. (13 points) B. VOCABULARY: In the text, you will see some highlighted words. Circle the best synonym. (2 points) A popular story today is that state sovereignty is in worldwide eclipse in the face of an overwhelming process of globalization. The central argument of this book is that this story relies ideas about sovereignty and globalization that are both overstated and misleading. In the first place, sovereignty, the electromagnetic-like charge of state control and authority across an operational zone, is not necessarily neatly contained territorially state-by-state in the way it is usually thought. Nor it ever been so. Yet the dominant image of globalization is the replacement of a presumably territorialized world by one of networks and flows that know no borders other than (3) define the earth as such. So, in challenging this image, I must trace the ways in which it has become commonplace. Beyond that, however, I also try to develop a way of thinking about the geography of sovereignty, the various forms in which sovereignty actually operates in the world, to offer an intellectual framework that breaks with the (4) \_\_/or thinking of state sovereignty versus globalization. The term sovereignty emerged out of a Western religious context in which sovereignty was first vested in the Roman polis and then the Roman Emperor and later in a monotheistic God represented on the earth the Pope and the Church. The intellectual descent of sovereignty has been central to European political debate from the Middle Ages to the present. Slowly and unevenly, first France, then England, and then other proto-states began to invest in the concept of "man-centered kingship." Interestingly, the geographer Gottmann sees this as a reaction to the rise of self-governing communities (such as the German and Italian city-states) in the fifteenth century and the increasing divorce of political debate from the metaphysical tradition invoking divine will. Machiavelli is a key figure in this regard. He abandoned the medieval tradition of the pretended divine origin of the rights of kings to argue for a stand-alone state ruler's right to rule rested on the "voluntary contractual submission of the governed." By the late sixteenth century, what Gottmann terms the "inner divisions of Europe and the vast potential of a new and diversified overseas world" as a result of European colonialism, reinforced the direct link between monarchical sovereignty and territory. In the philosophers Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes the new order of territorial states as the emerging manifestation of the historic body politic found its first modern prophets. Gottmann writes: "As the concept of a corporate national sovereignty gradually replaced the personal prerogatives of the individual sovereign, territorial delimitation acquired much more significance: it fixed limits to the spatial extent of sovereignty and outlined the size and location of it. The territory became the physical and legal embodiment of national identity, and the jurists and philosophers of the seventeenth century began to discuss how sovereign governments ought to use these prerogatives." In his Leviathan and other works, Hobbes undoubtedly tried to untangle a reasoned conception of sovereignty from the religious and fabulist roots of the body-politic metaphor. He set the terms of debate in which much recent academic discussion of sovereignty has been conducted even as practice has evolved in the face of dramatic socio-political change (following (7)\_ events as the Thirty Years War, the Holocaust, the Cold War, and globalization). Hobbes clearly propounded the idea of sovereignty, in Daniel Philpott's words, as "supreme authority within a territory." This signifies the autonomous rule over a given territory free from external interference that is the timeless definition of sovereignty in contemporary political science. IVCrucial for later understanding and practice, Hobbes saw sovereignty as the consequence of a "'multitude" of subjects coming together to constitute a state but that cannot by its own volition simply dissolve sovereign power it has itself created. This did not, (8) , mandate absolute subjugation of subjects to the state. In other words, disobedience is one thing, dissolution of the state something different entirely. The central paradox of modern state sovereignty as commonly understood, therefore, is owed to Hobbes: that the people is not the state itself, since only individual persons can act or consent, not the people understood as a collectivity, so the state they have endowed with power (9) overthrown by them once they have called it into existence; it exists as some ultimate authority which is sovereign and absolute. Yet, even if only metaphorically, in using a family/state analogy to articulate his theory of political obligation (the subjugation of children and servants to the parents is held as akin to that of subjects to state), Hobbes reinforced the tendency to see the state, if no longer in the singular person of the monarch, as a separate social entity that could be endowed with its own power and intentionality.

**V** [...] What exactly is meant by "globalization"? Various "myths" or powerful and widely accepted or popular ideas about globalization can be distinguished. My point is not to portray them as falsehoods but as

deas that are frequently exaggerated in terms of their novelty or simplicity about the way the world works.
This has happened because globalization has been portrayed as involving a totally new ontology of world
order. Lurking behind this claim is a strong sense of a clean break with the past brought (10) by
processes that have just happened rather (11) been chosen. That is to say, "Globalization
hetoric has taken on mythical propositions, in Roland Barthes's view of myth as the transformation of the
cultural products of history into something apparently natural" (Strath 2003). The focus here is above all in
terms of what globalization is seen as signifying for sovereignty. Usage of the word itself first deserves some
attention.
VI Talk about "globalization" is relatively new, dating (12) only to the late 1950s and
early 1960s in languages such as English and French. But thinking globally is in fact much more deeply
rooted (circle the best synonym: basis/derived/embedded/originated) in the experience of European
mperialism and the associated beginnings of the European state system in the sixteenth century. The period
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries was the time when the entire earth first became the framing for
world politics as we know it today. But this historical framing of the national by the global has been obscured
pecause of its displacement in many academic and popular circles by thinking in terms of an entirely state-
centered world. Ipso facto, the new globalization represents the first impact of the global on a previously
state-centered world.
VII At first appearance, usage of globalization was relatively straightforward in referring to the global
scale at which some transactions, particularly trade, were now taking place. From 1980 to 1995, however, the
erm was applied increasingly to the entire economic sphere in general and to the activities of multinational
companies in particular. If among liberals this trend augured a world of free trade that knows no boundaries
and from which all could benefit collectively, for the traditional left it conjured up the world imagined by
Karl Marx in the Communist Manifesto in which the bourgeoisie was finally taking over the entire globe and
capitalism was scaling up to the world as a whole. Not only a change of scale, then, but also a sense of the
decomposition of a previous—state-based—order was now entailed by globalization. Since the mid-1990s
use of the word has exploded. For example, the number of articles in the French daily newspaper <i>Le Monde</i>
using the term <i>mondialisation</i> (the French equivalent of globalization) underwent its biggest single-year
ncreases in 1995–1996 and 1998–1999. Though waxing and waning since then, the level of usage still
averages five to six times the level before 1995. The meaning has also expanded. Now it refers not only to a
change in scale as the world effectively <b>shrinks</b> (circle the best synonym:
contracts/decreases/lowers/reductions) as a result of new transportation and communication technologies but
also to an acceleration in the rate of change in scale across a range of transactions, the development of global
finance, the changing nature of production (particularly the emergence of global production chains), and the
weakening of national and international. In just a few years globalization (13) become one of
the central "paradigms" in the social sciences. (Adapted from Agnew 2009)
C. LOGICAL ORDER: Number the sentences in the most logical order (1-5). The first sentence has
already been given. (5 points)
This book attempts to tell a rather different story about sovereignty.
aSome, perhaps a majority, may have <u>aspired</u> to exert sovereignty in some respect or other but have
never entirely succeeded in doing so.
Hobbes's conception of Leviathan (the state) and a patchwork of sovereign spaces, these prophets are still
competing for whose trumpet will sound the final note in the struggle between each worldview and its
associated <i>modus operandi</i> .
Thus, instead of a linear story about recent globalization undermining a long-established state
erritorial sovereignty, I want to emphasize how globalization has merely further complicated an already
complex relationship between sovereignty and territory.
dMoreover, it illustrates the fact that such states have never exercised either total political or
economic-regulatory monopolies over their territories.
eWhile accepting the reality of a recent upturn in globalization and its potential to undermine the
presumed political monopoly exercised by states over their territories, it questions the ready association
petween sovereignty and territory.

Decide whether each statement is true or false based on what you have read in the text. Justify each answer in 1-2 sentences, <u>using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text.</u>

- 1. Ever since the Nineties, the use of the term 'mondialisation' in the French newspaper *Le Monde* has constantly increased, thus denoting the importance of the concept of globalization.
- 2. Hobbes compared the sovereign to the heads of a household and the subjects to their offspring, the latter occupying a position of subjugation.
- 3. The author supports the view that sovereignty, unlike globalization, is strictly linked to a confined territory.
- 4. Though only theorized as such in the last half-century or so, the phenomenon of globalization has actually been in act for various centuries, according to the author.

E. SHORT ANSWER: Answer the following question in 1-2 sentences, <u>using your own words and not copying more than three consecutive words from the text</u>. (2 points)
Why are Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes likened to prophets in para. 2?

### **SOLUTIONS:**

#### Transcript: Prof Singh on Colonialism in India Part 1

**Prof. Singh:** Asia is always an important place for Europe. It's been interested for at least 500 years in its commerce, in resources, in its mineral wealth, and also in its people. Over the course of the 17th, 18th, and 19th century, Europe began to consolidate its naval routes into Asia, all of which centered on India being a primary place where ships would stop and either trade or refuel. By the middle of the 19th century, the British East India Company has acquired enough political and economic power that they actually have to fight some fairly substantial political campaigns. The largest of these was the 1857 battle, what is called in India "The War for Independence," but is usually referred to by the British and Americans as the Sepoy Mutiny, where soldiers who were paid by the East India Company to be their armed forces rebelled against the East India Company. At that point, the British government thought it fit to take over control of India from the British East India Company and consolidated then what is called the British Raj. They began to run the country from England for the next 90 years.

Many wonder how Britain was able to maintain this power from such a great distance. Was it manpower people that they sent over—was it the use of local elite classes, or some combination of the above? This is the question that has always befuddled Indian nationalist historians: how so few British men-less than 100,000 British men-were able to control a country of over 300 million people. Part of the way the British were able to do this has to do with three things. The first is economic and industrial superiority that the British had because of the industrial revolution very early on. It allows them the technological capacity to send troops over whenever they need to, but also to run supply lines for their own military. It gives them immense military capacity and allows them the ability to control. The second thing, and this is the most important thing, I think, from an historical standpoint, is that India is not one nation when the British arrive. It's actually divided up into smaller princely states, many of which are at war with each other. The British are able-pretty successfully-to pit smaller states against one another, and to design treaties with larger states, and the larger political infighting allows Britain to consolidate its power much more easily than it would have been able to if it had to do this entirely on its own. The third thing, importantly for British military rule, is that they are able to siphon off a class of Indians from the middle layers to become ambassadors for British rule in India. It's a class of ambassadors who are trying to think about industrialization, education, modernization, who see the advances that Europe has made and want similar things in India, and they began to support British rule. These three things help the British substantially in maintaining rule over a very large country for quite some time.

India is famously called the Jewel in the Crown of the British empire, and it has three basic things that it provides to the British that strategically make it important enough that the British held onto it for as long as they did with such a tight grip. The first and the most important thing that it provides is naval routes into the rest of Asia. Because Britain holds India, it's able to send its navy, its air force, and its troops all over the Indian Ocean, everywhere from the tip of Africa to Southeast Asia. The second thing it provides is human labor power. Labor, not only in the sense of Indians who were sent to work on plantations starting in the middle of the 19th century when Britain outlaws slavery — slaves started to be replaced by Indian indentures workers in areas under British colonial possession. Most of the places in the Caribbean, Africa, and Southeast Asia where you see large South Asian populations, they're the result of this indentured migration — but also in the sense of military recruitment. India provides one million soldiers for the British during World War I, and two million during World War II to fight in the European theater and also in the Middle East. Famously, the British campaign in Mesopotamia / Iraq is done by Indian soldiers. The third thing it provides is massive amounts of economic resources for the British. It provides markets for their industrial goods, it provides raw materials that they need to process, and it allows Britain to essentially become a premier economic power. In fact, its industrial capacity and success depends in large part on its control over the economic success of India. (845)

#### Transcript: Prof Singh on Colonialism in India Part 2

Interviewer: You touched a bit on India's importance during the world wars, but can you talk a little bit more about the impact that the world wars had on Britain's imperial project, with respect to India in particular? **Prof Singh:** During World War I and World War II both, Britain plays a pretty major role but takes a pretty severe beating as a result of how devastating it is. Even though it comes out on top in World War I, it's at a pretty severe cost to the strength of the empire. It also proves to most Indians that no matter how loyal they are to the British crown, Britain is not going to take Indian demands for independence seriously. It does a bunch of things both to the infrastructure of the British empire—in terms of weakening it in certain places—but it also reinforces for many Indians what the cost will be for India if Britain continues its global imperial project. Many Indian politicians said famously that India was bled dry in order to finance Britain's campaigns in World War I. Indian medical orderlies attending to wounded soldiers on stretchers outside a dressing station, Mesopotamia, during the First World War. In World War II, there are massive famines that happen all over the country, not because there's lack of agricultural production, but because food is literally taken from India and sent to English. So, the war has an economically devastating impact on India but also, and it's important to point this out, Indian soldiers are returning from the war now with some military experience and confidence that they should be entitled to the same benefits that British soldiers are getting when they come back from the war. When that doesn't happen, it really does strengthen the demands for Indian independence. The last thing that I want to say, though, is that I think that the untold story for India's independence is really the mutinies that are taking place by Indian soldiers during World War II. Famously, the Royal Indian Navy and the Royal Indian Air Force both mutiny in important ways at the tail end of World War II, and this convinced England that it's no longer going to be able to hold on to India militarily. The costs of the empire are at direct odds with what they need infra-structurally to keep the imperial project going.

**Interviewer:** We know from history that Britain abandoned its empire pretty rapidly after World War II. They pull out of India, they pull out of the Middle East-in both cases with pretty disastrous consequences. Was this an outgrowth of the war? Was this something they'd been considering with the change of leadership from Churchill to Atlee in London, that suddenly there was this will on the part of the colonizers to abandon the project? How did that come about? Prof Singh: There are three parts of this story that are important to tell. The first is that Britain does not have the capacity to hold on to chunks of its empire, and it's making choices about what it can hold and what it can't hold. Part of that decision making calculus is being determined in Whitehall, in as smart a way as they can make it (I think). I don't believe for a second that Churchill was somehow more or less compassionate than anyone else. The British economy depended so greatly on what India was able to do that even the most liberal minded of British politicians, I don't think, wanted to let India go. The second thing, and the one that I think most people know, is that the campaign for independence inside of India was massive. Millions of people are out in the streets campaigning for freedom, for liberty, for the lack of colonial interference in politics, Gandhi's campaigns are immensely popular globally, and this makes it very difficult for the British to keep a lid on nationalist sentiment. In some places the ruthless repression of the nationalist movement basically watered the soil and more and more nationalists grew out of it. During World War I there were aerial campaigns against centers of nationalist agitation; during World War II similarly they were very worried that sections of India are going to hook up with Japan, and make India a new front in World War II, and that's all happening because of nationalist agitation within India and trying to find new ways to work this out. Thirdly, it seems to me, that global politics was really beginning to change, and Britain's position is now being eclipsed by new superpowers that are setting the terms of the debate and how the game is going to be played. Britain has to abandon much of its imperial project in the Middle East and South Asia because Soviet influence in the region is growing massively, and it settles for having a rearguard position in Africa as its primary colonial possession through the 1950s and 60s. These are all calculated decisions that are made because of national, international, and regional politics that are changing after World War II, and the re-division of the spoils of empire that happen. The US and the Soviet Union are basically determining how the map will look. (877)

# Transcript: Prof Miller on John Locke

John Locke is one of the most celebrated political philosophers of the seventeenth century, one that scholars have looked to for a better understanding of how intellectuals conceived of freedom and equality. Despite Locke's popularity however, recent trends in academic scholarship are critical of the philosopher, labeling him anti-republican, or even a racist.

To say that Locke's position on the slave trade is complicated is an understatement. Though the philosopher never left definitive evidence that concretely revealed his opinion either way, some historians have formulated arguments that Locke's theory did not justify the trade nor the slavery of Africans. Conversely, other scholars have also claimed that he participated in it, and supported it wholeheartedly. Let us now look at how historians have interpreted (or misinterpreted) his actions in relation to African slavery.

John Locke did not have financial independence for most of his life, a fact that shaped his relationship with the slave trade. He depended on the patronage of the Earl of Shaftsbury (spelt SHAFTSBURY) for his income, and he lived off of the investments jointly made with Lord Shaftsbury, including six hundred pounds Locke invested in the Royal African Company. Several authors have thus concluded that this is a sign that Locke was an advocate of the slave trade. Bernasconi, Mann and Davis have argued that "Locke's investment in the slave trade is . . . damning" proof that his philosophical theory of slavery was meant to legitimize the institution of African slavery.

There are several reasons why this stance becomes problematic. First, does investment in an institution make one complicit with it? Contemporaries widely understood that England's colonies brought a vast amount of wealth. If Locke is condemned as condoning slavery for his investment in the Royal African Company – an institution that is systemic to the overall economy of Britain – then what could Locke have invested in that had no connection to the slave trade at all?

Part of the problem of analyzing Locke's position on slavery is his relative silence about the issue. As scholars have looked to Locke as one of the founders of Republicanism, they have to grapple with the fact that he did not speak out against the institution. So, is he a traitor to his own principles? Without further evidence, we can only speculate as to Locke's feelings about African slavery. (390)

#### Transcript: Prof. Arsenault on the Atlantic Slave Trade

The Portuguese went to Africa in the 15<sup>th</sup> century looking to bypass Muslim North Africans who had a monopoly on the sub-Saharan trade in gold and spices. As they explored and traded in West Africa, the Portuguese learned that money could be made by transporting slaves along the Atlantic coast to Muslim merchants. In addition to trading in Africa, the Portuguese began to export small numbers of slaves to Europe, to work in the cities. At the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, about 10% of the population of Lisbon (one of the largest cities in Europe) was African. Also, at this time, Europeans established sugar plantations on the islands off of Northwest Africa and the slave trade to those islands became profitable. I want to highlight this because the use of slave labor for plantation agriculture foreshadows the development of slavery in the Americas. Soon enough, other countries became interested in the profitable slave trade.

English and Dutch ships joined in. They would raid Portuguese ships as well as going onto the mainland to enslave Africans for the trade. Europeans began to explore the Americas, Africans were part of most expeditions to the region. The Spanish brought them in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century to work on sugar plantations and in gold mines on the island of Hispaniola (current-day Haiti and the Dominican Republic). Slaves were also put to work draining the shallow lakes of Tenochtitlán, the Aztec capital, in Mexico. The slave trade increased in the seventeenth century, as more large-scale agricultural production increased the need for labor. The demand for sugar, a highly profitable crop that grew well in various parts of the Americas, continued to grow. And the Europeans introduced large-scale production of indigo, rice, tobacco, coffee, cocoa, and cotton. Imports of African slaves increased over the latter half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century and into the 18<sup>th</sup>. Approximately 1.3 million slaves were exported on the trans-Atlantic route in the 17<sup>th</sup> century; over 6 million were exported in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The end of the trans-Atlantic slave trade began in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, with bans on the importation of slaves in Britain and the U.S. in 1807. International pressure, as well as British blockades of slave ships, led to the decline of the slave trade, which had mostly ended by the 1850s. (...)

By the time the Portuguese started to pay attention to Brazil, they had been active in the slave trade for nearly a century. In the mid-16th century, sugar plantations began to spring up in the Northeast, where sugar grew well. The colonists looked to the Indians to provide the necessary work force for this labor-intensive crop. However, the enslaved Indians quickly fell victim to European diseases (an important aspect of the Columbian Exchange) or fled to the unnavigated interior of the country. The Portuguese decided that the Indians were too fragile for plantation labor and, already active in the Atlantic slave trade, they began to import African slaves. Soon, the sugar plantation system became entirely dependent on African slave labor. "Without Angola no slaves, without slaves no sugar, without sugar no Brazil" was a common expression during the 17th century. While slaves were initially brought in to provide labor for the sugar plantations, the eventual overabundance of African slaves caused them to be used in almost all areas of the economy. Slaves were distributed in Brazil based on the primary export of the time, depending on where they were needed for work: first, on the sugar plantations in the Northeast, then in the gold mines of the Southeast, on the coffee plantations of the South, and in the major cities of Salvador and Rio de Janeiro as household servants. By the late 18th century, about half of the households in Brazil's most prominent cities held slaves. The slave trade, which allowed for the constant importation of inexpensive labor, allowed Brazil to develop several major industries and filled their need for most manual labor in almost every profession. African slaves were brought into Brazil as early as 1530, with abolition in 1888. During those three and a half centuries, Brazil received 4,000,000 Africans, over four times as many as any other American destination. The slave trade lasted longer in Brazil than in almost any other country in the Americas. .

#### The Value of Philosophy (B. Russell)

Cloze:1.ought 2.who 3. as 4.were 5.waste 6.any 7.soon 8.while 9.which 10.make 11.such 12.contrary 13.might 14.another

True/False: 1.TRUE The practical individual only focuses on the body and its material needs (para 3). 2.FALSE Its importance lies precisely in the fact that it is uncertain and deals with questions that lack a specific answer (see para. 6) 3.FALSE Russell considers the review to be too short and lacking in completion (see para. 1) 4.FALSE Many find it useless to study philosophy (see para 2).

Short answer: 1. As soon as a branch of philosophy produces specific answers, it becomes its own science. 2.'Hair-splitng' is used derogatively to describe an excessively detailed analysis of something whose aim is fruitless. 3. An example of metaphor is 'tyranny of custom' and an example of simile is 'like a garrison in a beleaguered fortress'.

#### Francis Bacon and the Scientific Method

3.d 4.g 5.b 6.e 7.f

#### **Social Contract Theory and Hobbes**

Cloze: 1.like 2.according 3.another 4.as 5.being 6.what 7.many 8.addition 9.however 10.which

11.make 12.at 13.either Vocabulary: 1.before 2.seek Logical Order: 2—5—3—1—4

True/False: 1.False 2.False 3.True 4.True

Short answer: People are free to do whatever they want; they are free of all restrictions.

#### **Hobbes and China**

Cloze: 1.such 2.as 3.contrary 4.by 5.million 6.on 7.make 8.so 9.which 10.than 11.either 12.to

13.Had

Vocabularly: 1.case 2.reckons Logical Order: a.2 b.5 c.1 d.4 e.3 1. False 2. True 3. False 4. False

Short Answer: It means doing something from the beginning, without using anything that already exists. In this context, it is used to refer to forming a completely new government where before there was none.

#### **Property**

Cloze: 1.to 2.like 3.own 4.no/little 5.do 6.be 7.hand 8.most 9.how 10.that 11.which

12.would/could 13.between Vocabulary: 1.presents 2.truly

True/False: 1.False 2.False 3.True 4.False

Short answer: Mill means to say that the difficulties with Communism are insignificant (like dust) with

respect to current-day capitalism and the suffering it creates.

Logical Order: 2—5—3—1—4

#### David Hume

Cloze: 1.which 2.as 3.having 4.while/although 5.than 6.on 7. Those 8.extent 9.cannot 10.sets

11.nor 12.would 13.contrast Vocabulary: 1. range 2. likely

True/False: 1.True 2.False 3.True 4.False

Short Answer: When referring to an unidentified impersonal individual, nowadays it is common to use either

'she' or the more traditional 'he' form.

Logical Order: 2—5—1—3—4

#### Utilitarianism

Cloze: 1.only 2.and 3.such 4.yet/ever/always 5.moreover 6.than 7.on 8.but 9.into 10.which

11.have 12.cannot 13.being

Vocabulary: scholarly=intellectual raises=puts forth

Logical Order: a.2 b.4 c.1 d.5 e.3

True/False:

- 1. T: The book focuses on such  $19^{th}$  c. Utilitarians as Bentham and Mills and their views on colonialism and slavery.
- 2. T: Bentham was worried that newly released slaves might have even greater difficulties.
- 3. F: It was Mill, not Bentham, who justified colonialism.
- 4. F. Not all of the essays eg. Varouxaki's view Mill as a racist, nor do they all focus on racism (eg Miller's legal pursuit).

Short Answer: It is a review. In addition to listing the title/authors/publisher and price, it presents a critique of the book and ends with a general overview of the work.

#### John Stuart Mill

Cloze: 1.is 2.because 3.has 4.as 5.although 6.setting 7.own 8.be 9.which 10.whether 11.who

12.thereby 13.what

Vocabulary: 1.injury 2.backed

True/False: 1.False 2.False 3.True 4.False

Short Answer: He is referring to totalitarian systems in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Logical Order: a.5 b.1 c.4 d.3 e.2

#### Mill and Slavery

Cloze: 1.until 2.which 3. forcing/obliging 4.hand 5.as 6.his 7.be 8.did 9.that 10.by 11.well 12.in 13. While/whereas/Though

Vocabulary: though; bring about

True/False: 1.True 2.False (one was an essay in Fraser's) 3. False (anonymous) 4.True

Logical Order: a.2 b.5 c.1 d.3 e.4

SHORT ANSWER: According to Mill, the Egyptians represent an exception to his generally held belief that

Europeans are historically superior to people from other parts of the world.

#### John Dewey

Cloze: 1.known 2.in 3.such 4.only 5.social 6.which 7.can 8.what 9.at 10.at 11.in 12.either 13.be

Vocabulary: 1. chief 2. maintains

True/False: 1.F. Social context was a key factor in Dewey. 2.T. In para 5, it says Dewey was critical of dogmatic principles and in para. 4 it says that Dewey favoured an experimental approach. 3.T. The text says that knowledge comes from a human's active adaptation to the environment. 4.F. Dewey states that teachers should provide cultural resources for students. 5.F. The text only says that in addition to his articles in periodicals, he wrote a broad body of work.

Logical Order: 1.C 2.E 3.A 4.B 5.D

#### **Dewey on Racism**

Cloze: 1.anything 2.much 3.While 4.what 5.out 6.however 7.as 8.creating 9.another 10.has 11.with 12.which 13.have

Logical order: a.4 b.3 c.1 d.5 e.2

True/False: 1.F 2.F 3.F 4.T

Short answer: This text is an essay, as demonstrated by its argumentative style, the fact that the author cites other critics and uses quotations from the primary source; moreover, the language is formal in register.

#### Karl Popper

Vocabulary: 1.tested 2.aimed 3.look for 4.astonished 5.draw attention to

True/False: 1. True 2.False 3.True 4.False 5.False

### Africans and African Americans, to 1870

Cloze: 1. better 2. away 3. either 4. up 5. fewer 6. as 7. no 8. had 9. out 10. what 11. Because

12. did 13. addition 14. could Vocabulary: 1. arrived 2. raise Logical Order: a. 2 b. 4 c. 1 d. 3

True/False: 1.False 2.False 3.True 4.False

#### The British Presence in India in the 18th Century

Cloze: 1. other 2. would 3. either 4. its 5. being 6. Those 7. were 8. as 9. succeeded 10. done 11.

what 12. which 13. Should Vocabulary: 1. fight 2. fading Logical Order: a.2 b.4 c.1 d.5 e.3 True/False: 1.True 2.False 3.False 4.False

#### **Colonialism and the American West**

Cloze: 1. too 2. only 3. According 4. as 5. by 6. demanded/proposed 7. but 8. For 9. fewer 10.

which 11. what 12. out 13. Rather/Instead

Vocabulary: 1.looked 2.long

Logical order: a. 4 b. 1 c. 5 d. 3 e. 2

True/False: 1. True 2. False 3. False 4. True

#### Colonialism

Cloze: 1. up 2. made 3. Both 4. places 5. whether 6. turn 7. just 8. would 9. among 10. hand 11. order 12. which 13. made

Vocabulary: 1. take for granted 2. may not have

Logical Order: a. 4 b. 1 c. 5 d. 3 e. 2 True/False: 1.False 2.False 3.True 4.False

#### **Apartheid in South Africa**

Cloze: 1. no 2. many 3. which 4. as 5. had 6. what 7. ever 8. How 9. if 10. Both 11. did 12.

make 13. Had

Vocabulary: 1. embracing 2. ultimately Logical Order: a.5 b. 1 c. 3 d. 2 e. 4 True/False: 1.True 2.False 3.True 4.False

#### Post-colonial language and literature

Cloze: 1. at 2. Nevertheless 3. order 4. what 5. which 6. least 7. as 8. however 9. for 10. Both 11. did 12. comes 13. such

Vocabulary: 1. branches 2. try to find

Logical Order: I. C II. A III. E IV. D V. B True/False: 1.True 2.False 3.False 4.False

### **Africana Philosophy**

Cloze: 1.many 2.which 3.well 4.nor 5.being 6.as 7. scholars' 8. little 9. early/late 10. by 11.

however 12. for 13. whether

Vocabulary: 1. sought 2. writings

Logical Order: a. 4 b. 2 c. 5 d. 3 e. 1

True/False: 1.False 2.False 3.True 4.True

#### **Before the Melting Pot: Colonial New York City**

Cloze: 1. out 2. those 3. no 4. has 5. which 6. Though 7. Forcing 8. moving 9. one 10. closer 11. own 12. By 13. upon 14. well

OWII 12. Dy 13. upon 14. wen

Vocabulary: 1. depend 2. in the end resulted in True/False: 1.True 2.False 3.False 4.False

#### **International migration**

Cloze: 1. well 2.does 3.However 4.such 5.no 6.what 7. both 8.than 9.comes 10.for 11.other 12.which 13.at

Vocabulary: strain prospect

Logical Order: a.5 b.2 c.1 d.4 e.3

True/False: 1.False 2.True 3.True 4.False

#### Border control

Cloze: 1. most 2. latter 3. whose 4. whole 5. we 6. order 7. cannot 8. or 9. middle 10. fact 11. as 12. unless

Vocabulary: 1. feel the strain 2. removed Logical Order: a. 5 b. 2 c. 1 d. 4 e. 3 f. 6 True/False: 1.False 2.False 3.True 4.True

#### **Immigration:** The right thing to do

Cloze: 1.longer 2.are 3.why 4.well 5.even 6.tell 7.than 8.order 9.such 10.by 11.able 12.on 13.whose

Vocabulary: 1.proponents 2.search for

Logical Order: II:B IV:D VI:A VIII:E X:C True/False: 1. False 2.False 3.False 4.True

### The Silk Roads

Cloze: 1. What 2.whose 3.have 4.while 5.such 6.made/found 7.no 8.travellers 9.well 10.as 11.would 12.being 13.few

Vocabulary: 1. far 2. possessed Logical Order: a. 3 b.2 c.5 d.4 e.1

True/False: 1. False 2. False 3. True 4. True

#### **Globalization in the History of Ideas**

Cloze: 1. twentieth 2. order 3. suggesting 4. has 5. travel 6. into 7. According 8. most 9. which 10.

Instead 11. in 12. as 13. were 14. contrast

Vocabulary: 1. in no way 2. as one Logical Order: a.3 b.1 c.4 d.2

True/False: 1.False 2.True 3.False 4.False

### **Globalization and Sovereignty**

Cloze: 1. on 2. has 3. those 4. either 5. by 6. whose 7. such 8. however 9. cannot 10. on/about 11.

than 12. back 13. has

Vocabulary: 1. embedded 2. contracts Logical Order: a.3 b.5 c.4 d.2 e.1 True/False: 1.False 2.True 3.False 4.True